
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 

Chap.... 



UNITED STATES 



.... Copyright No.. 
Sheiu!u3i2>0 

OF AMERltA. 



mmm 

"US)- 




NOTICES OF THE PRESS. 



"Based upon a careful study of the best authorities of both hemi- 
spheres and upon independent examination of noteworthy examples 
in the military history of our own country as well as Europe."— The 
Nation. 

"Should be in the hands of every one desiring to know his pro- 
fession." — Army and Navy Journal. 

"Full of suggestions valuable to even an experienced officer, and 
invaluable to one for the first time called to a position of danger and 
immediate exercise of judgment." — Army and Navy Register. 

"A practical and common-sense view of the subject worthy of 
adoption in our service." — Broad Arrow, London. 

"This volume ought to meet with a hearty welcome from all arms 
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r T f- 11 






Show/hg Changes Mao€ at Night 



Bay Positions Night Positions 

a iMain Body ...A. A 

Reserve BB B& / , / 

Supports CDE GDDEE 

Pickets. FGHIK ...FGLM 

Cossack Posts.. O- Q, 

Detached JV N 

Artitlejy P P 

Small Patrols ..p p 



. I.-X.I m icn.K.c.Mo 



THE SERVICE 



OF 



Security and Information 



/ 



ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 

Captain, Sixth Regiment of Infantry, U. S. Army ; Instructor in the 

Art of War at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School ; Gold 

Medalist of the Military Service Institution of the 

United States; author of "Organization 

and Tactics," "The Campaign 

of Koniggratz," etc. 



THIRD EDITION. 



Officially authorized by the War Department as a Standard 

in the Examination of Officers of the Regular 

Army for Promotion. 



« 



■4 *»' 






■ ^ P ■ n 



HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING COMPANY, 

1014-1016 Wyandotte Street, 

KANSAS CITY, MO. 

1896. 



Uzzo 



Copyright 

by 

ARTHUR L,. WAGNER, 

1893 and 1896 



Circular, ) HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, 

C ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, 

No. IT. ) Washington, June 7, 1893. 

With the approval of the Secretary of War, the following is 
published for the information and guidance of the Army: 

"The Service of Security and Information," by Captain Arthur L. 
W^agner, 6th Infantry, is announced as an authorized text-book, in 
connection with the system of examination to determine the fitness 
of officers for promotion, prescribed in General Orders, No. 80, of 
1S91, from this office. 



By command of Major-General Schofield: 

R. WILLIAMS, 

Adjutant-General. 
Official : 



Assistant Adjutant-Genet al. 



PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION 



The gratifying reception accorded to the first and second editions 
of "The Service of Security and Information" encourages the author 
to hope that the revised edition of the book now presented may not 
be unwelcome to the officers of the Regular Army and the National 
Guard. 

Profiting by the kind criticism of his brother officers, and by his 
own experience in using the work for more than two years as a text- 
book at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, the author has made 
a few changes in the text, which, it is believed, will meet with 
approval; but these changes are neither so many nor so great as to 
effect any radical alteration in the work. 

The author desires here to express his thanks to Captain Eben 
Swift, Fifth Cavalry, First Lieutenant A. L. Mills, First Cavalry, and 
First Lieutenant J. T. Dickman, Third Cavalry, assistant instructors 
in Art of War at the U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, for valued 
suggestions in the revision of the book. 

U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

February 1, 1896. 



PREFACE. 



PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 



This book lays claim to no other merit than that of being an 
earnest attempt to meet the demand, often expressed, for an Ameri- 
can text-book on the subjects herein discussed. Many of the features 
of the service of security and information are common to both 
hemispheres and to all armed forces, whether savage hordes or 
highly organized armies. Other details of the same science vary with 
the topography, the organization of the army, national characteris- 
tics, and the nature of the enemy encountered. It follows, therefore, 
that a text-book on this subject might be admirably adapted to the 
requirements of European officers and at the same time be in some 
respects quite unsuited to our needs. 

English, French, and German military writers have written so 
voluminously on all tactical subjects, that the author has found a 
wealth of valuable books at hand for consultation; and he has dis- 
covered, on most of the important points, a gratifying unanimity of 
opinion on the part of writers of different nations. The aim of the 
author has been to select the best established theories of European 
tactical authorities, to illustrate them by a reference to events in our 
own military history, and to apply to them the touchstone of Ameri- 
can practice in war. To this end he has submitted his manuscript 
to several officers of high rank and distinguished ability, who have 
criticised it in the light of their own extensive military study and 
great experience in actual warfare. 

The author is at a loss for an adequate expression of thanks to 
Brigadier-General Thomas H. Ruger and Brigadier-General Wesley 
Merritt, U. S. A., for the valuable criticism, comments, and notes 
with which they have favored him, and by means of which he has 
been enabled to place upon his work the best stamp, as it were, of 
American experience in war. He desires also to express his obliga- 
tions to Lieut-Col. H. S. Hawkins, 23d Infantry, Lieut.-Col. Guy V. 
Henry, 7th Cavalry, Major H. C. Hasbrouck, 4th Artillery, Major C. 
C. C. Carr, 8th Cavalry, and Major J. B. Babcock, A. A. G., for 
valuable information and comments. To Lieut.-Col. Henry, Cap- 
tain E. S. Godfrey, 7th Cavalry, and First Lieutenant Thomas Cruse, 
Gth Cavalry, the author is indebted for most of the information on 
which the chapter on "Indian Scouting" is based. To Colonel E. F. 
Townsend, 12th Infantry, Commandant of the U. S. Infantry and 
Cavalry School, in compliance with whose order this work has been 
written, and whose steady and consistent encouragement has accom- 



8 PREFACE. 

panied it from its inception to its appearance in these pages, the 
author's thanks are especially due and are gratefully tendered. 

A word in regard to the form in which this book makes its appear- 
ance may not be out of place. There is a fashion in books, as in all 
other human products; and the shape in which some of our most 
valuable military manuals have appeared would seem to indicate a 
tendency to sacrifice everything to the fancied benefits of portability; 
military books being printed in small type to reduce them to a proper 
compass to fit the pocket — in which, by the bye, they are never car- 
ried. It is not clear that this fashion has anything to recommend it; 
while anyone who has noticed the impaired eyesight of many of the 
graduates of our officers' schools must find much to condemn in a 
typographical style which seems designed mainly for the benefit of 
the oculis*t. It is hoped, therefore, that the typographical dress of 
this volume will prove a welcome innovation. 

The plates with which this work is illustrated are, with a single 
exception, from drawings made by Lieutenant C. B. Hagadorn, 23d 
Infantry, whose skill and accuracy in such work are well known, and 
to whom the author desires to express his obligations. 

A list of books consulted in the preparation of this work is given 
below. Where the author has felt under special obligations to any 
particular work, acknowledgment has been made in the text or in a 
foot-note. In many cases, however, the words of several authorities 
on the same subject are so similar that it seemed impossible to ren- 
der tribute to any particular one. The author accordingly takes 
pleasure in expressing his obligations generally to all the works 
mentioned in the following list; more especially to De Brack, Riistow, 
Von Minis, Clery, Shaw, Wolseley, and the Guide Manuel du Chef de 
Patrouille. Cumberland, Md., March 1, 1893. 



LIST OF BOOKS CONSULTED IN THE PREPARATION OF 
THIS WORK. 
Apergus sur Quelques Details de la Guerre, Bugeaud. 
Artillery Drill Regulations (U. S.). 
Art of War, Jomini. 

Avant Postes de Cavalerie Legere, De Brack. 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 
Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry, H. B. McClellan. 
Catechism of Military Training, Marryatt. 
Cavalry Field Duty, Von Mirus (tr. by Russell). 
Cavalry Drill Regulations (U. S.). 

Cavalry, Regulations for the Movements and Instruction of (British). 
Cavalry in Modern War, Trench. 
Conduct of a Contact Squadron, De Biensan (tr. by Bowdler-BelD. 



PREFACE. 9 

Duties of the General Staff, Bronsart von Schellendorf. 

Dienstunterricht des Infanteristen, Von Waldersee. 

Elements of Modern Tactics, Shaw. 

Esprit des Institutions Militaires, Marmont. 

Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal, Von Arnim (tr. by East). 

Guide Manuel du Chef de Patrouille. 

History of the Crimean War, Hamley. 

History of the Peninsular War, Napier. 

History of the War with Mexico, Ripley. 

Infantry Drill Regulations (U. S.). 

Infantry Fire Tactics, Mayne. 

Instruction for Cavalry, Von Schmidt. 

Johnston's Narrative. % 

Journal of the Military Service Institution of the U. S., various 

volumes. 
La Petite Guerre, Rustow (tr. by Savin de Larclause). 
Letters on Cavalry, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen. 
Life of Andrew Jackson, Parton. 
Methodes de Guerre Actuelles, Pierron. 
Minor Tactics, Clery. 
Maximes de Guerre, Napoleon. 
Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 
Memoirs of W. T. Sherman. 
Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan. 
Napoleon's Expedition to Russia, Segur. 
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. 
Operations of War, Hamley. 
Precis of Modern Tactics, Home. 

Reglement sur le Service des Armees en Campagne, De Savoye. 
Service d'Exploration et de Surete, Bonie. 
Soldiers' Pocket Book, Wolseley. 
Strategic Service of Cavalry, Bowdler-Bell. 
Strategischer Kavalleriedienst, Von Widdern. 
Strategy and Grand Tactics, Dufour. 
Studies in Troop Leading, Verdy du Vernois. 
Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-71, Boguslawski. 
Tactique de Perizonius. 
Tactique des Renseignements, Lewal. 
The Army in the Civil War ("Scribner Series"). 
The Franco-German War, Borbstaedt (tr. by Dwyer). 
The Franco-German War, Von Moltke (tr. by Bell and Fischer). 
The Nation in Arms, Von der Goltz. 
War, Clausewitz. 
War, Maurice. 



IO CONTENTS. 



CONTENTS. 



PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS Page 14 

CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

The punctilio of private combat not applicable to the operations 
of war.— Condition of an army taken by surprise.— Security and in- 
formation inseparably connected. — Information necessary for a com- 
mander.— How obtained.— Exceptions in former wars.— Kind of infor- 
mation considered in the subject of tactics Page 17 

CHAPTER II. 

THE ADVANCE) GUARD. 

Division of a column of troops on the march.— The duty of the 
advance guard.— Its objects.— Its strength.— The several parts of the 
advance . guard. — The .formation of the advance guard. — Distance 
from the main body.— The commander of the vanguard. — Staff officer 
with vanguard. — The commander of the advance guard. — Halts. — Sig- 
nals.— Compliments.— Cavalry advance guard.— Its formation.— Ad- 
vance guard of all arms.— Formation modified by terrain.— Encounter- 
ing the enemy. — Advance guard of a division. — Advance guard of an 
army corps.— Flank guards.— Advance guard in a retreat. .. .Page 22 

CHAPTER III. 

OUTPOSTS. 

Definition of outposts.— Historical instances of evil results of neg- 
lect of outpost duty.— Duties of outposts.— Subdivisions of the out- 
posts.— Two systems of outposts.— Position.— Strength.— Composi- 
tion.— Distance of outposts from the main body.— The commander Of 
the outpost.— Sentinels and vedettes.— Connecting sentinels.— The 
picket sentinel. — Examining posts. — Detached posts. — Pickets. — Sup- 
ports. — Cossack posts. — The reserve. — The outpost at night. — Outpost 
patrols. — Visiting patrols. — Reconnoitering patrols. — Strong patrols. — 
Posting the outpost. — Defense of the outpost.— Relieving the out- 
post Page 56 

CHAPTER IV. 

^ 

RECONNAISSANCE- 

Importance of reconnaissance.— Kinds of reconnaissance.— Recon- 
naissance in force.— How conducted.— Objections. — Historical in- 
stances.— Special reconnaissance.— Historical instances.— Patrolling. 



CONTENTS. 1 1 

—Exploring patrols.— Small infantry patrols.— Composition.— Prep- 
aration and inspection.— Signals.— Formation of the patrol.— Con- 
duct of the patrol.— Encountering the enemy.— Inhabitants.— Guides. 
—Reconnaissance of different kinds of ground.— Cross-roads- 
Heights.— Denies.— Bridges or fords.— Woods.— Inclosures.— Houses.— 
Villages.— Cities and towns.— Reconnaissance of s the enemy in posi- 
tion.— Reconnaissance of the enemy on the march.— Signs and 
trails.— Reports.— Strong infantry patrols— Expeditionary patrols- 
Prisoners.— Harassing patrols.— Flank patrols.— The advance guard 
passing through a town.— Cavalry patrols.— Historical instances- 
Connecting patrols.— Pursuing patrols.— Cyclist patrols.— Balloon re- 
connaissance Page 107 

CHAPTER V. 

THE CAVALRY SCREEN. 

Screening and reconnoitering duty in the Napoleonic wars.— Re- 
vival of the duty in the War of Secession.— The cavalry screen in re- 
cent European wars. — By whom the duty may be performed. — Dis- 
tance of the screen from the army. — Frontage of the screen. — Forma- 
tion of the screen.— Typical formation of a cavalry screen consisting 
of a brigade.— Horse artillery with the brigade.— Patrols— Bonie's 
points.— Duties of the scouts.— The Uhlans in 1870.— Officers' patrols. 
—German patrols after Spicheren.— Battle of Tom's Brook.— Separa- 
tion of the duties of security and information.— Transmission of in- 
telligence.^Contact and fighting.— Buford at Gettysburg— Protect- 
ing the infantry. — Siezing important points. — Battle of Hoover's Gap. 
—Foraging. — Connecting posts. — A regiment as a screening force. 
— Conclusions Page 165 

CHAPTER VI. 

REAR GUARDS. 

Effect if a defeated army be vigorously pursued.— Vigorous pur- 
suits not often made.— Duty of the rear guard.— Ney's method.— 
Strength of the rear guard.— Morale.— Offensive returns— De Fezensac 
at Smolensk. — Lee at Boonsboro. — Commander of the rear guard. — 
Distance from the main body. — Formation and composition of the rear 
guard.— Typical formations.— Withdrawal from action.— Communica- 
tion between the several parts of the rear guard and with the main 
body. — Protection of the flanks. — Riistow's intermediate body. — Con- 
tact with the enemy to be preserved.— Defiles.— Negative measures.— 
Johnston's retreat in 1863.— Sick and wounded.— Halts.— Retreating 
by parallel roads.— When line of retreat is changed.— Rear guard in a 
retrograde movement which is not a retreat.— Rear guard in a friendly 
'country.— In a hostile country— The rear guard in a forward march. 

Page 197 



12 CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VII. 



SPIES. 

Military and civilian spies.— When the services of spies are most 
valuable.— Persons who should be selected as spies.— Qualities requi- 
site in a spy. — Compulsory espionage. — Double spies. — Concealment of 
messages. — Spies as a check upon each other. — How spies should leave 
and return.— What a spy should report— Means of identification.— 
Use of the telegraph.— Precautions against enemy's spies.— The detec- 
tion of spies. — Their search. — The management of the secret service. 

Page 223 

NEWSPAPERS. 

Their importance in war. — Newspaper correspondents "the plague 
of modern armies."— Control of correspondents.— The press censor.— 
Not merely the great newspapers that betray information.— Means of 
utilizing reporters. — Punishment for indiscreet or mischievous publi- 
cation Page 233 

CHAPTER VIII. 

ORIENTATION AND MAP-READING. 

Definition of orientation. — Orientation by compass. — By observing 
the sun. — Use of a watch as a compass. — Orientation by observing the 
moon.— By observing the North Star.— By maps.— By indications- 
Practice in map-reading.— Measuring distances on the map . . Page 236 

CHAPTER IX. 

INDIAN SCOUTING. 

Apaches as small infantry patrols.— Scouting methods in Arizona. 
—Skill in selection of positions and in defensive dispositions.— The 
Sioux scout.— Crook's march from Fort Fetterman — Scouting methods 
of the Sioux.— Long-distance reconnoitering — The Sioux camps.— The 
tactics of the Sioux.— Knowledge of geography and topography- 
Observations Page 242 



APPENDIX I. 

Advance guard drill (Infantry).— Advance guard drill (Cavalry). 

Page 249 

APPENDIX II. 
Questions for General Review Page 257 

INDEX Page 283 



ILLUSTRATIVE PLATES. 1 3 



ILLUSTRATIVE PLATES. 



Outpost Line, Showing Changes Made at Night. .Frontispiece. 

Facing Page. 

I. Company of Infantry as Advance Guard 27 

II. Permissible Formation of a Company of Infantry as Ad- 
vance Guard on an Open Plain 31 

III. Battalion as Advance Guard 32 

IV. Troop of Cavalry as Advance Guard 38 

V. Order of March of a Division Acting Independently 48 

VI. Regiment of Infantry as Outpost for a Division 61 

VII. Squadron of Cavalry as Outpost for a Cavalry Brigade. ... 64 
VIII. Comparison of Cossack Posts with the Picket System .... 86 

IX. Patrol System of Outposts 94 

X. Patrols 120 

XI. Advance Guard Entering Franklin, Tenn 150 

XII. Cavalry Screen Consisting of One Brigade 172 

XIII. Cavalry Screen Consisting of a Brigade on Two Roads . . . 176 

XIV. Company of Infantry as Rear Guard 206 

XV. Troop of Cavalry as Rear Guard 208 



14 PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS. 

PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS. 



Abatis— Rows of felled trees, with the smaller branches lopped off, 
and the others sharpened and turned towards the enemy. 

Base — "A base of operations is the portion of country from which the 
army obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it 
starts when it takes the offensive, to which it retreats when 
necessary, and by which it is supported when it takes position 
to cover the country defensively. The base of operations is 
most generally that of supply— though not necessarily so, at 
least as far as food is concerned." — Jomini. 

Billet— Quarters provided for troops in private houses, barns, etc. 
Soldiers billeted generally obtain from the inhabitants food 
and drink for themselves and forage for their horses; payment 
for these supplies being usually made at the rates and in the 
manner prescribed in regulations and orders. 

Bivouac— A temporary place of repose for troops, in which they are 
sheltered by shelter-tents, bowers, or improvised shelter of any 
kind, or sleep in the open air. A camp differs from a bivouac, 
in that the men are sheltered with regular tents. Troops are 
cantoned when sheltered in huts or billeted in villages. 

Communications— -The routes (roads, railroads, etc.) by which an army 
communicates with its base, or by which the several parts of 
an army communicate with each other. 

Compliments — Ceremonious marks of respect paid by officers and 
soldiers to their military superiors; such as saluting, standing 
at attention, etc. 

Containing Force— A body of troops charged with the duty of hold- 
ing in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the 
enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against 
another portion of the hostile force. 

Depth— The space occupied by a body of troops from front to rear. 

Distance— The space between bodies of troops, or individual soldiers, 
from front to rear. 

Escort Wagon— A four-horse wagon, lighter than the "army wagon." 

Front— The extent of ground occupied by the front rank of a body of 
troops in any formation. 

Glacis — A mound of earth, with a gentle slope to the front, thrown up 
a few yards in front of the ditch of a fortification. 

Impedimenta — Baggage, and, in general, anything accompanying 
troops, which tends to impede the celerity of their movement. 

Interval— The lateral space between bodies of troops or individual 
soldiers. 



PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS. * 1 5 

Morale— The condition of troops as to discipline, bravery, confidence, 
or discouragement, etc. 

Provost-Guard— A guard under the orders of a provost-marshal. 

Provost-Marshal— An officer attached to the headquarters of the com- 
manding general to superintend the police of the army; to 
provide for the protection of the inhabitants, of the country 
from pillage and violence; to preserve order among camp- 
followers; to take charge of stragglers, prisoners, and desert- 
ers; and to superintend the secret service. 

Shrapnel— Called the "man-killing projectile." A shell filled with bul- 
lets, and having a bursting charge only sufficient to break the 
case and release the bullets, which then move forward with 
the velocity which the projectile had at the moment of 
bursting. 

Strategy— The art of moving an army in the theater of operations with 
a view to placing it in such a position relative to the enemy as 
to increase the probability of victory, increase the consequences 
of victory, or lessen the consequences of defeat 

Tactics— The art of handling troops on the field of battle. 

Terrain — The topography of a field, considered especially in its rela- 
tion to tactical operations. 

Theater of War— "The theater of war comprises all the territory upon 
which the parties may assail each other, whether it belong 
to themselves, their allies, or to weaker states who may be 
drawn into the war through fear or interest. When the war is 
also maritime, the theater may embrace both hemispheres. 
* * * The theater of war may thus be undefined, and must 
not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the 
other axmy."— J omini. 

Theater of Operations — "The theater of operations of an army embraces 
all the territory it may desire to invade, and all that it may be 
necessary to defend."— Ibid. 

Yedette — A mounted sentinel. 



CHAPTER I. 



INTRODUCTION. 



It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be taken by sur- 
prise.— Frederick the Great. 

If opposing armies could march unmolested to a desig- 
nated battle-field, as the knights of old repaired to their 
tournaments, the military problem would consist simply in 
drawing up the forces in order of battle, and nine-tenths of 
the difficulties of the art of war would be eliminated. But 
just as the code of ethics which governs the actions of indi- 
viduals is varied greatly when applied to the diplomacy of 
nations, so the chivalry and punctilio of private combat are 
necessarily lacking in the operations of war. It is the duty 
of a commander to assail the enemy under circumstances 
most unfavorable to the latter and most advantageous to 
himself; to catch the hostile army astride of an unfordable 
stream, or divided by an impassable obstacle of any sort; to 
assail the communications of his opponent while covering his 
own ; to surprise him, and, in brief, to take advantage of the 
unfortunate position or unskillful dispositions of the foe, and 
to guard against being similarly assailed himself. 

An army taken by surprise niay be compared to a sleep- 
ing man attacked by a well-prepared enemy. Astonishment, 
confusion, and alarm are opposed to coolness, preparation, 
and confidence; and severe blows are received before any can 
be given in return. The surprised army must possess many 
elements of superiority over its assailant to be able to over- 



1 8 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

come the enormous disadvantage at which it is taken; and a 
surprise generally means a defeat. 

If the entire army were constantly on the alert, its sur- 
prise would be impossible: so, too, if the plans and move- 
ments of the enemy were accurately known by the com- 
mander, surprise could easily be avoided. But to keep the 
entire force continually on the watch would be to ruin it by 
physical hardship; and a knowledge of the enemy's move- 
ments and objects is generally incomplete and usually infer- 
ential. To guard against surprise without making undue 
demands upon the endurance of the soldiers, use is made of 
covering detachments, which should be strong enough to hold 
the enemy while the main body is preparing for action. On 
the march the security of the army is thus provided for by 
advance guards, rear guards, and flanking detachments: at 
a halt a chain of outposts protects it from surprise. 

Information in regard to the enemy is the indispensable 
basis of all military plans, and nothing but faulty disposi- 
tions for the security of an army can be expected if such 
information is lacking. Moreover, the covering detach- 
ments, being nearer the enemy than the main body is, are 
charged either with gaining this information, or with the 
support of patrols or detachments engaged in scouting and 
observation. In military science the two elements of secur- 
ity and information are, therefore, inseparable. 

The information necessary for a commander is of two 
kinds: 

1. That relating to the geography, topography, and re- 
sources of the theater of operations. 

2. That which relates to the strength and composition 
of the enemy's forces, and their position, movements, and 
morale. 

Among military nations, the first kind of information 



INTRODUCTION. 19 

is now generally obtained in time of peace, and compiled 
by a bureau of military intelligence at the headquarters of 
the army. This has not, however, always been the case. 
When the Crimea was selected by the Allies, in 1854, as a 
theater of operations, it was practically a terra incognita. 
Haniley says : 

"It was as completely an unknown country to the chiefs 
of the allied armies as it had been to Jason and his argonauts 
when they journeyed thither in search of the Golden Fleece. 
It was known to contain a great harbor, and a city with docks, 
fortifications, and arsenal; but the strength and resources 
of the enemy who would oppose us, the nature of the fortifi- 
cations, and even the topography, except what the map could 
imperfectly show, lay much in the region of speculation."* 

Our own military history offers, if possible, still more 
striking instances. Such was the lack of information con- 
cerning Mexico, that our war with that country lasted a year 
before definite plans of campaign were adopted. Taylor's 
movement upon Monterey was avowedly for the purpose of 
obtaining information respecting the capacity of the country 
to sustain a force of 6,000 men or more; and Wool's expedi- 
tion against Chihuahua, undertaken upon insufficient infor- 
mation, terminated fruitlessly at Monclova, more than three 
hundred miles from its objective. 

In the War of Secession much of the theater of war had 
never been accurately mapped, and in many instances the 
topography of the immediate theater could be learned only 
by reconnaissances conducted during the military operations. 
In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
W T ar, General McClellan said: "Our maps proved entirely 
inaccurate, and did us more harm than good, for we were con- 
stantly misled by them/' In his report he states: "The 
*"The War in the Crimea," page 24. 



20 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

country, though known in its general features, we found 
to be inaccurately described in essential particulars in the 
only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which 
access could be had. Erroneous courses of streams and 
roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be 
placed on the information thus derived. Reconnaissances, 
frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of 
information/' Delays and embarrassments were caused by 
incorrect maps and faulty topographical information in 
Grant's Virginia campaign also.* 

Such instances will be more rare in future, and a nation 
contemplating the invasion of another country will generally 
possess beforehand an accurate knowledge of its geography, 
topography, and resources. Bat in the invasion of any Cen- 
tral American or South American country, we should, prob- 
ably, labor under the same disadvantages, in this respect, 
that were encountered during the War of Secession; and 
topographical reconnaissance becomes thus a matter of much 
importance to American officers. This subject belongs, how- 
ever, to military topography rather than to tactics, and is 
exhaustively treated in several well-known works. f 

The second class of information is gained in two ways: 

1. From spies, deserters, prisoners, newspapers, etc. 

2. By reconnaissance. 

The first method does not pertain to the subject of tac- 
tics. All the information gained in this manner is collated 
at the headquarters of the army, to which all information in 
regard to the enemy should be sent without delay 4 

*See Humphreys' "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," pages 
128 and 211; also "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," Vol. II., page 243. 

tThe student is referred to Root's "Military Topography," and to 
Chapter VII., Vol. I., and Chapter VIII., Vol. II., of Bronsart von 
Schellendorf's "The Duties of the General Staff" (Hare's translation). 

^Further on this subject, see Chapter VII. 



INTRODUCTION. 21 

In the subject of tactics we have, then, to deal solely 
with military reconnaissance, in contradistinction to topo- 
graphical reconnaissance. A reconnaissance may be effect- 
ed by forces varying in size from a single scout to an entire 
division ; and the reconnoitering force may consist of infant- 
ry or cavalry, of both, of all three arms, or of cavalry and 
horse artillery. 

To gain reliable information of the enemy, contact with 
him should be quickly gained and never lost. On the march 
bodies of cavalry, pushed out in advance, come in touch with 
the advanced parties of the enemy, which they endeavor to 
drive in or brush aside, at the same time covering their own 
ariny with a veil which the enemy must be prevented from 
penetrating. If the army is at a halt, and the enemy is ad- 
vancing, similar reconnoitering bodies are pushed out to 
meet him while he is still at a distance. 

Reconnaissance is thus primarily performed by a screen 
of cavalry extended well to the front of the main body. It is 
also conducted by bodies of troops sent out from the main 
body or its advanced detachments or posts. The question of 
reconnaissance is inseparable from each of the subjects con- 
sidered in the following chapters. 



22 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 



CHAPTER II. 



THE ADVANCE GUARD. 



Marches in the vicinity of the enemy can not be made with too 
much precaution and prudence. — Marmont. 

Troops moving in one body would, if they came suddenly 
upon the enemy, certainly be thrown into confusion, and per- 
haps defeated, before deployment for action could be effected. 
Moreover, insignificant bodies of the enemy could seriously 
delay the march of the column by causing it to halt and 
deploy for action. 

A column of troops on the march is, therefore, divided 
into a main body, an advance guard, a rear guard, and such 
-flanking parties as may be necessary. 

The objects of the advance guard are, in general terms, 
to observe and to resist ; specifically, they are : 

1. To provide for the security of the main body by giv- 
ing it time for deployment when the enemy is encountered. 

2. To clear the way for the main body and prevent its 
march from being delayed. 

3. To seize and hold important points until the arrival 
of the main body. 

4. To support the reconnoitering cavalry, and afford 
a rallying point for it in case it is driven in by the enemy. 
Even when a cavalry screen is operating in front of the ad- 
vance guard, the latter should not relax its vigilance. The 
cavalry may be driven in, and the advance guard must then 
check the enemy. On advance the security of the column 
must, therefore, depend essentially upon the advance guard. 

Strength. — The, proportionate strength of the advance 



STRENGTH OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 23 

guard varies with the size of the main body, the object of 
the march, the topography of the country, and the nature of 
the eneiny. In a close, rugged country, and against an 
enemy inferior in numbers and morale, it should be less than 
in an open country, against a strong, aggressive enemy, or 
when the intention is to bring on a decisive engagement. 
With a large force the proportionate strength of the advance 
guard is larger than in the case of a small column. No abso- 
lute rule for the strength of the advance guard can be given. 
If too weak, it can not fulfill its proper functions; if too 
strong, there will be a hurtful waste of energy, for service 
with the advance guard is much more fatiguing and exhaust- 
ing than marching with the main column. Moreover, a 
strong advance guard has a tendency to engage an enemy 
seriously, even when its duty requires that it should merely 
fight a delaying action to gain time for the main body. 

As a general rule (subject, however, to a multitude of 
exceptions), we may assume the strength of the advance 
guard to be one-sixth of the whole force, and the rear guard 
to be half as strong as the advance guard. On a retrograde 
movement the relative strength of the advance and rear 
guards would be reversed. The flanking parties are taken 
from the advance and rear guards, except in the case of very 
large f orces,when they would be separate bodies of a strength 
according to circumstances. Thus we have about a fourth of 
the whole force on duty with the covering detachments on 
the march. 

With a small force the advance guard might be reduced 
to one-eighth, or even one-tenth, of the whole. The time re- 
quired for the deployment of a large column (such, for in- 
stance, as an army corps) being much greater than in the 
case of a small force, the delaying action of the advance 
guard must be much longer, and its strength much greater. 



24 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

In the Franco-German war the German columns sometimes 
pushed forward half of their force as advance guard, and 
never less than one-fourth. But this proportion can not be 
recommended; for no advantage worth considering seems 
to have been gained by these great advance guards, while 
they frequently brought on battles, as at Spicheren, Worth, 
and Colombey, contrary to the wishes and plans of the com- 
manding general. In view of this tendency of large advance 
guards to commit themselves to serious engagement, Von 
der Goltz says: "The advance guard must be only small. 
It was formerly the rule to employ a third or fourth part of 
all the troops on this duty. The justification of this propor- 
tion appears very doubtful. The commander-in-chief parts 
with a considerable portion of his own troops, and creates an 
independent will beside his own." A large advance guard, 
by engaging seriously, is likely to defeat the object for which 
it is created; for instead of gaining time for the main body 
to deploy, it hurries it into action. Von der Goltz adds: 
u The experience of the late wars has taught us that the main 
body never, as a rule, deployed, because the urgently needed 
assistance required by the advance guard when struggling 
with a superior enemy demanded that the troops should be 
led by driblets straight into the battle." It seems, therefore, 
that, even in the case of large forces, the advance guard 
should not have so great a proportionate strength as the Ger- 
mans gave it, and that it should be so composed as to admit 
of its withdrawal from action, if desirable, without precipi- 
tating a battle. 

Formation. — An advance guard consists of a series of 
detachments increasing progressively in size from front to 
rear, each being charged with the duty of protecting from 
surprise the body immediately following it and gaining time 
for the latter to prepare for action. 



PLATTEI. 



COMPANY OF INFANTRY AS ADVANCE GUARD. 

4 4 

* . * POINT 

* * g * * 

FLANKERS 4-— ISO YDS-->--!50 YDS — * FLANKERS 



I SECTION 



ADVANCE PARTY 



4 4 

FLANKERS 4-. 

4 



*J* 



4 4 

?-4 FLANKERS 

4 



I SECTION "^''SUPPORT 



Q 
a: 
< 
> 
4 4 



PLATOON 



RESERVE 



*! * 



414 



MAIN BODY 



FORMATION OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 27 

The advance guard is divided into two parts: the reserve 
and the vanguard. The reserve consists of from one-third to 
one-half of the entire advance guard. The remainder con- 
stitutes the vanguard, which is divided into the advance party 
and the support, the latter being generally twice as strong as 
the former. In large advance guards this proportion is often 
different; the support, relatively to the advance party, and 
the reserve, relatively to the vanguard, being considerably 
greater. These proportions are, moreover, varied according 
to the most convenient subdivisions of the organizations 
composing the advance guard. They may be regarded as 
suitable in most cases. 

The following is given as a typical (but by no means in- 
variable) formation of a company forming the advance guard 
of a battalion. (See Plate I.) 

The advance party (one section) throws forward a 
"point" consisting of three or four men under a non-commis- 
sioned officer. On each side a flanking group of four men 
marches about 150 yards from the main route to the right 
and left rear respectively of the point. Each flanking group 
should be under a corporal or old soldier, and would habitu- 
ally march with two men in front and one in rear of the group 
leader, though the formation adopted would depend upon 
circumstances.* The rest of the advance party follows 100 
yards in rear of the point. 

The support (one section) follows the advance party at 
a. distance of 200 yards, throwing out two flanking groups of 
four men each to its right and left front, and somewhat far- 
ther out than the flankers of the advance party. These groups 
can -safely move farther out than those of the advance party, 
thus extending the field of view; while each can, if neces- 
sary, protect by its fire the outer flank of the group in front. 
*See chapter on Reconnaissance. 



28 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

All Hanking groups should be relieved every hour, if practi- 
cable, as their duty is much more fatiguing than that of the 
meq marching on the main route. A connecting file, de- 
tached from the advance party, marches between the ad- 
vance party and the support to aid in the transmission of in- 
telligence from one to the other. On many roads bicycles can 
be advantageously used by the connecting files. 

The reserve marches about 500 yards in rear of the sup- 
port, a connecting file marching between them. The reserve 
may throw flanking groups to the front or to the front and 
rear, the groups being slightly farther out than those of the 
support. The flankers from the reserve can generally be 
dispensed with, and should be thrown out only when reason- 
able prudence requires them; for, as a rule, the reserve 
should be kept entire and well in hand. 

The main body follows the reserve at 500 yards, one or 
two connecting files marching between the two bodies. 

The distances given above are all variable; but those from 
the support to the reserve, and from the reserve to the main 
body, can not prudently be made more than 600 or 800 yards, 
respectively, in the case of so small a force as the one consid- 
ered. In the case of a single company acting as an advance 
guard, the rule for the proportionate strength of the advance 
party and the support is necessarily modified to accord with 
the most convenient subdivisions of the company. 

If the nature of the country is such as to render the use 
of flanking groups impracticable, both the advance party and 
the support move forward entire, with the exception that the 
advance party is always preceded by a point. 

When marching in an open country, the entire advance 
party may be deployed as skirmishers, with considerable in- 
tervals, the support following in line of squads. Both lines 
may be straight or echeloned back slightly from the center 



PLATE H. 



Permissible formation of a Company of Infantry 
JJduance Guard on Open Ground 



\ Advance party deployed 

I 



Support in line of Squads 
(1 Section) 



1 Platoon. 



Reserve in column 
of fours. 



Main Body 



DISTANCE FROM MAIN BODY. 3 1 

toward the flanks. The reserve should ordinarily be kept 
in column. (See Plate II.) 

When the advance guard consists of a battalion, the first 
and second companies constitute the vanguard, and the third 
and fourth the reserve. In this case, the first platoon of the 
first company constitutes the advance party, the support 
consisting of a company and a half. The distances may be 
as follows: From point to advance party, 150 yards; from 
advance party to support, 200 yards; from support to reserve, 
600 yards ; from reserve to main body, 800 yards. (See Plate 
HI.) In the case of two battalions acting as the advance 
guard of a brigade, the vanguard and reserve would each 
consist of a battalion, the advance party consisting of a com- 
pany, and the support of three companies. The distances 
would be about the same as in the case of a single battalion. 

Distance from Main Body. — The distance from the ad- 
vance guard to the main body depends so entirely upon cir- 
cumstances that it can not be made subject to any rigid rule. 
If the distance were too great, the advance guard might be 
forced into a heavy engagement while beyond the assistance 
of the main body, and might even be entirely cut off by an 
attack upon its flank and rear. If, on the other hand, the 
distance were not great enough, time could not be afforded 
for the preparation of the main body for action. 

The advance guard should be far enough ahead to enable 
the commander of the column to make his^ plan of action with- 
out extreme haste while the advance guard is still success- 
fully resisting the enemy; but it should not be so far in ad- 
vance that the commander of the main body should be 
obliged to abandon every other consideration to the one ob- 
ject of hurrying to the succor of the advance guard. 

A rough rule, which will answer in many cases, is that 
the minimum distance should be equal to the depth of the 



32 



SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 



main body; as the time required for the rear troops to deploy 
on the head of the column would not be greater than that 
taken by the advance guard in falling back. 

It is evident that this rule will not answer when a large 
force is acting with energy and aggressiveness for the pur- 
pose of bringing on a battle, as the advance guard must then 
be promptly supported. At Mars-la-Tour, when the German 
army was moving forward with the object of stopping Ba- 
zaine's retreat and bringing him to battle, the advance guard 
of SttilpnageFs division, being separated by a considerable 
distance from the main body, was so roughly handled by the 
enemy that the leading battalion of the main body had to be 
hurried into action without deployment, and the escape of 
the division from disastrous defeat was due only to the fail- 
ure on the part of the French to take advantage of the oppor- 
tunity presented. 

The distance will also depend upon the nature of the 
country and the state of the weather. If the country is full 
of defensive positions, such as to admit of a sturdy delaying 
action on the part of the advance guard, the distance may be 
decreased. In foggy weather, or at night, or during a storm 
of rain or snow, the distance should be decreased, as well as 
the front covered by the scouting groups or flanking parties. 
If, on the other hand, the country is open, the weather clear, 
and there is danger of the advance guard being driven back, 
the distance must be increased. 

It will be observed that, in the typical formations given 
above, the main body is from 1,300 to 1,750 yards from the 
point, while the reserve is from 800 to 950 yards from the 
point. Even if the enemy were so well concealed, and the 
advance guard so careless, that the point should be in actual 
contact with the enemy before opening fire, the reserve 
would be at least 800 yards from the hostile force. In almost 



PLATE EL 



BATTALION AS ADVANCE GUARD. 
44 S 4 * 

4-.- ISO YDS-x-- 150 YD3-;4 
A O - ' i 



PLATOON "P ADVANCE PARTY. 



4 
4-4 

4 



4 4 

A 
4 



3 PLATOONS ■■ SUPPORT 



4 4 

4-, 



4 

>- 4 

' 4 



2 COMPANIES 



RESERVE 



MAIN BODY 



COMMANDER OF THE VANGUAKD. 35 

every conceivable case, the lirst shots fired by the point or 
flankers of the advance party would be at such a range that 
(with the distances given above) the reserve could prepare 
for action before coming under destructive fire. The reserve 
is the first body that really demands time for deployment. 
It is essentially the fighting part of the advance guard; the 
vanguard is the reconnoitering part. 

The Commander of the Vanguard. — The vanguard should 
always be commanded by an officer, who should be mounted, 
if possible, and furnished with a detailed map of the region 
through which the force is marching. He habitually marches 
with the support, but goes to any part of the vanguard where 
his presence may be necessary. He may take immediate com- 
mand of the advance party, if it seems advisable to do so, 
leaving the support under the immediate command of the 
officer or non-commissioned officer next in rank. If guides 
are present, they should accompany the support and be under 
the orders of the commander of the vanguard. 

* It is the duty of the commander of the vanguard: 

1. To see that the proper road is taken by the point. 

2. When cross-roads are passed, to see that a man is 
left to guide the main column. 

3. To send out special patrols to examine all ground 
that might afford shelter to the enemy, such as woods, farm- 
houses, hamlets, etc. 

4. To send out special patrols to watch and oppose any 
hostile patrols that may be seen, or whose presence may be 
suspected. 

5. To cause necessary repairs to be made in roads, 
bridges, approaches to fords, etc. 

6. To transmit promptly to the commanding officer of 
the advance guard all information that he may gain about 
the enemy, first testing its accuracy as far as possible with- 



36 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

out delaying the transmission of important news to the 
commander. 

7. To see that the march of the column is not, under any 
circumstances, unnecessarily delayed. 

The support replaces any men of the advance party who 
may be relieved or placed hors de combat. When a scout of 
the advance party brings in important inf ormation,he should, 
if practicable, be sent to the commander of the advance 
guard. His place with the advance party is at once supplied 
from the support. He is retained with the reserve, from 
which another man is sent forward to the support. The num- 
ber of men with the point and flankers should, if possible, 
remain unchanged. When there are particular reasons for 
sending the man back to his former post, the man who re- 
placed him should be returned. 

Staff Officer. — In a command of considerable size a staff 
officer usually accompanies the vanguard, and is charged 
with the duty of selecting a camp or bivouac for the main 
body. When he has selected the place, he remains there 
with such a detail as may be necessary, until the arrival of 
the main body, the advance guard marching on and forming 
the outpost, at least temporarily. 

The Commander of the Advance Guard. — The commander 
of the advance guard is generally with the reserve; but, on 
approaching the enemy, should go wherever his presence is 
most needed. He should always be mounted, if practicable, 
even in the case of a small advance guard. With the excep- 
tion, perhaps, of the commander of the rear guard in retreat, 
no officer needs a more perfect combination of courage, self- 
reliance, and good judgment. 

A timid officer in command of an advance guard would 
suffer the column to be delayed by small parties of the ene- 
my; a rash one would plunge, into combat, and might thus 



THE COMMANDER OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 37 

impose upon his superior a course of action at total variance 
with his plans. Small parties of the enemy should always 
be quickly driven back. On the other hand, an engagement 
should generally be avoided, unless the commander of the 
advance guard has orders to touch upon the enemy and bring 
him to a stand at all hazards. 

The commander of the advance guard should continually 
consider the measures necessary for the security of the 
march, and for rapidly gaining reliable information of the 
enemy. He should carefully observe the ground, and con- 
sider the tactical use that might be made of it, and should 
have a clear idea as to what he intends to do in case the 
enemy is encountered. His orders will be either to march in 
a certain direction and arrive promptly at a certain point, to 
pursue the enemy vigorously, or to follow him with prudence, 
and profit by his faults and by all advantages that offer them- 
selves. In the first two cases he should execute his orders 
promptly and exactly. In the last case he should move cau- 
tiously, venturing upon any particular route only after hav- 
ing well weighed the probable results of his decision. 

Halts. — Whenever the advance guard halts, all ap- 
proaches should be reconnoitered and guarded, and an officer 
should be sent to get an extended view from the highest avail- 
able point. During a short halt each part of the advance 
guard remains in the place where it is halted. The reserve 
may usually be allowed to fall out; but the support and the 
advance party rest or stand at ease, according to the prox- 
imity of the enemy and the consequent necessity of alertness. 
If a prolonged halt is contemplated, the advance guard en- 
deavors first to occupy ground that will furnish a good de- 
fensive position, behind which the main body is assembled 
in the best formation for prompt deployment. 

Signals. — Information from one part of the advance 



38 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

guard to another should be conveyed by some code of signals, 
and shouting and unnecessary firing should be carefully 
avoided. The point and flankers fire only when they are cer- 
tain that they have been seen by the enemy and that he is 
not retiring. 

Compliments. — Advance guards, as a body, pay no com- 
pliments whatever; but individual soldiers on this duty, as 
on all other, salute when addressing, or addressed by, a 
superior officer. 



CAVALRY ADVANCE GUARDS. 

The formation of a cavalry advance guard is similar 
to that of one composed of infantry. An advance guard 
composed of a single troop will be first considered. (See 
Plate IV.) 

If the troop consists of but two platoons, the first con- 
stitutes the vanguard and the second the reserve. If there 
are three platoons, the first and second compose the van- 
guard, and the third the reserve. When there are four pla- 
toons, the first and second form the vanguard, and the third 
and fourth the reserve. The point consists of four troopers. 
The flanking groups, each consisting of four troopers, march 
about 100 yards in rear Of the point, and from 300 to 500 
yards from the line of march. The advance party consists of 
the point and flankers, and is under the command of a ser- 
geant, who is generally with the point. In some cases the 
commander of the advance party may reduce the point to 
two troopers, holding the other two in rear of the point and 
abreast of the flankers, or he may march in this position him- 
self without reducing the point. He should be where he can 
best command and control the reconnaissance of the advance 
party. The flanking groups are each commanded by a cor- 



PLATE JK 



TROOP OF CAVALRY AS ADVANCE GUARD 



* • 



• ---300 YD5. ---4%4--- 300 YDS *. 

* ADVANCE PARTY 4 



J*. 



SUPPORT 



'A MILE -* % 



RESERVE 



A 



MAIN BODY 



'/a MILE 



4 
4 

i 4 

t 



CAVALRY ADVANCE GUARDS. 4 1 

poral or an old soldier. Generally two troopers ride in front 
and one in rear of the group commander. The groups may, 
however, be kept together in any suitable formation, or dis- 
tributed along the front so as to make an arc of scouts from 
one extreme flanker, through the point, to the other extreme 
flanker. 

The support follows the point at a distance of 500 yards, 
a flanking group of from four to eight men being sent out 
on each flank about half a mile from the column and slightly 
in advance of the reserve. In an enclosed country these 
groups would march on the nearest roads parallel to the one 
taken by the main colulnn, and should keep up communica- 
tion with the advance guard. 

The reserve follows the support at a distance of 700 
yards. As a rule, it is kept entire; but, if necessary, flanking 
parties may be thrown out in such a manner and to such dis- 
tances as circumstances may require. The main body fol- 
lows the reserve at a distance of 700 to 1,000 yards. 

Communication between the parts of a cavalry advance 
guard being much easier than in the case of a corresponding 
body of infantry, connecting files are not so necessary, and 
may often be dispensed with. No part of the advance guard 
should, however, lose sight of the body immediately preced- 
ing it; and whenever it becomes necessary, one or more 
troopers should be detached and sent ahead, so as to keep 
in view both the body in advance and the one from which de- 
tached. On a winding road and in a rough country connect- 
ing files are indispensable, but they should be called in as 
soon as the nature of the terrain renders their services un- 
necessary. 

If two troops compose the advance guard, the first troop 
constitutes the vanguard and the second the reserve. In this 
case the advance party consists of a half -platoon, if there are 



42 SECURITY AND INFORM VTION. 

but two platoons in the troop; or a platoon, if the troop con- 
tains three or four. The members of the advance party not 
employed as point and flankers form a center group, which 
marches in rear of the point and abreast of the flankers. Any 
increase in the strength of the advance party generally in- 
creases the center group, the point and flanking groups 
rarely exceeding four men each. 

In the case of a very large advance guard the advance 
party should consist of an entire troop, in which case it, in- 
stead of the support, would furnish the flanking patrols. 

It will be observed that the distances and intervals are 
considerably greater in a cavalry advance guard than in one 
composed of infantry. Cavalry possessing much greater 
mobility than infantry, the different covering troops can 
safely be separated from each other by greater distances in 
the former than in the latter arm. Moreover, the resisting 
power of cavalry is less than that of infantry, and when a cav- 
alry advance guard is driven in by the enemy, the ground is 
passed over more rapidly in retreat than in the case of a 
corresponding infantry force. Hence, in order to give each 
successive body in rear time to prepare for action, the dis- 
tances must necessarily be greater for cavalry. It would 
seem, however, that in our service these distances might 
safely be reduced; for American cavalry, which can make 
effective use of dismounted tire-action, has greater resisting 
power than European cavalry, and it is not limited, as the 
latter seems generally to be, to a charge to the front or a 
flight to the rear. 



ADVANCE GUARDS OF ALL ARMS. 43 

ADVANCE GUARDS OF ALL ARMS. 

To perform its functions thoroughly, an advance guard 
should be composed of all arms. Reconnoitering duty can be 
performed more efficiently and more easily by cavalry than 
by infantry — more efficiently, because a cavalry group can 
safely push much farther away from the column than an 
infantry group can, and the field of observation is thus ex- 
tended; more easily, because a trooper can, with compara- 
tive ease, reconnoiter to a degree that would exhaust a foot 
soldier. 

All European authorities recommend the use of cavalry 
as reconnoiterers, but prescribe that the support should con- 
sist in part of infantry to supply the necessary resisting pow- 
er. In our service this is not in general necessary, as our 
cavalry has enough resisting power to carry out the delaying 
action of the support; and nothing but the lack of sufficient 
cavalry should necessitate the adoption of a composite sup- 
port. Indeed it is, in most cases, a great mistake so to com- 
bine cavalry with infantry as to tie the former down to the 
pace of the latter. The cavalry should ordinarily be given 
great latitude in pushing forward, for its great object is to 
gain information; and even when it constitutes the entire 
vanguard of a composite advance guard, no attempt should 
be made to fix the distance between the support and the re- 
serve. If the cavalry push far ahead, the reserve should 
throw out an advance party with a point and flankers. If 
pressing closely upon the enemy, the cavalry will probably 
be delayed enough by exploration and skirmishing to reduce 
its progress to the pace of the infantry reserve. 

Artillery is of great value to the advance guard in pre- 
paring the way for the infantry attack, and in compelling the 
enemy to deploy at a distance. Light field batteries only 



44 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

should be used with the advance guard, mobility being essen- 
tial. When the advance guard is specially strong in cavalry, 
a battery of horse artillery should be attached to it. The 
guns of a battery attached to the advance guard should be 
kept together, any subdivision being generally a mistake. 
Under exceptional circumstances, part of the guns may be 
with the vanguard (marching with the support); but in such 
an advanced position the artillery would be liable to suffer 
from the enemy's infantry fire at short range, and would be 
exposed to capture by sudden assault. When the front is 
restricted and the country is hilly, part of the guns may be 
with the vanguard ; for the enemy could find advantageous 
positions from which to bring guns to bear upon the advance 
guard, and would have to be opposed by artillery; and in 
such a country the guns would not be greatly endangered by 
their forward position, as the enemy could advance only on 
a narrow front. In a large advance guard (such as that of 
an army corps) a battery might safely march at the rear of 
the support. But, as a rule, all the artillery of the advance 
guard should generally be with the reserve, and should be 
preceded by a small force of infantry to prevent it from being 
taken at a disadvantage by sudden attack. In any case, the 
delay in bringing artillery into action from the reserve would 
be so slight that but little would be gained by having guns 
with the vanguard. As the guns should come into action 
within artillery range, but beyond infantry range, of the 
enemy's position, they would generally be nearer to their 
proper position if with the reserve than they would be with 
the support. The battery commander accompanies the com- 
mander of the advance guard on the march and in reconnais- 
sance of the enemy, and receives his orders as to bringing 
the battery into action. 

A few engineers should march with the support, to re- 



FORMATION MODIFIED BY TERRAIN. 45 

pair bridges, remove obstacles, etc. If the rest of the sup- 
port consists entirely of cavalry, the engineers should be 
mounted. Owing to the small number of engineer soldiers 
in our army, this duty would generally be performed by pio- 
neer detachments from the infantry. 

The proportion of each arm in the advance guard de- 
pends upon the nature of the country, the object of the march, 
and the strength, composition, and proximity of the oppos- 
ing force. In a close or mountainous country the proportion 
of infantry should be increased. In an open country the 
cavalry should be strengthened. If the enemy is strong and 
near, and a battle seems imminent, the advance guard should 
be specially strong in infantry and guns. If, however, it is 
desired merely to develop the enemy without seriously en- 
gaging, the advance guard should consist of cavalry and light 
artillery (horse artillery if possible), as these troops can be 
more readily withdrawn than infantry. In the pursuit of a 
beaten foe, or whenever the object is to follow and keep 
touch with the enemy, the proportion of cavalry should be as 
great as possible. In any case all three arms are needed. 

As a rule, the different organizations of the command 
perform in turn the duty of advance guard; but in opera- 
tions of special importance it may be desirable to have the 
advance guard composed of select troops. Napoleon says: 
"It is necessary that the advance guard should consist of 
lite troops, and that the generals, officers, and soldiers 
should thoroughly understand their tactics, each according 
to the needs of his grade. An uninstructed body of troops 
would be only an embarrassment to the advance guard."* 

Formation Modified by Terrain. — In the formation of an 
advance guard considerations of terrain take precedence over 
all prescribed rules. If, for instance, a ridge from which 

*"Maximes de Guerre et Pensees de Napoleon Ier." 



46 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

a good view can be obtained lies near one of the flanks, the 
flankers must be pushed out to the ridge, whether it be nearer 
or farther from the flank than the normal distance. When 
the nature of the country is such that flankers are unneces- 
sary or can not keep up with the command, dispositions 
must be made accordingly. Whether on active service or mere- 
ly at drill, the commander of an advance guard, outpost, or 
rear guard must exercise judgment, and make his dispositions 
in accordance with the nature of the ground and the real 
or supposed circumstances of warfare under which he is acting. 

An ingenious disposition of the advance guard made by 
General Cox, in West Virginia, in 1861, is worthy of remark. 
The main body of the command, embarked on steamers, 
moved up the Kanawha river, on either side of which the 
enemy might be expected. An advance guard accordingly 
marched along each bank, the main body being held in readi- 
ness to land and reinforce whichever one should encounter 
the enemy. 

Encountering the Enemy. — As soon as the enemy is seen> 
the advance guard must endeavor to ascertain promptly 
whether it has to deal with an outpost of a stationary force, 
an advance guard of a marching body, or a flanking detach- 
ment of a column. It should lose no time in discovering 
where the enemy's main position is, or how far away is the 
marching column. The relative numbers and position and 
the orders under which the advance guard is acting will de- 
cide the question of attacking or taking up a defensive posi- 
tion. The offensive is generally the best, if an attack seems 
at all likely to succeed. If between the advance guard and 
the enemy there is an exceptionally good position, the enemy 
should be attacked vigorously, in order that the position 
may be occupied and held for the deployment of the main 
body. If the defensive has been decided upon, and a good 



ENCOUNTERING THE ENEMY. 47 

defensive position has been passed a short time, before the 
enemy is encountered, or if the latter is in such force that 
the advance guard can not hold its own against him, it will 
be necessary to fall back slowly and stubbornly to the posi- 
tion or upon the main body; the commander of the advance 
guard sending to the commander of the main body prompt 
warning of the threatened or actual attack. 

It is not always necessary for the advance guard to take 
up a position on the road by which the main body is advanc- 
ing. If the latter is compelled in its advance to adhere to 
the route, it is often better for the advance guard to make 
a stand at one side, holding the road with only some de- 
tached troops. The main body advancing along the road is 
thus sometimes enabled to make its attack in the most effect- 
ive direction. Moreover, in case the advance guard is driv- 
en back, it will not be pushed directly upon the main body, 
to which it might communicate its disorder. In case of a 
sudden encounter with the enemy, the advance guard will 
probably be compelled to take up a position as best it may, 
which will probably be on the road. In this case the main 
body may sometimes be able to advance by a lateral road, to 
avoid the danger of being compromised in a reverse of the 
advance guard, and at the same time gain the advantage of a 
flank attack upon the enemy. When the advance guard is 
strong and able to hold its own against the enemy for some 
time, and when the main body does not follow the advance 
guard too closely, such a movement may be decisive. 



48 SECURITY AND INFORM VTION. 

ADVANCE GUARD OF A DIVISION. 

A division consists of three brigades of infantry and 
two or more batteries of artillery. As no divisional cavalry 
is provided, a portion of the corps cavalry must be detached 
and assigned to the division whenever the latter is acting 
independently, or when the front is not covered by a general 
screen of cavalry. The corps cavalry will not comprise more 
than two regiments, and may consist of only one.* 

It can not, therefore, be safely assumed that more than 
one squadron will be assigned to each division. The experi- 
ence of recent wars would seem to indicate four as the proper 
number of batteries; and it may be assumed, then, that the 
division consists of three brigades (composed of nine regi- 
ments, or twenty-seven battalions) of infantry, four batteries 
of light artillery, four troops of cavalry, one company of 
engineers, three companies of hospital troops,t and a section 
of signal soldiers. 

The advance guard, of the division might be formed as 
follows (see Plate V): The advance party consists of one 
troop of cavalry, its point being about a quarter of a mile in 
advance, and the flankers at the same distance from the line 
of march. A flanking patrol would march on each flank, 
abreast of the advance party, and from two to four miles 
from it. Each of these flanking patrols should be not less 
than a platoon, and should be commanded by a lieutenant or 
an experienced sergeant. 

The support follows one mile in rear of the advance 
party. It consists of two and one-half troops of cavalry, two 
battalions of infantry, one section of engineers, with a tool 

*Infantry Drill Regulations, paragraphs 479 and 484. 

t Namely, a bearer company, an ambulance company, and a field 
hospital. Most of the ambulances and the field hospital would be with 
the train. For the details of the organization of a division, see "Organ- 
ization and Tactics," page 34. 



PL. ATE V. 




I 4 | 



JflSllllNllin. 



These flanking detachments are always 
slightly farther out from the line of march 
Own these sent out from (' 



If* 

It: 

5 



i H 






Com position of the Division . 

3th Infantry) 
13tk Infantry) 
6th Infant,!/ ) 

Tnd Brigade . 

1 



Infantry 

Litf'htl 



Orde r p/' March of a Division acting independent ly.- 



I I 



'I ft 

If 






a 
lit 

il 



«««eiHOfl««-w«-»-«-« 



full war strength. 

The number <f platoons in 
assumed to he four. 

The flunking patrols abrea 



"■'■ ■'/ ■"'"'" 

Una the rear , 



ADVANCE GUARD OF A DIVISION. 5 1 

wagon ; one machine-gun detachment, and infantry ammuni- 
tion carts. The number of carts is regulated by the fact that 
as the advance guard may have to fight during many consecu- 
tive hours after touching upon the enemy, it should have, in- 
cluding ammunition carried by the soldiers, at least 200 
rounds per man. 

A flanking detachment varying in strength from one-half 
to one-fourth of a troop is sent out to each flank from the 
cavalry of the support. It marches slightly farther out from 
the line of march than the corresponding detachment from 
the advance party, and nearly abreast of the reserve. 

The reserve follows at a distance of a mile and a quarter. 
At its head marches the commanding officer of the advance 
guard, followed by a platoon of cavalry. The rest of the re- 
serve is arranged in the following order: A battalion of in- 
fantry, a battery, a regiment of infantry, a section of engi- 
neers, infantry ammunition carts, and a platoon of hospital 
troops with ambulances. 

Members of a mounted signal detachment should be 
with the advance party, the support and the reserve, and at 
the head of the main body. One or two machine guns might 
be advantageously used with the support. Connecting files, 
preferably cyclists, march between the advance party and 
the support, and between the support and the reserve. 

Two or three escort wagons conveying picks, shovels, 
and axes, in addition to those required for the use of the 
engineers, should accompany the reserve, following immedi- 
ately in rear of the infantry. The War of Secession demon- 
strated the necessity of having at hand every facility for in- 
trenching rapidly and strongly; and these implements would 
be a valuable addition to the intrenching tools carried by the 
soldiers. The number and kind of tools would depend upon 
the nature of the country and the object of the march. If the 

4 



52 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

advance guard were charged with the duty of seizing and 
holding an important point, the necessity of intrenching 
would be imperative. On the other hand, in the pursuit of a 
beaten foe intrenching tools might be neglected. In a wood- 
ed country axes would be a prime necessity; in a prairie 
country picks and shovels would be most important.* 

The main body follows the reserve at a variable distance. 
In the case of a division the distance would vary from half a 
mile to three miles, but should not ordinarily exceed a mile 
and a half.f I* 1 the case of large forces the distance may be 
as great as live miles ; or even greater if it be desired to seize 
some important point even at the risk of incurring the defeat 
of the advance guard before it can be succored by the main 
body. On the other hand, if the advance guard is strong and 
has orders to bring on a battle, the distance may be not more 
than half a mile. At the head of the main column marches 
the major general with his staff and a platoon of cavalry. 
The main body is formed in accordance with the maxim that 

*Immediately after the battle of The Wilderness, Lee, learning 1 
that Grant was extending his left toward Spottsylvania, began to push 
forward his own right toward the same point, Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry- 
division in advance. The two armies marched on parallel roads at a 
short distance from each other. Pushing forward rapidly, Fitzhugh 
Lee placed his division across the Federal line of advance on the Brock 
Road, and quickly intrenched so strongly as to thwart all attempts 
to dislodge him. The important point of Spottsylvania was thus 
secured by Lee. 

Later in the same campaign, the First Cavalry Division (General 
Torbert) seized and held the important position of Cold Harbor. By 
some mistake it was withdrawn in the night, but, under orders, retook 
the position, strengthened it with slight intrenchments, and held it 
against a determined assault by the Confederate infantry, until the 
arrival of General Wright with the Sixth Corps placed the position 
definitely in the possession of the Union forces. 

Similar results might often be gained by the advance guard by 
seizing and intrenching important points. 

tit should be remembered that all the distances here given are 
based on the assumption that the division is operating in an open 
country. In a close country they would be much less, and in any case 
they should be regulated by the object of the march and the nature 
>f the terrain. 



ADVANCE GUARD OF AN ARMY CORPS. 53 

the troops likely to be first needed should be in advance. This 
would place the artillery at the head of the column, but a 
small force of infantry must precede it for its protection. We 
have, consequently, the following arrangement of the main 
body from front to rear : One regiment of infantry, followed 
by its ammunition carts; three batteries; one brigade of in- 
fantry, followed by its ammunition carts; two regiments of 
infantry with ammunition carts; the remainder of the hos- 
pital troops with ambulances; a platoon of engineers with a 
bridge train; the ammunition column, and the baggage and 
supply train. The position of the bridge train depends upon 
circumstances. Ordinarily it would be with the main body, 
as stated above, but under certain circumstances, especially 
in the pursuit of a defeated enemy, it might be with the re- 
serve of the advance guard. 

The commander of the first brigade commands the ad- 
vance guard, all the infantry of which is taken from his bri- 
gade. The infantry at the head of the main column also 
belongs to the first brigade. The infantry of the rear guard 
(one regiment) is taken from the third brigade. The brigades 
alternate from day to day in their positions in column. 

If the country is close and the enemy's guerrillas are 
active, detachments must flank the train. These detach- 
ments are generally taken from the rear guard. 



ADVANCE GUARD OF AN ARMY CORPS. 

If the entire corps were operating together, the corps 
cavalry would screen its front, and the advance guards of 
the divisions would be composed of infantry and artillery. 
In view of the protection afforded by the advance screen of 
cavalry, two regiments of infantry and a battery would prob- 
ably be sufficient for the advance guard of each division, if 



54 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

the corps were marching on three parallel roads. If, how- 
ever, the corps were marching on two parallel roads, the col- 
umn composed of two divisions should be preceded by at 
least a brigade of infantry and two batteries. 

The above dispositions may be taken as a guide, but 
must not be blindly followed. In nothing does the adage 
"circumstances alter cases" find a more complete verification 
than in the details of the security and information of an 
army. No fixed rule for distances and formation can possibly 
be given. In very few cases, indeed, can the normal dis- 
tances and formations be used without some modification. The 
object of the advance guard must be continually borne in 
mind, and any disposition or formation that will enable it best 
to perform its functions is right. 



FLANK GUARDS. 

It has already been stated that in the case of large forces 
the flanking parties are taken from the .main body. These 
parties are not mere flanking groups, but are bodies varying 
in strength and composition from a small patrol of infantry 
or cavalry* to a large force of all arms. 

In the case of a flank march near the enemy, the flank 
guard becomes a body of the greatest importance, and its 
composition and formation resemble those of an advance 
guard. A flank march near the enemy being an especially 
hazardous operation, and one never made to a great distance, 
a force undertaking it is generally in light marching order 
and ready to form promptly for action. For this reason, the 
distance from the flank guard to the flank of the column is 



*The movements of flank patrols and the minor details of the 
conduct of an advance guard are considered in the chapter on Recon- 
naissance. 



THE ADVANCE GUARD IN A RETREAT. 55 

not so great as the distance from an advance guard to the 
head of the main body. Moreover, the formation from col- 
umn to a. flank can be made more quickly than a formation on 
the head of the column. 

In a flank march it may be necessary to have an advance 
guard, flank guard, and rear guard, each of very considerable 
strength. 

THE ADVANCE GUARD IN A RETREAT. 

When a force is retreating, the functions of security and 
information devolve upon the rear guard, which is, of course, 
the force nearest the enemy.* Nevertheless, it is important 
that there should be a small advance guard, to clear the way 
for the main body by removing obstacles, repairing roads 
and bridges, selecting the most practicable routes of march, 
driving away small parties of hostile cavalry which may have 
passed entirely around the flanks of the retreating force, and 
(if in the enemy's country) dispersing bodies of partisans or 
hostile inhabitants who may be endeavoring to block the 
way. As already stated, the strength of the advance guard 
on a retrograde movement would be the same as that of the 
rear guard on a forward march, f 

*See Chapter VI. 
tSee page 23, ante. 



56 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 



CHAPTER III. 



OUTPOSTS. 



To exercise ceaseless vigilance, to be in constant readiness for 
action, and to preserve the most profound silence, are the cardinal 
principles of outpost duty.— Yaw Mulken. 

Outposts are detachments thrown out from a force when 
halted, for the purpose of protecting it from surprise. Like 
advance guards on the inarch, outposts are charged with the 
duties of observation and resistance. Thej prevent the re- 
connaissance of the position by the enemy's scouts and pa- 
trols, give warning of the approach of hostile bodies, and 
offer sufficient resistance to the enemy's attacks to enable 
the main body to prepare for action. 

The proper performance of outpost duty is of vital im- 
portance to an army, and history presents many examples of 
disasters resulting from its neglect. At Laon, in 1814, Mar- 
mont's neglect to exercise proper vigilance caused him to be 
overwhelmed by Blticher's night attack. At Shiloh the care- 
lessness with which outpost duty was performed by the 
United States army enabled the Confederates to form their 
line of battle deliberately within a mile and a half of the 
camp of their unsuspecting opponents, and to take the Union 
forces at a terrible disadvantage. At Vionville, in 1870, For- 
ton's cavalry division was so negligently guarded by its out- 
posts that it was surprised by the German horse artillery, 
and forced to fly in confusion through the camp of its own 
infantry. Scores of similar examples might be mentioned. 

When a strong cavalry screen is in front of the army, the 



OUTPOSTS. 57 

duty of observation becomes much less important to the out- 
posts than would otherwise be the case. In 1870 the effect- 
iveness of the cavalry screen was such that Boguslawski 
says: "As an additional result of the use to which our cav- 
alry was put, we may mention the perfect security and tran- 
quility enjoyed by our army corps on the march and in camp, 
in rear of the cavalry divisions pushed forward half or a 
whole day's march to the front. The army corps had not, as 
a rule, to trouble themselves with outpost duty, but only to 
provide for the immediate security of the bivouac or canton- 
ment." This was, however, an exceptional condition of 
affairs, for the German cavalry was strong and enterprising, 
and the opposing cavalry was weak and dispirited. While 
a good cavalry screen greatly increases the security of an 
army, and thus materially lightens the duty of the outposts, 
it furnishes no excuse for the latter to be careless, or to for- 
get that the duty of observation is inseparably connected 
with that of resistance. 

Unbroken rest at night being necessary for the preserva- 
tion of the health and efficiency of troops undergoing the 
hardships and fatigues of a campaign, it is of the utmost im- 
portance that the repose of the army in camp or bivouac 
should not be disturbed by needless alarms. The army must 
feel that the vigilance of its outposts enables it to sleep in 
security. 

The duties of the outposts may be classified as follows: 
f 1. To observe constantly all approaches 

Observation: J by whioh the enemy might advance - 

j 2. To watch, and immediately report, the 

L movements of the enemy. 

f 1. To prevent reconnaissance by the enemy. 

J 2. Above all, to check the advance of the 
Resistince* ~\ 

enemy long enough to enable the main 

[ body to prepare for action. 



58 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Subdivisions of the Outpost. — The outpost is divided into 
four parts, namely: 1. Sentinels or vedettes; 2. Pickets; 
3. Supports; 4. Keserve. The sentinels or vedettes occupy 
the line of observation. They are sent out from the pickets, 
and supported by them. The supports usually occupy the 
line of resistance, and are supported by the reserve. 

In an infantry outpost the pickets are from 100 to 400 
yards in rear of the sentinels ; the supports, from 400 to 800 
yards in rear of the pickets; and the reserve, from 400 to 800 
yards in rear of the supports. In a cavalry outpost the dis- 
tance from the vedettes to the picket is about 600 yards, and 
the other distances vary between the limits of 1,200 and 2,000 
yards. These distances can not be definitely fixed, as they 
depend upon many circumstances of ground, weather, ana* 
the nature and proximity of the enemy. When the outpost 
occupies a strong defensive position and the approaches 
from the rear are open and unobstructed, the distances may 
be much greater. The only essential requirement is that the 
supporting bodies should be able to reinforce in time. Thus, 
in an infantry outpost, if the support can be depended upon 
to hold its position for half an hour against a heavy attack, 
and the reserve can be kept in instant readiness, the latter 
may be held back at any distance not exceeding that over 
which it can march in twenty minutes, or, in other words, a 
mile. Such a great distance would, however, be quite excep- 
tional, and would be justified only by the conditions sup- 
posed. The distances given above may be regarded as ap- 
proximations to those that might be adopted in most cases. 

The general plan of an outpost may be likened to an open 
fan, the sentinels being along the outer edge; or, better yet, 
to a hand with the fingers extended and widely opened. A 
line along the tips of the fingers would represent the chain 
of sentinels; the first joints, the line of pickets; the second 



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POSITION OF THE OUTPOST. 6 1 

joints, the line of supports; and the knuckles, the line of the 
reserve; while the wrist would represent the position of the 
main body. (See Plate VI.) 

The reserve generally consists of not less than one-third 
nor more than one-half of the entire outpost. The strength 
of the supports and pickets would consequently vary from 
two-thirds to one-half of the outpost. The strength of each 
picket depends upon the number of sentinels and patrols that 
it has to furnish, and the size of each support is regulated by 
the principle that it should be epual to the aggregate strength 
of all the pickets supported by it. As a general rule, one- 
third of the outpost would be assigned to the reserve, one- 
third to the supports, and one-third to the pickets and 
sentinels. 

Two Systems of Outposts. — Outposts are of two kinds: 
the cordon system, in which the entire front is covered with a 
chain of sentinels; and the patrol system, in which only the 
roads and other avenues of approach are guarded by senti- 
nels, closely backed up by pickets, while the intervening 
country is constantly patrolled. The best results are gener- 
ally obtained by a combination of the two systems. 

Position. — The outpost must cover the front of the army 
and overlap its flanks, unless the latter are secured by im- 
passable obstacles. A prominent natural feature should be 
selected to mark the general line, such as a ridge, a river, or 
the farther edge of a wood. The most favorable position will 
be one which furnishes a good view and field of fire to the 
front, while affording concealment from the enemy and shel- 
ter from his fire. One of the best positions is, therefore, a 
wood held at the edge toward the enemy, and one of the 
worst is a wood held at the nearer edge.* 

*When Banks, falling back after his defeat at Sabine Cross Roads 
the day before, took up his position at Pleasant Hill (April 9, 1864), 
Benedict's brigade of the Nineteenth Corps was in line in an open 



62 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

If the farther edge is too distant to be occupied, and no 
broad roads or continuous clearings exist in the wood, the 
measures to be taken will depend upon the length of time 
the position is to be occupied. If the outpost is to hold the 
position for some time, as, for instance, in the case of the 
investment of a fortified place, a belt at least twenty yards 
wide should be cleared, an entanglement made of the felled 
trees, and the sentinels posted along the near edge of the belt. 
If the entanglement consists of obstacles of such a nature 
that they might furnish shelter to the enemy, it should be 
placed on the near side of the clearing; otherwise on the far 
side. Thus felled trees, trous-de-loup, etc., would be at the 
near edge, while wire entanglements, etc., would be at the 
far edge. If, as is usually the case, time and opportunity do 
not admit of making such a clearing, and the outpost line 
must traverse the wood, the line of sentinels should be along 
a stream, ordinary road, or ridge overlooking a valley, so as 
to get the best view practicable under the circumstances. In 
holding the outpost line in a heavy forest, it would be well 
to make use of Cossack posts closely backed up by the sup- 
ports, the posts sheltered by barricades of timber, patrolling 
in front being constant. Instead of carrying the outpost line 
through the wood when the farther edge can not be occupied, 
it is generally advisable to place the sentinels under cover 
of some kind, facing the wood, and at least 200 yards from 
the near edge, the tuoocl being patrolled. Where a stream, 

field within effective infantry range of the southern edge of a forest. 
The outpost covering the brigade was established in the wood, the 
pickets being only a short distance from the southern edge. The Con- 
federates, advancing from the north, through the wood, drove in the 
outpost, and, with little or no loss, took up a position at the edge of the 
wood, where they were sheltered by the trees, while the Union troops 
were not only in the open, but had their fire masked for a time by the 
outpost troops retreating across the unsheltered space. The Federal 
brigade was soon thrown into confusion, and suffered heavy loss, its 
commander being among the killed. 



STRENGTH OF THE OUTPOST. 63 

canal, or other obstacle having but few passages, lies parallel 
to the outpost line, the sentinels, or even the pickets, may 
sometimes be posted beyond it; but the supports should be 
kept on the near side for fear of so large a body being cut off 
before it could make good its retreat. It would generally be 
best to keep even the line of sentinels on the near side, and 
merely patrol beyond the obstacle. The sentinels may be 
withdrawn some distance from the obstacles, especially dur- 
ing the day, if they can thus get a more extended view or find 
better cover. 

The outpost line is convex towards the enemy, or straight 
with its extremities thrown back. Unless the nature of the 
ground compels, it should never be concave, even when that 
is the shape of the position which it covers. It does not nec- 
essarily conform to the line of the position in any case. 

Strength. — To avoid overtaxing the troops, the strength 
of the outpost should be the least that is compatible with the 
proper performance of its functions. It depends upon vari- 
ous considerations, such as the nature of the country and the 
strength, proximity, and character of the enemy. In a coun- 
try well adapted to defense, smaller numbers suffice than in 
an open country. When the enemy is near and aggressive, 
the outposts must be strong and vigilant. The strength of 
the outpost will also depend upon the plan of action deter- 
mined upon in case of attack. If the line chosen for the de- 
ployment of the main body coincides with the line of resist- 
ance of the outpost, the latter force must be strong enough 
to hold the chosen position to the utmost. If it is decided to 
fall back upon the main body, the outpost not only may be, 
but should be, weaker than in the former case, as a strong 
force would be more likely to become compromised in a seri- 
ous engagement than a weaker one. 

The strength of the outpost thus depends upon so many 



64 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

different considerations that no definite rule on the subject 
can be prescribed. Clery gives six different examples of out- 
posts in the European wars of 1866 and 1870-71, in which the 
strength varies from 250 to 1,000 men to a mile. As a rule, 
the maximum strength of an outpost is one-sixth of the entire 
force. This proportion should not be exceeded, except in 
case of absolute necessity, and it should be less whenever a 
reduction is consistent with prudence. 

Composition. — When an army is on the march from day 
to day, the advance guard constitutes the outpost at each 
halt; but if its duties during the day's march have been ardu- 
ous, it must be relieved, as soon as practicable, by fresh 
troops. If outposts are required on the flanks and rear, they 
will be composed of the flank and rear guards, when such 
guards exist in sufficient strength; otherwise such outposts 
are taken from the main body, which will also furnish them 
when the duties of the flank and rear guards during the day 
have been especially trying. In the disposition of an outpost 
the different tactical units should as far as practicable be 
kept intact. Thus, supposing the outpost of a division to con- 
sist of a regiment of infantry, the reserve might be composed 
of the first battalion ; the supports, of two companies of the 
second battalion and two of the third, each supporting the 
remaining companies of its own battalion, which would con- 
stitute the pickets and sentinels. (See Plate VI.) Similarly 
the outpost of a cavalry brigade (three regiments) might con- 
sist of a squadron arranged as shown in Plate VII. 

Each division will generally furnish the outpost for its 
own front. In a large force especially this principle may be 
advantageously applied to brigades. In this case the out- 
post of the division might consist of a battalion (four com- 
panies) from each of the three brigades. The brigade out- 
post would then have two companies in reserve, one in the 



COMPOSITION OF THE OUTPOSTS. 67 

support, and the other furnishing the pickets and sentinels. 
As alternative formations, one company might furnish the 
reserve; two, the supports; and one, the pickets and senti- 
nels: or the reserve and support might each consist of one 
company, the pickets and sentinels consisting of the other 
two. The outpost of each brigade would be under the com- 
mand of the officer commanding the battalion composing it, 
and would constitute a section of the general outpost. An 
officer should be detailed to command the entire outpost. 

If two 1 brigades encamp in the first line, with the third 
in reserve, the outpost for the division is taken from the first 
two. If outposts for the flank and rear should be necessary, 
they should be taken from the reserve brigade. 

All the baggage of the troops on outpost duty remains 
in rear with the main body, the only vehicles brought up be- 
ing those containing intrenching tools and a part of the re- 
serve ammunition. 

An outpost may consist of infantry, of cavalry, of both, 
or of all three arms. The proportion of the different arms 
depends upon circumstances. In an open country, in day- 
time, the duty can be best performed by cavalry. In a close 
country, at night, and when the enemy is near, infantry is 
preferable. The best performance of outpost duty requires 
a combination of the two arms. Cavalry is of the greatest 
value when pushed well to the front as a screen, but it may 
often be advantageously combined with infantry in the out- 
post proper. It may thus occupy look-out stations too dis- 
tant to be held by infantry, or to patrol to a distance beyond 
the outpost that would be impracticable for the latter arm. 
When a considerable portion of the outpost line is in wooded 
or enclosed country and the space adjoining it is open, it may 
sometimes be advisable to hold the former portion with 

infantry and the latter with cavalry; but such a formation 
5 — 



68 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

cannot generally be recommended. As a rule, when it is 
impracticable to use the cavalry as an advanced screen, its 
use with the outposts should be limited to patrolling and to 
furnishing orderlies, when necessary, to the pickets, sup- 
ports, and reserve. The experiment was made at Metz of 
employing cavalry on picket duty, but it was soon given up, 
and the use of cavalry with the outposts confined to attach- 
ing mounted orderlies to the infantry pickets. True, the 
German cavalry was not as well suited as American cavalry 
to this duty; but it may safely be laid down as a general rule 
that cavalry ought never to be used on any duty that can be 
performed as well, or better, by infantry. 

When cavalry is used with an outpost, it should be em- 
ployed in constant and vigilant patrolling as far to the front 
as may be consistent with reasonable precautions for safety; 
but a squadron should not be used where a troop, or perhaps 
a few small patrols, could perform the duty equally well. 
Moreover, the use of mounted orderlies with the pickets, sup- 
ports and reserve should be limited to the req-uirements of 
actual necessity. If the duty of patrolling and furnishing 
mounted orderlies does not employ all the cavalry of the out- 
post, the rest should be held in hand by the outpost com- 
mander with, or near, the reserve, at a point on one of the 
main roads leading towards the enemy, whence it can be 
quickly sent forward in any emergency requiring its action. 
It would generally be a mistake to> employ cavalry as pickets 
with infantry supports, as in the case of an attack upon the 
outpost such pickets would be thrust back upon the infantry, 
with which they would be intermingled in such a manner as 
to hamper the correct tactical handling of the two arms. 

Too much stress cannot be placed upon the fact that the 
best use of cavalry in the service of security and information 
is as a body constituting a screen so far in advance of the 



ARTILLERY WITH THE OUTPOST. 69 

general outpost line as to be quite independent of it.* When 
such use is impracticable, and its service as a part of the 
outpost proper is, for any reason, necessary, its employment 
should be strictly limited to those duties for which it is espe- 
cially suited. Cavalry is an expensive arm; its efficiency is 
more easily impaired than that of infantry; and its peculiar 
uses are of such vital importance to an army that its strength 
should not be needlessly frittered away.f 

Commanders inexperienced in the mounted service are 
too apt to impose heavy outpost duty on the cavalry as a mat- 
ter of convenience. The superb cavalry force of the Army 
of the Potomac was badly treated in this respect. In de- 
scribing the condition of the cavalry corps when he assumed 
command of it, General Sheridan says: "The horses were 
thin and very much w T orn down b}^ excessive and, it seemed 
to me, unnecessary picket duty; for the cavalry picket line 
almost completely encircled the infantry and artillery camps 
of the army, covering a distance, on a continuous line, of 
nearly sixty miles, with hardly a mounted Confederate con- 
fronting it at any point. From the very beginning of the war 
the enemy had shown more wisdom respecting his cavalry 
than we."| 

Artillery is of great value to an outpost when it can be 
so posted as to command an important road or defile, and be 
at the same time beyond the effective range of the enemy's 
rifle fire. It may aid materially, with shrapnel fire, in sup- 
porting the advanced portions of the outpost and in covering 
their retreat. It should be in constant readiness to move 

*See Chapter V. 

tit would be well to furnish each regiment of infantry with a suf- 
ficient number of horses to provide for mounted orderlies with the 
outpost and the mounting of the commanders of the advance guard 
and vanguard. 

t "Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan," Vol. I., page 355. 



70 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

from one point to another, the horses being kept harnessed, 
and only a portion fed or watered at a time. Only the lim- 
bers should be with the battery, the caissons and other car- 
riages being at the rear. If possible, the guns of a battery 
should be kept together. Emergencies may, it is true, de- 
mand the detachment of guns; but, as a rule, it is a mis- 
take to divide a battery, especially if the pieces are so sep- 
arated as to deprive the battery commander of the power 
to use them in concert. All cover afforded by the ground 
should be utilized for the concealment of the guns from the 
enemy; and the pieces should not be exposed, except when 
some definite object is to be gained. As a rule, they should 
not take position within artillery range of ground on which 
the enemy's batteries could take post unperceived; should it 
be necessary to do so, they must be carefully concealed and 
their prompt withdrawal provided for. The artillery, when 
not posted to command bridges or roads, should be with the 
reserve, preferably near a road. Machine guns may be used 
with the outpost to command approaches with long-range 
fire. Horse artillery is best suited to the requirements of 
outpost duty. 

Distance of Outposts from Main Body. — The outpost must 
be far enough from the main body to give the latter time to 
form for action before the outlying troops are driven in. On 
the other hand, it must not be so far distant as to be in dan- 
ger of being cut off by the enemy. The distance will also de- 
pend upon the strength that can be spared for the outpost 
line, the length of the line increasing almost in direct propor- 
tion with the distance. When the country is open, the dis- 
tance will generally be greater than in an enclosed country 
which offers good positions for defense. When the main 
body is under the enemy's artillery fire, it can not form for 
action in the security which it needs; but if the line of resist- 



THE COMMANDER OF THE OUTPOST. 71 

ance is at a distance from the camp or bivouac equal to the 
limit of the effective range of artillery, the outpost must be 
driven from that line before the main body can be subjected 
to the fire of the hostile guns. The supports (occupying the 
line of resistance) should, therefore, be at a distance of about 
3,000 yards from the main body. This fixes the line of sup- 
ports, at proper distances from which the other parts of the 
outpost are established. The maximum distance from an 
infantry outpost to the body which it covers is about three 
miles, supposing the outpost to be of considerable strength 
and strongly posted. 



THE COMMANDER OF THE OUTPOST. 

The officer detailed to command the outpost makes his 
headquarters with the reserve, and establishes there his field 
telegraph or signal station. If the front of the outpost is 
considerable, it is divided into sections of about a mile or 
a mile and a half for infantry and three miles for cavalry, 
and an officer assigned to the command of each section. Each 
section commander makes his headquarters with one of his 
supports, and is under the orders of the commander of the 
outpost. When each brigade guards its own front, the sec- 
tions of the outpost coincide with the brigade fronts. 

The outpost commander receives from the commander 
of the forces instructions as to the general front to be occu- 
pied by the outposts, their object, and the amount of resist- 
ance they are expected to make. He is also informed about 
the avenues of approach from the direction of the opposing 
force, and is made acquainted with everything known in re- 
gard to the position and probable intentions of the enemy. 
He then determines the strength of the reserve, supports, 
and pickets; decides upon the distance of the line of resist- 



72 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

ance from the main body, and selects a line of observation 
farther in advance. A good topographical map of the posi- 
tion selected for the camp and the surrounding country 
would enable him to choose these positions at once. In the 
absence of such a map they must be determined by reconnais- 
sance, and in any case the ground must be carefully examined 
before the detachments move out. The station of the reserve 
is next fixed, the positions of the supports pointed out, places 
for the pickets approximately designated, and the general 
line of the sentinels roughly indicated. 

The outpost commander then gives instructions to his 
subordinates as to: 

1. The general front of the outpost line. 

2. The ground to be occupied by each. 

3. The positions of neighboring supports and pickets. 

4. The night positions of the pickets and supports. 

5. What is known of the enemy and his probable 
movements. 

G. The approaches by which the enemy might advance. 

7. The direction and method of patrolling. 

8. What is to be done in case of attack. 

9. How flags of truce and deserters are to be received. 

10. The kind of reports required. 

11. Where he himself is to be found. 

12. The countersign and parole. 

When the outpost has been posted, its commander makes 
his inspection; orders such changes in the positions of sup- 
ports, pickets, or sentinels as may seem advisable; sees that 
the roads and paths leading from the enemy are properly 
guarded; gives directions for the fortification of such parts 
of the position as need strengthening; and is especially care- 
ful that the flanks are secured by resting them on impassable 
obstacles, or by refusing them and protecting them by de- 



SENTINELS AND VEDETTES 73 

tachinents. As a rule, the outpost should strengthen its 
position by intrenching. A continuous line of intrenchments 
is out of the question, as it would require too much labor to 
make it and too many men to hold it; but each picket and, 
above all, each support should intrench when practicable. 
Whether the reserve should intrench or not will depend on 
circumstances. If the outpost remains in the position for 
some time, the sentinels should shelter themselves in pits 
about two and a half feet in depth, the earth being thrown 
up toward the enemy and covered with sod or twigs, in order 
that it may not attract attention. 

The outpost commander sends to the commander of the 
main body all information received, first testing its accuracy 
as far as he can without delay in its transmission. If time is 
lacking for such test, he sends back the information with a 
clear statement of the source from which it came, and after- 
wards sends back any corroborative or contradictory news 
he may receive in regard to the matter reported. 

SENTINELS AND VEDETTES. 

Sentinels must be so posted as to have a good view to the 
front and flanks, and be concealed as much as possible. They 
do not walk their posts, but remain stationary, being gener- 
ally posted double, so that one man may go to examine any 
suspicious point while the other remains on post. They may 
also be posted in groups. In the former case the reliefs not 
on post remain with the picket; in the latter case the group 
accompanies the sentinel to his post and remains in conceal- 
ment a short distance behind him. When the group system 
is used, a single sentinel for each will suffice by day, but 
double sentinels should be used at night. As the group fur- 
nishes the reliefs, it should consist of three or six men, and 



74 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

every two or three groups should be under charge of a non- 
commissioned officer. 

There should be easy communication with neighboring 
sentinels and with the picket, and a clear view of all ap- 
proaches; and the post (especially at night) should not, if it 
can be avoided, be so situated that the noise of falling water 
or the soughing of the wind through the trees would deaden 
the noise of approaching footsteps. Sentinels are generally 
not less than 100 nor more than 400 yards apart — the lesser 
limit being usually the minimum for single sentinels, and the 
greater limit the maximum for double ones. Vedettes may 
be as far as GOO yards apart. But no definite rule can be laid 
down in this matter, except that the number of posts should 
be as small as may be compatible with a vigilant watch on 
all points at which the enemy might approach. The posts 
furnished by each picket are numbered from right to left. 

Sentinels should watch and listen without betraying 
their own presence; but observation is the first considera- 
tion, and concealment is of secondary importance. A senti- 
nel must expose himself to see, rather than limit his observa- 
tion for the purpose of remaining concealed. 

Sentinels must not smoke, and such conversation as may 
be necessary between them must be conducted in a whisper. 
The sentinel must not haveabout him any glittering accouter- 
ments ; and, except in foggy weather or on a dark night, must 
keep his bayonet in its scabbard. 

Each sentinel should clearly understand the following: 

1. The countersign. 

2. The number of his own post. 

3. The number and position of his own picket and the 
name of its commander. 

4. The position of the neighboring sentinels and of the 
examining post, when there is one. 



SENTINELS AND VEDETTES. 75 

5. The direction of the enemy and the probable line of 
his advance. 

6. The points to which all roads, paths, and railroads 
in sight lead. 

7. The names of all villages and rivers in view. 

8. The signals by which he should communicate with 
the pickets or detached posts. 

The mistake of giving sentinels too many instructions 
and orders should be avoided. If his mind is burdened with 
many details, the sentinel is likely to become hesitating, 
timid, and confused. The principal tiling is that he should 
know where to look for the enemy and what to do if he sees him. 

Only persons in the performance of duty with the out- 
post, or having authority over it, are allowed to cross the line 
of sentinels. All other people, with the exceptions below, 
are halted, not more than one being advanced at a time, and 
then conducted to the examining post. If there is no examin- 
ing post, they are conducted by one of the sentinels back to 
the picket, or detained until the arrival of the visiting patrol. 
If they refuse to halt, or attempt to escape, they must be 
shot down. 

Deserters from the enemy are halted at some distance 
from the post, and required to lay down their arms. The 
commander of the picket is at once notified, and he sends out 
a patrol to bring them in. If the deserters are pursued by 
the enemy, they are ordered to throw down their arms, the 
picket being at the same time alarmed. If they refuse to 
obey the order, the picket opens fire on them as a necessary 
precaution against a possible ruse on the part of the enemy. 
As a rule, inhabitants and deserters are not allowed to cross 
the line of sentinels at night. An exception to this rule, in 
the case of deserters, is when the demoralization of the ene- 
my is known to be such that wholesale desertions are to be 



76 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

expected. Under any circumstances too much care can not 
be exercised in receiving deserters. In the spring of 1865 
there were many desertions from Lee's army, and the Federal 
sentinels in front of Petersburg had fallen into the habit of 
allowing the deserters to bring their arms in with them. 
Taking advantage of this carelessness, the Confederates, on 
the morning of the 25th of March, quietly gained possession 
of several picket posts by means of sham deserters, and, im- 
mediately thrusting in a storming party, overwhelmed the 
trench guard, broke the main line between batteries 9 and 10, 
turned to the right and left, captured battery 10, and over- 
powered the garrison of Fort Stedman. 

When a flag of truce approaches, the bearer and his es- 
cort (if he have one) are halted in front of the line of sentinels 
and ordered to face in the direction from which they came. 
Word is then sent back to the commander of the picket. 
Wliile the bearer and his escort are halted, the sentinel must 
not converse with them nor allow them to reconnoiter. 

The vigilance of the sentinel in watching the enemy must 
not be disturbed by any requirements of military etiquette. 
He pays no compliments and takes no notice of any of his 
officers who come upon his post, unless addressed by them, 
except so far as may be necessary to challenge and identify 
them. 

Everything observed by the sentinel in regard to the 
enemy should be communicated at once to the picket, espe- 
cial care being taken to report promptly all indications of the 
enemy's approach. If the sentinel is satisfied that the enemy 
is advancing to attack, he gives the alarm by firing; but 
when immediate alarm is not necessary, firing should be 
avoided; it disturbs the repose of the troops, and if ground- 
less alarms are frequently given, the troops grow careless 
and fail to heed the warning when real danger comes. The 



SENTINELS AND VEDETTES. 77 

su-called "picket firing," so common in the early days of the 
War of Secession, deserves even more serious condemnation 
than it has generally received. It seems to have been the 
custom of the sentinels to fire whenever a sentinel of the op- 
posing force was seen. This slaughter of sentinels doubt- 
less added considerably to the aggregate loss of life, but it 
probably never benefited either ariny, while certainly acting 
to the detriment of each. The sentinel, by firing, often need- 
lessly alarmed his own outpost, and gave a certain amount 
of information to the enemy by betraying his own position; 
while by remaining hidden and watching carefully he might 
have been able to give a valuable report of the disposition of 
the opposing outpost. As the armies grew in their knowl- 
edge of "the trade of war," this pernicious custom disap- 
peared; quite as much, it seems, from the good sense of the 
soldiers themselves as from orders from higher authority.* 

It is advisable to keep the same men on the same posts 
instead of changing them to new ones each time they are 
posted. For very important posts the most intelligent men 
should be selected. If the army is stationary, the sentinels 
should be divided into regular reliefs, which should be on 
post two hours at a time during the day, and an hour at a 
time during the night. If, however, the army is to march 
the next day, it would generally be better to post the sentinels 
after the manner of a "running guard," as the men should not 
be unduly fatigued before beginning the day's march. In a 
running guard all the privates of a company are detailed as 
sentinels an hour at a time, thus giving each man only a short 
period of sentinel duty during the night. In very inclement 
weather, sentinels should be relieved every hour during the 
day as well as at night. 

* Sentinel firing might be employed for the purpose of annoying 
the enemy when it is practicable for a sentinel to play the part of a 
harassing patrol (see next chapter), but such exceptional cases serve 
only to mark the general rule. 



78 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

The foregoing principles are applicable to vedettes as 
well as sentinels. Vedettes, like sentinels, are posted in 
pairs, and for similar reasons. One is habitually six or eight 
yards to the right or left rear of the other ; a greater distance 
would make the horses uneasy, and thus distract the atten- 
tion of the riders, while a less distance would encourage con- 
versation between the vedettes. When cavalry is operating 
in a close or wooded country, the vedettes may dismount, one 
holding the horses while the other keeps watch. Whenever 
the vedette can perform his duty dismounted, he should do 
so as a means of sparing his horse. The horse may some- 
times be held, with the lariat, behind the brow of a hill,while 
the vedette, lying down, peers over the crest. In any case, 
the mode of action must be determined by the two considera- 
tions of observation and concealment, it being always re- 
membered that it is more important to see than to avoid be- 
ing seen. 

Connecting Sentinels. — When the sentinel post is not in 
plain vieAV of the picket, a connecting sentinel is posted at a 
point where he can see the post and be seen by the picket. 
It is his duty to transmit signals from one to the other. Con- 
necting sentinels are always single. A connecting vedette 
is generally mounted by day, and always at night. If dis- 
mounted, his horse is with the picket. 

The Picket Sentinel. — A single sentinel is posted at the 
picket to keep a lookout on the sentinels or connecting senti- 
nels, and report all signals made by them or any unusual 
occurrence. In a cavalry picket the sentinel is dismounted. 

Examining Posts. — It is recommended by many military 
writers that no persons, except in the performance of duty 
with the outpost, be allowed to pass the line of sentinels ex- 
cept at certain designated points on the main roads, where 
examining posts are established, each consisting of an officer 



EXAMINING POSTS. 79 

or non-coininissioned officer and six men — three reliefs for 
one double-sentinel post. On the approach of any person to 
the examining post, one of the sentinels advances and halts 
him at some distance from the line, while the other notifies 
the commander of the post, who examines the stranger, and 
either allows him to pass or conducts him to the commander 
of the picket. Any person approaching the line of sentinels 
at any other than a designated point is passed along from 
post to post until he is brought to the examining party; care 
being taken that he is not given an opportunity to observe 
the location of the pickets and supports. The bearer of a 
flag of truce, or a suspected spy, should be blindfolded before 
being conducted to the examining post, if he be conducted 
thither. As a rule, the bearer of a flag of truce is not al- 
lowed to cross the line of observation, all communication 
with him being held beyond the chain of sentinels. If 
brought within the lines, he should invariably be blindfolded 
before entering. 

Examining posts do not seem to have been used at any 
time in the armies of the United States. Though they are 
in use in the German, Austrian, and Dutch armies, and have 
the sanction of such authorities as Von Waldersee, Van Mul- 
ken, and Shaw, their use is doubtful. If the sentinels are 
intelligent and well instructed, and the non-commissioned 
officers on duty with the outpost understand their business, 
examining posts would seem to be generally unnecessary. 
In the close investment of a place, or when preparations are 
being made for the secret execution of an important move- 
ment, orders will probably be given to allow no persons to 
pass the chain of sentinels without the most rigid scrutiny; 
and in such cases examining posts may be of use, if care is 
exercised to see that the people conducted to them do not 
thus gain an opportunity of spying out the dispositions of 
the outposts. 



80 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Detached Posts. — Small parties are often detached from 
a picket to protect exposed points or support isolated senti- 
nels. These detached posts consist generally of from three 
to twelve men, and are under an officer or non-commissioned 
officer, according to their strength and the importance of 
their position. They are, in fact, small pickets, and must act 
in concert with the pickets from which they are taken. 

A bridge on a flank might be held by a detached post. 
An isolated hill, affording a good outlook, too far to the 
front to be included in the general line, but near enough to 
be occupied without extreme risk, should be held by such a 
post, communicating with the outpost by signal. If there 
is reason to expect the enemy to attempt to occupy the hill, 
a support may be pushed forward to assist in holding it 
against an isolated attack, but noi: against a general advance. 

If practicable, detached posts should be relieved every 
six hours. They are not allowed to light fires, and the men 
are required to keep on their equipments and have their arms 
constantly at hand. In a detached post composed of cavalry 
the horses are kept constantly saddled and bridled and held 
by horse-holders, three-fourths of the men being ready to 
fight on foot. The sentinels or dismounted vedettes are 
posted close in front of the party. Vedettes may be pushed 
farther forward. 



PICKETS. 

An infantry picket generally consists of from 25 to 50 
men, and a cavalry picket usually varies between 20 and 30. 
A picket furnishes from two to four double sentinels or 
vedettes, there being three reliefs for each post. If detached 
posts are to be sent out from the picket, corresponding addi- 
tional strength must be given it, and an allowance must be 



PICKETS. ol 

made for patrolling. The requirements for patrolling vary 
so much that the proportion of the picket to be used for that 
purpose can not be fixed. Generally, about a third of the 
picket should be used in patrolling. In a close country, the 
patrols, rather than the sentinels, should be increased; and 
at night the patrols are the principal reliance for observation. 
There should be enough men for three patrols, so as to admit 
of one patrol being out, one ready to go out, and one resting. 
This is especially the case with a cavalry picket. The 
strength of the picket will thus vary; but its minimum 
strength must allow six men for every double-sentinel post, 
three for each connecting sentinel, three for the picket senti- 
nel, and at least three non-commissioned officers. These are 
the barest requirements, without considering patrols. The 
picket commander should always, if possible, be a commis- 
sioned officer. 

It has already been stated that the distance between sen- 
tinels will vary from 100 to 400 yards, the smaller limit being 
in the case of single sentinels, four of whom could easily be 
supplied by a small picket. The minimum front covered by 
the sentinels of a single picket may, therefore, be placed at 
400 yards. The maximum front, even when the picket fur- 
nishes four double sentinels, may be placed at 800 yards : for, 
as we have already seen that the distance from the sentinels 
to the picket may be as great as 400 yards, it is evident that 
with a front of 800 yards the commander of the picket or the 
reliefs, in visiting or relieving the sentinels, would have to go 
about a mile. The front covered by the vedettes of a cavalry 
picket varies from 1,000 to 2,000 yards. Infantry pickets are 
generally from 600 to 800 yards apart, and cavalry pickets 
from 1,000 to 1,500 yards. All these distances vary with dif- 
ferent circumstances of ground and weather: the distances 
given above have been found by "experience to answer in 
many cases, but they must often be materially changed. 



82 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

The line of resistance should be made the first considera- 
tion in selecting the ground for the outpost; then the line 
of observation should be fixed, the position of the sentinels 
regulating that of the pickets, and not the reverse. The 
following points should be considered in posting a picket: 

1. It should be near enough to the sentinels to give 
them prompt support, but not so close as to be involved in 
their disaster if they should be surprised and suddenly driv- 
en in. 

2. It should be posted on, and command, some route 
leading from the enemy; the largest pickets on the most 
important routes. 

3. It should be in a good defensive position, should have 
a good field of fire to the front, and should be so far concealed 
that the enemy could not discover it without attacking. 

4. It should, as far as consistent with the foregoing 
requirements, be in rear of the center of its line of sentinels. 

5. It should have free approaches to its sentinels, neigh- 
boring pickets, supports, and reserves, and should have a 
good line of retreat. 

6. It should be close enough to the neighboring pickets 
for mutual support, and a mutual flanking fire should be pro- 
vided for. 

A position fulfilling all these requirements can scarcely 
be hoped for; the best -position will be the one which fulfills 
the greatest part of them. 

If the picket is posted in a defile, its front should be cov- 
ered with obstacles, in order that it may not be overpowered 
by a sudden rush of the enemy. 

A picket should not be posted in a house nor in an en- 
closure. An exception to this rule is found in the case of a 
besieging force, whose front is covered with formidable 
obstacles. Thus, at the siege of Paris, the German pickets 



PICKETS. 83 

were frequently sheltered in houses or in underground posts, 
security from surprise being afforded by constant patrolling 
well to the front, and by formidable abatis in front of the 
line of sentinels. 

Any junction of roads leading from the enemy's posi- 
tion should be in front of the picket, and roads passing the 
flank should be carefully guarded. 

When an impassable obstacle, such as a swamp, lake, 
or stream, lies along a portion of the front of the outposts, 
the strength at that part of the line may be limited to the 
requirements of observation, the sentinels being few, and 
the chief reliance being placed upon patrolling. 

Other considerations affecting the position of the picket 
have already been noticed in connection with the general 
subject of the position of the outpost. 

Fires should not be lighted by a picket unless they can be 
well concealed from the enemy. If a fire is allowed at night, 
the rallying point should be some distance in its rear. If 
the enemy attacks, he will almost invariably march upon the 
fires, and will thus be clearly visible, while the picket will 
have the advantage of the darkness. 

The men composing the picket stack arms and may re- 
move their equipments, with the exception of the cartridge 
belt. They must not leave the immediate vicinity of the 
picket, and must be ready to fall in at a moment's notice. 
Part of the men must be constantly under arms at night, and 
separated from the rest, who keep their arms close at hand 
while sleeping. If danger seems imminent, the entire picket 
must be awake and under arms. The commander of the 
picket will cause it to stand to arms at once if a noise is heard 
from a neighboring picket ; and if that picket is attacked, he 
will endeavor to relieve it by an attack upon the enemy's 
flank. If an attack is not evident, but the noise seems sus- 
picious, a patrol must be sent to investigate. 



84 SKCURI1Y AND INFORMATION. 

In a cavalry picket, or in the case of mounted orderlies 
attached to an infantry picket, the horses should be kept con- 
stantly saddled, and the bridles should be taken off only for 
feeding and watering. Not more than one-third, or at most 
one-half, of the horses should be fed at a time. When there 
is no water close to the picket, only a few horses should be 
taken to the water at a time, the men in charge of them being 
under arms and fully equipped. Saddles should be adjusted 
once every twelve hours, or as much oftener as necessary, 
under direction of an officer or non-commissioned officer. 



SUPPORTS. 

The supports constitute a force upon which the pickets 
fall back if driven in by the enemy, or with which (in excep- 
tional cases) the pickets may be reinforced. The ground reg- 
ulates their position, as they should occupy the line of resist- 
ance. The position selected should afford a good general 
line of defense, ground uniformly moderately good being 
preferable to that which is very strong in some parts and 
weak in others. The supports should not be too far away 
from the pickets to render timely aid, nor so close as to be 
involved in their defeat if suddenly driven in. They should 
be located as centrally as practicable in reference to the 
pickets in their front, and should preferably be upon, or near, 
the main routes by which the enemy might advance. A de- 
file on the road leading from the enemy's position to the 
camp is generally a good position for a support. Often the 
best line of resistance lies close to the line of observation, or 
even coincides with it. In such cases the supports may be 
close to the pickets or merged with them. One support is 
generally sufficient for two or three pickets. 

The commander of the support should make arrange- 



COSSACK POSTS. 85 

ments with the commanders of the pickets in his front for 
concerted action in case of attack, and should maintain com- 
munication with them, with the neighboring supports, and 
with the reserve. This communication is generally kept up 
by means of patrols. 

The support must provide for its own immediate safety 
by sentinels or vedettes, but may relax to some extent the 
watchfulness exacted from the pickets. The men stack arms 
and are allowed to remove their accouterments (excepting 
always the cartridge belt), but they are not permitted to wan- 
der away from the post of the support, and must be ready at 
all times to fall in. They are usually allowed to light fires, 
and may be required to do the cooking for the pickets as well 
as for themselves. The horses with the support are kept in 
the same degree of readiness as those with the pickets. No 
shouting or unnecessary noise of any kind should be per- 
mitted in any part of the outpost. 



COSSACK POSTS. 
In many cases it will be expedient to replace the pickets 
and sentinels with a line of Cossack posts, sent out directly 
from the supports. Each of these posts consists of four men ; 
namely, three reliefs of a single sentinel, and a non-commis 
sioned officer or old soldier for the command of the post. 
Each support furnishes from four to twelve Cossack posts, 
which are placed from 300 to 400 yards in advance of it, and 
from 100 to 300 yards apart; the smaller limits of distance 
in the case of very close and rugged ground, and the latter 
in the case of very open ground. The sentinel is stationed 
from 10 to 30 yards in advance of the post, the other members 
of which remain concealed and keep him constantly in view. 
The sentinels are relieved every hour and the post every three 



86 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

hours. One or two men may be sent from the post, from time 
to time, to patrol to the post on either side; but, as a rule, all 
the patrolling is done from the support. 

It would seem at first thought that a line of Cossack 
posts must lack the resisting power of the two lines of sen- 
tinels and pickets, and that it should, therefore, be used 
only when the ground affords strong defensive positions. It 
is not, however, without many positive elements of strength. 
The sentinels are more likely to be free from the timidity of 
loneliness, and to be more resolute in the performance of 
their duty, when they are closely backed up by a friendly 
post, than when they are at a considerable distance from a 
picket. Each post could be intrenched, and should be so 
stationed as to be able to cross its fire with that of the posts 
on its right and left. It is reasonable to suppose that the 
posts could thus hold their own long enough to enable the 
supports to prepare fully for action. In consideration of 
these facts and the still more important one that the system 
of Cossack posts is in thorough keeping with the nature of 
American warfare, its adoption in almost every case may be 
safely recommended.* 

A comparison of the diagrams bn Plate VIII. will show 
the economy of men for outpost duty effected by the use of 
Cossack posts. In each case the line of observation is 2,400 
yards in length. In the first case we have four pickets, each 
supplying three reliefs for two double-sentinel posts and the 

* Notwithstanding the name, Cossack posts are of American ori- 
gin, and are the outgrowth of our own experience. General Pierron 
(quoting Baron von Valentini) says : "In the American war (1776-1783), 
as the terrain was extremely wooded and rough, instead of forming 
the first line of a thin chain of sentinels separated from each other 
(who could not have been relieved during the night, as the relief 
would have lost its way in the underbrush), a cordon of small groups 
was employed, in which one man watched while those who were in 
turn to relieve him slept. These groups were placed at the edge of 
the wood and on the roads."— Me'thodes de Guerre, tome III, lere partie, 
p. 52. 



PLATE Tffl. 



Figure / 



line of observation = »^antr. 



.--♦«- * 



<;--•--** 



m Pickets 



001 Su/i/iorts 4fc- 






Figure 2. 



„r O bseruation » o 4 
i ine ' «*»«* A* ****** 

.-* '.r-v-r--;.-.., . 

7 \\ /V >--*. 



u r- P- \° r t 



:'. 



/^.jopP 



** 



e s e r V e 



THE RESERVE. »9 

post at the picket. Add three reliefs of (say) four connect- 
ing sentinels for the entire line, and we have 72 men ; but 
one-third of the picket consists of patrols, which makes the 
total for the pickets 108 men. In the second case we will take 
the same number of connecting sentinels and allow the same 
number of men for patrols, assigning them, however, to the 
supports. 

We have, then, the following: 

Fig. 1. Fig. 2. 

Pickets . . . 108 men. Cossack posts . 48 men. 

Supports . .108 men. Supports 96 men. 

Eeserve . . .108 men. Reserve 96 men. 

Total. . . 324 men. * Total 240 men. 

Adding non-commissioned officers, we should have in the 
first case about 360 men for the strength of the outpost, and 
in the second case about 260. In round numbers, we should 
require four companies (war strength) in the first case and 
three in the second. This estimate may be regarded as a 
minimum rather than a maximum. 



THE RESERVE. 

The reserve forms the general support and pivot of re- 
sistance of the whole outpost, and usually consists of all three 
arms. It should be concealed from the enemy, and should 
be posted as centrally as practicable, so as to enable it to 
move quickly to any endangered point. It may sometimes 
be divided into two parts, to facilitate supporting the more 
advanced bodies; and it should be upon their principal line 
or lines of retreat to the main body. Its position may be in- 
trenched and strengthened with obstacles; but, as a rule, it 
will advance to reinforce the supports or pickets, and the 
intrenchments should be on the line of resistance. 



9<D SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

The same rules obtain, in regard to the men and horses, 
with the reserve as in the case of the supports. The reserve 
is allowed to light fires ; and in the exceptional cases where 
fires are prohibited to the more advanced parties, it must do 
the cooking for them. 

In the case of a small force which can prepare quickly for 
action, or when the main body bivouacs in order of battle, the 
reserve may sometimes be dispensed with. When the reserve 
is not needed, its omission greatly relieves the troops from 
the pressure of outpost duty; but it can rarely be safely 
omitted from the composition of the outpost. The line of re- 
sistance being 3,000 yards from the main body, it is evident 
that, unless the latter were in a state of instant readiness, 
the supports might be overwhelmed before they could receive 
assistance, if there were no reserve. To keep the main body in 
such a state of readiness would, to a great extent, defeat the 
prime object of the outpost. In rare cases, where the sup- 
ports occupy a very strong defensive position, and the main 
body can be held close at hand sheltered from the enemy's 
artillery fire, the reserve may be omitted. 

No compliments are paid by the outpost; but when a re- 
serve, support, or picket is approached by a general officer, 
the commander of the outpost, or an armed party, the men 
fall in in rear of the stacks, ready to take arms. Individual 
members of the outpost, with the exception of sentinels on 
post, salute when addressing, or addressed by, a superior 
officer. 



THE OUTPOST AT NIGHT. 

The foregoing description of the outpost duties relates 
principally to the cordon system. If this system were re- 
tained at night, it would be necessary either to increase the 



THE OUTPOST AT NIGHT. 9 1 

number of sentinels greatly, thus adding to the burden of 
oupost duty, or else to draw in the outpost line closer to the 
main body, thus contracting the front. The greatest objec- 
tion to the latter alternative is, that valuable ground would 
thus be abandoned, which, if the enemy were enterprising, 
might be regained only at the cost of an engagement. If it 
can be avoided, the outpost line must never be drawn in at 
night; but should such a measure become necessary, the 
position should be resumed again at early dawn, and the out- 
post should occupy it with as much caution and vigilance as 
when it was first taken up. 

The outpost system of Marshal Bugeaud is generally 
adopted in its essential features for night. This is based on 
the idea that in making a night attack, in any but an excep- 
tionally open country, the enemy's movements must neces- 
sarily be confined to roads and clearly defined paths. In a 
close country, movements off the roads can not, in fact, be 
made by any force larger' than a patrol; while in an open 
country, roads and paths must be followed for guidance, un- 
less the ground is thoroughly known and there is a bright 
moon. The uncertainty of effecting the necessary combina- 
tions at night, and the danger of columns losing their way 
and not arriving at appointed destinations at the proper 
time, render night attacks in force very infrequent. They 
must, however, be carefully guarded against; and partial 
attacks for the purpose of alarming the outpost, capturing 
sentinels or pickets, or reconnoitering the position, must be 
expected. 

If, then, double sentinels are placed on the roads and 
paths, and closely backed up by their reliefs, the advanced 
posts thus formed will give timely warning of the enemy's 
approach in force. But the intervening ground must not be 
neglected, or hostile patrols might push through and recon- 



92 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

noiter the position. The ground between the sentinels is, 
therefore, thoroughly patrolled, the number of men available 
for this purpose being increased by the diminution of the 
number of sentinel posts. Nothing more than careful obser- 
vation and warning should be expected of the advanced 
posts, the duty of resistance falling first upon the pick- 
ets, which should be nearer the sentinels at night than dur- 
ing the day, and should be in strong defensive positions on 
the roads, in rear of the advanced posts furnished by them. 

In cavalry outposts the pickets are placed on the roads, 
double vedettes being pushed out in front. Each picket must 
be on the alert and prepared to fight on foot. Its position 
may be strengthened by barricading the road; but care must 
be taken to leave a passage by which the vedettes may retire, 
and the barricade must not be so constructed as to prove an 
obstacle to the advance of the troops in rear. 

When the enemy is close at hand and aggressive, it may 
sometimes be advisable, in addition to barring his advance 
on the main roads, to post a cordon of sentinels near the camp 
or bivouac, to check small patrols of the enemy, which might 
otherwise annoy and alarm the main body and destroy its 
repose. As a rule, however, patrolling between the advanced 
posts will be sufficient to check such hostile parties. 

All changes in the position of the outpost must be ar- 
ranged during daylight, and made at late dusk. Even if the 
cordon system is retained and the line is not drawn in, the 
positions of the sentinels and pickets should be changed, in 
order to prevent their possible capture by the enemy, who 
may have noted their positions during the day. The senti- 
nels, who are habitually posted on high ground during the 
day, should be moved to lower ground at night, so as to 
bring an approaching enemy in view on the sky line. As a 
rule, the sentinels should be pushed forward from the high 



THE OUTPOST AT NIGHT. 93 

ground rather than drawn back, in order to retain possession 
of the ridge. 

The plate given as a frontispiece illustrates the changes 
made in the positon of the outpost at night, and the manner 
in which the normal formation may be modified to suit the 
topography. In this case the lines of observation and re- 
sistance are coincident, and in case of attack the supports 
would advance to the line of the pickets. Support C is on 
the coincident lines, its front covered with Cossack posts. 
The reserve is necessarily divided, the right portion being in 
readiness to reinforce supports and D, and the left portion 
to reinforce support E. Picket K sends out a detached post 
N to watch the bridge, and establishes one double sentinel, 
whose functions are mainly those of a connecting sentinel 
between the picket and the detached post. 

At night, picket K moves close to the detached post at 
the bridge. Pickets H and I are united and posted at L, send- 
ing out a single double sentinel closely backed up by the re- 
lief. In a similar way picket G moves to G' and picket F to 
F'. There are no changes in support C and its Cossack posts. 
Support D is divided and moves to D' D'. Similarly, sup- 
port E is divided and stationed at E' -E\ It is not usual 
either to divide or advance the supports, but in this case 
topographical conditions make it necessary. The same con- 
ditions render it advisable to advance the reserve B B to 
B' B'. It will be observed, however, that the line of resist- 
ance is the same as by day, and that the distance from this 
line to the main body remains the same. 

The artillery of the outpost is stationed on the hill P, 
where it commands every avenue of approach, and is sup- 
ported by the reserve. The range and direction of the bridges 
and other important approaches are obtained during the day, 
and the guns remain in the same position at night. 



94 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

The extent and direction of the patrolling are indicated 
in the diagram. 

Sandy Creek is fordable with difficulty, and is passable 
for all arms only at the bridges. Swamp Run is everywhere 
fordable, but the swamp is impassable. 



OUTPOST PATROLS. 

The outpost patrols are of two kinds : visiting patrols and 
reconnoitering patrols. 

Visiting Patrols. — Visiting patrols usually consist of a 
non-commissioned officer and two or three men. They are 
sent out from the picket, and keep up communication be- 
tween it and its sentinels and detached posts, the neighbor- 
ing pickets, and the support. In making its rounds the patrol 
first touches upon the nearest sentinel of the picket on its 
right (or left), and then passes along the front of its own sen- 
tinels to the nearest sentinel of the picket on its left (or right), 
returning by the rear to its own picket. The patrol (espe- 
cially if composed of cavalry) may often find it expedient, as 
a means of concealment, to pass in rear of the sentinels. The 
patrol must see that the sentinels of its picket understand, 
and faithfully perform, their duties. They examine any sus- 
picious points which the sentinel can not inspect without go- 
ing too far away from his post; take charge of persons de- 
tained by the sentinels, and relieve any sentinel who may be 
sick or wounded. 

Visiting patrols are mainly used at night. When the 
sentinels can be seen from the picket, the patrol would not 
ordinarily make the rounds, during the day, oftener than 
once each relief. At night, the patrol should not cover a 
front of more than 500 yards in its operations. When the dis- 
tance between two advanced posts exceeds this, they should 



PLATE IX. 



A 


Reserve 


B 


Support. 


C 


Picket 


P 


Patrol 


M 


Main body. 


:=. 


County road. 




Farm road 



Patrol System of Outposts. 



JVote: - 

Only the lateral patrols are 
shown in the sketch. Patrols 
would also be sent to the 
front on each road. 




A.R. 



PATROLLING POSTS. 97 

be visited by separate patrols, which would generally be from 
different pickets, as posts at so great an interval would rarely 
be furnished by the same picket. It is seldom necessary for 
a visiting patrol to examine beyond the line of observation 
during the day. When it does so, it should not go beyond 
sight of the sentinels; and at night it should not advance 
beyond short rifle range. When the picket is weak, the re- 
liefs must be used as visiting patrols. 

Reconnoitering Patrols. — The sentinels guard against sur- 
prise, but the information they can gain in regard to the ene- 
my is generally very slight. This information must be sought 
by reconnoitering patrols sent out towards the enemy, to 
watch his movements, and, if possible, examine his position. 

Eeconnoitering patrols are either small or strong. A 
small patrol varies in size from three men to a squad. If com- 
posed of infantry, it should not, as a rule, advance more than 
half a mile beyond the line of sentinels at night: in daytime 
it may often prudently advance farther. Cavalry is gener- 
ally used for this duty by day, and may push out five or ten 
miles, or even farther, according to the discretion of the 
patrol commander. The patrol should go far enough to see 
the enemy's sentinels, if not too distant, and may even pene- 
trate his line of observation. 

It is a good rule to use at night the patrols that have 
scouted the same region by day. The time, direction, and 
manner of sending out patrols must be constantly varied, in 
order that the enemy may not be prepared to cut them off. A 
small patrol must constantly bear in mind that its business is 
not to fight, but to observe. It should accordingly be careful 
to avoid engagements, unless ordered to take prisoners. Its 
duty is most efficiently performed when it comes back with 
valuable information without having been seen by the enemy. 

Patrolling Posts. — At night the advanced posts in front 



98 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

of the pickets may be replaced by patrolling posts of four 
men each. The patrolling posts are small patrols sent out 
at dusk along all the avenues by which the enemy might ap- 
proach. The commanders of these patrols should be selected 
with care, and should be hampered with as few restrictions 
as possible; usually receiving general instructions to patrol 
a certain road to a certain distance. The distance will de- 
pend upon circumstances ; but it should always be such that 
information of the enemy's approach may be sent back in 
time to enable the picket and support to be ready to receive 
him. When the distance is greater than 1,000 yards, the 
patrolling post might better be composed of cavalry. If com- 
posed of infantry, a mounted orderly should accompany it. 

The patrolling post must not leave the road or path 
assigned to it; but it may either keep moving or remain sta- 
tionary at the limit of the distance to which it is ordered to 
patrol. In the latter case a sentinel or vedette is posted, and 
the rest of the patrol remains near at hand and well con- 
cealed. The sentinel should be relieved every half -hour, and 
the patrolling post every three hours. The relief moves out 
from the picket, along the designated road or path, until it 
comes upon the patrolling post. As the picket itself must 
generally be constantly on the alert at night, the only object 
in relieving the patrolling posts it to make an equitable divi- 
sion of a hazardous duty. If the number of patrolling posts 
is such as to weaken the picket materially, the support must 
be moved up close enough to it to render prompt assistance; 
or, if this can not be done without abandoning a strong posi- 
tion for a weaker one, the support must send reinforcements 
to the picket, and draw corresponding reinforcements from 
the reserve. The members of the patrolling post must pre- 
serve the strictest silence, and must not under any circum- 
stances smoke or light fires; for the safety of the post de- 



STRONG PATROLS. 99 

pends upon the darkness, silence, absence of fire, and the 
enemy's ignorance of its location. 

Strong Patrols. — When strong patrols are sent out from 
the outpost, they are generally taken from the support or re- 
serve. They vary in size from nine men to a company or 
troop ; and if composed of less than two squads, may be taken 
from a picket. As a rule, the movements of a strong patrol 
are not so cautious as those of a small one. Its object is to 
gain information that can not be acquired by sentinels or 
small patrols. If composed of infantry, it rarely goes more 
than a mile and a half from the line of sentinels, and it should 
have one or two mounted men with it to insure the rapid 
transmission of intelligence back to the outpost. If a post of 
the enemy is discovered, the patrol will generally endeavor 
to remain concealed in observation of it, sending back infor- 
mation of anything important that may be noted; but a 
strong patrol may sometimes be used offensively to discover 
the enemy's position or intentions by attacking a post. Pa- 
trols of the enemy must be kept back, and may be attacked, 
especially for the purpose of capturing prisoners; but, as a 
rule, the patrol avoids firing, and endeavors, as far as possi- 
ble, to see without being seen.* 

If the patrols return without reporting anything, vigi- 
lance must not be relaxed; for it is possible for patrols to 
take a wrong direction, or to pass close to the enemy without 
discovering him. On the afternoon before the battle of 
Shiloh, General Prentiss sent a force, consisting of three com- 
panies of the 21st Missouri Infantry (Col. Moore), to recon- 
noiter in his front. They followed a line oblique to the front 
of the camp, which led them to the right, in front of Sher- 
man's line. After marching three miles, they returned to 
camp, and reported that they had seen nothing. Had they 

♦For the conduct of patrols, see the next chapter. 

7 



IOO SKCURITY AND INFORMATION. 

moved direct to the front, they would have struck Hardee's 
Confederate corps. 

As a rule, patrols are frequent; and when the enemy 
is in force and close at hand, they are constant. 



POSTING AND RELIEVING THE OUTPOST. 

The men detailed for outpost duty should have a proper 
supply of ammunition, and (when practicable) one day's 
cooked rations. Their canteens should be filled with coffee, 
or, if cooking is to be allowed, with water. Each officer 
should have a watch, compass, field-glass, memorandum pad 
and lead-pencil; and, if possible, he should be provided with 
a topographical map of the ground to be occupied by the out- 
post. Every non-commissioned officer should have a lead- 
pencil and a small memorandum pad. 

The troops detailed having been inspected, and the sub- 
ordinate officers having taken down in writing the instruc- 
tions of the outpost commander (if time admits), the force 
moves out, with an advance guard, to take up the designated 
positions. The reserve and supports may each march inde- 
pendently from camp directly to its position; or they may 
march together and be detached from the column at suitable 
points. Each body moves to its position covered by a point 
and flanking groups, and the pickets especially move with 
extreme vigilance. When the picket is halted, slightly in 
rear of the selected line of observation, several squads 
are deployed as skirmishers, with sufficient intervals to en- 
able their front to cover approximately the front of the senti- 
nels of the picket, and are pushed forward cautiously to re- 
connoiter, being followed by the first relief of sentinels. If 
it should be impracticable to use a sufficient number of skir- 
mishers to cover the front of the sentinels without too great 



POSTING AND RELIEVING THE OUTPOST. IOI 

an extension of intervals, several small patrols should recon- 
noiter the ground in front. The picket commander halts on 
the line of observation, and the skirmishers move on to re- 
connoiter in its front, not going farther than 100 yards if 
the country is close or wooded. When the relief comes up, 
the picket commander posts the sentinels quickly, the posts 
afterwards being changed as may be required. Any tree, 
building, haystack, or other object affording a good view 
should be occupied at once as a lookout by two men, one of 
whom should, if practicable, be provided with a field-glass. 
As soon as the sentinels have been tentatively posted, the 
skirmishers or patrols are recalled and sent back to the 
picket; after which the picket commander touches upon the 
nearest sentinel of the picket on his right (or left), and 
passes along his own line of observation to the nearest 
sentinel of the picket on his left (or right). He assures 
himself that his sentinels are in positions best suited for 
observation and concealment, sees that the number of posts 
does not exceed the requirements of efficient observation, 
and then returns to his picket. He next posts the picket 
sentinel and such connecting sentinels as may be necessary, 
sends out such detached posts as may be requisite, details a 
portion of the picket for patrolling (dividing the men thus 
detailed into patrols numbered consecutively), orders the 
picket to stack arms and fall out, and sends to his immediate 
commander a report of his position and dispositions, accom- 
panied, if practicable, with a rough sketch of the same. 

If Cossack posts are established instead of pickets and 
sentinels, the force on leaving the supports deploys first into 
line of squads, and then into line of skirmishers, taking such 
intervals as to cover the front to be occupied. On halting on 
the line of observation, such reconnaissance to the front as 
may be necessary is effected, and the skirmishers are then 



102 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

assembled by squads. Numbers 3 and 4, front and rear rank, 
of each squad are then marched half way to the next squad 
on their left, and halted. Each group of four men then con- 
stitutes a Cossack post. 

A cavalry picket is posted in a manner similar to the 
method of posting one composed of infantry. If the country 
is open, the picket remains mounted during the posting of the 
vedettes; if the country is wooded and close, it is prepared 
to fight on foot. When the picket commander returns to the 
picket, the men are allowed to dismount; or, if prepared for 
fighting on foot, they are assembled and stand to horse. The 
horses are then placed under a proper guard, and the men 
fall out. 

After the picket commander has sent in his first report, 
he visits his detached posts, and makes such inspection of 
the ground as may be necessary to familiarize him with the 
roads, paths, and other topographical features of his position, 
but should not go beyond reach of his picket. If streams or 
other obstacles exist in front of his position, he ascertains at 
what points they are passable; and he must satisfy himself 
that the picket occupies a post fulfilling, as far as possible, 
the requirements already set forth. He takes such measures 
in regard to strengthening his position as may be required 
by circumstances and be in consonance with orders received 
by him; but while he should make all prudent preparations 
to defend the main avenues of approach, bridges, fords, etc., 
he should not obstruct a main road with obstacles whose 
removal might delay the advance of the main body, nor de- 
stroy bridges, without orders from higher authority. He 
must be especially careful to see that the picket post at night 
is prepared for a stubborn defense; and he must, at all times, 
consider what he would do in case of attack. "Though by 
nature he be slow of thought, he has nothing to fear, provided 



POSTING AND RELIEVING THE OUTPOST. 103 

he has made up his mind beforehand as to what he will do 
when attacked."* 

When, at the close of a day's march, the advance guard 
forms the outpost, the advance party furnishes the pickets 
and sentinels (being reinforced, if necessary, from the sup- 
port until the two bodies are equal in strength) ; the support 
furnishes the supports; and the reserve constitutes the re- 
serve of the outpost. When the place for camp or bivouac is 
selected, the advance guard marches to its post as an outpost 
in the same general manner as though detailed from camp. 

Whenever practicable, the outpost should be divided into 
three equal parts, which should so relieve each other as to 
make an equitable division of the duty on the line of observa- 
tion. At the end of each eight hours the reserve should take 
the place of the support, the support should relieve the pick- 
ets; and the latter should march back and unite at the posi- 
tion of the reserve. This arrangement would give each senti- 
nel two hours and forty minutes on post (which might be di- 
vided into two periods of an hour and twenty minutes each) 
during his tour of outpost duty. If, for any reason, this 
method of equalizing the duty should be impracticable, a 
careful roster of sentinel duty, and especially of night duty, 
should be kept, and the burden should be equalized in the 
course of several tours. To equalize the burden of sentinel 
duty as advised above, it might sometimes be expedient to 
change the typical formation as given in Plate VI., so as to 
have one entire battalion in each line ; though such a change 
is open to the objection that, in case of attack, it would be 
difficult to avoid an intermingling of the different battalions. 
*Wolseley. 



104 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

THE DEFENSE OF THE OUTPOST. 

The outpost should, as a rule, avoid unnecessary move- 
ments tending to bring on an engagement; but if attacked, 
it should resist stubbornly, in order to give the main body 
time to prepare for action. The chief resistance is generally 
made on the line of supports, though in some cases it may be 
best for the supports to advance to the line of pickets. In 
the former case, the picket usually deploys as skirmishers, 
and advances to reinforce the line of sentinels; the whole 
line then falling back slowly upon the supports, taking ad- 
vantage of every defensive feature of the ground, and fight- 
ing resolutely. In order that the fire of the support may not 
be masked, the pickets will direct their retreat upon its 
flanks, instead of falling directly back upon it. The skir- 
mishers then form on a line with the skirmishers of the sup- 
port. In the latter case the pickets should be intrenched. 
The sentinels fall back upon them, moving towards their 
flanks to unmask their fire ; and the supports are brought up 
and deployed in the intervals between the pickets. In either 
case, the reserve is brought up to reinforce the troops in 
front, as soon as the nature and direction of the attack be- 
come apparent. 

In case the enemy is repulsed, the infantry should re- 
sume its former positions, but should not ordinarily pursue. 
The cavalry should send out patrols to discover where the 
enemy halted. These patrols should beware of ambuscade, 
and must not push beyond an indicated distance. When the 
outpost is composed of infantry alone, small detachments de- 
ployed as skirmishers may sometimes be sent in pursuit, but 
the outpost must not be much weakened for this purpose. 
Soon after the repulse of the attack, the pickets and supports 
should shift their positions (unless by so doing it would be 
necessary to abandon strong points), in order to deprive the 



RELIEVING THE OUTPOST 105 

enemy of profiting by the knowledge of the position gained 
by attacking. 

When knowledge of the enemy's approach is gained in 
time to admit of full preparation, he should be received with 
volleys. This would enable the officers to keep the troops 
better in hand, and would have a desirable moral effect on the 
enemy, as volleys may be regarded as an indication of cool- 
ness and readiness on the part of the troops delivering them. 

The pickets should be under arms an hour before day- 
break, as an attack is most likely to occur at dawn. 



RELIEVING THE OUTPOST. 

The outpost is relieved at daybreak, in order that there 
may be double strength on the outpost line at the time when, 
an attack is most to be feared. 

The new reserve marches to the post of the old one, where 
both rest with arms stacked, and the new commander re- 
ceives from the old all information possessed by the latter in 
regard to the enemy, and the standing orders for the reserve. 
Each support marches to the post of the support which it is 
to relieve, and both supports rest, while information and 
orders are turned over as in the case of the reserves. When 
a new picket arrives to relieve an old one, each stands at 
ease while the new and the old commanders visit the senti- 
nels' posts together, followed by the first relief from the new 
picket. The old commander points out to the new the im- 
portant topographical features of the vicinity, and the known 
or suspected positions of the hostile posts ; and gives him alt 
the information that has been gained in regard to the enemy.* 

*There is a complete absence of ceremony in relieving an outpost 
ihere is no position prescribed for the new reserve, supports or pick- 
ets. They rest solely to avoid fatigue, and the pickets stand at ease- 
merely to insure silence. 



106 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

When the old sentinels and detached posts have been re- 
lieved, the commander of the old picket (unless there appears 
to be danger of an attack) sends in a written report to the 
commander of the outpost or section, and marches his picket 
back to its support. As soon as the support has been joined 
by its pickets, it marches back to its reserve, and the entire 
old outpost returns to camp; or each support may march 
directly back to camp as soon as it is joined by its pickets. 
If, while the old outpost or any part of it is returning, the 
enemy should attack, it must be at once marched back to 
the assistance of the new outpost. 

As a rule, outposts should be relieved every twenty-four 
hours. With cavalry this is necessary; but in the case of 
infantry, if the enemy is not near and enterprising, it may 
sometimes be advisable to keep the same troops on outpost 
duty for forty-eight hours, if the command remains in camp. 

If the army is on the march, the outpost will be relieved 
as soon as the advance guard has passed the chain of senti- 
nels. The pickets will not, as a rule, fall back to the sup- 
ports, but will join them at some designated point on the line 
of march, in order to save the fatigued men from unnecessary 
marching. The reserve follows the rear of the column, and 
the supports and pickets, united at designated rendezvous, 
form the rear guard of the column. 

If the army is retreating, the outpost each day (when 
practicable) forms the rear guard. The manner of relieving 
the outpost in this case is considered in the chapter on Rear 
Guards. 



RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE. 107 

CHAPTER IV. 

RECONNAISSANCE. 



How can any man decide what he should do himself, if he is 
ignorant of what his enemy is about?— Jomini. 

It is an easy matter to criticise military operations after 
the event; but it should be borne in mind that the conditions 
and relative positions of the opposing forces, always set forth 
with clearness by a good historian, are matters of doubt to 
the commanders while the operations are in progress. The 
curtain that separates the players in the game of kriegsspiel 
is an apt symbol of the veil of uncertainty which hangs be- 
tween two opposing armies. To screen his own movements 
and positions, and to gain a knowledge of those of his oppo- 
nent, a commander must depend mainly upon reconnoitering 
bodies; and upon the zeal, daring, prudence, and skill of 
these bodies, the intelligence and promptness with which 
their reports are collated, and his own power of making cor- 
rect deductions or synthetical conclusions from separate 
facts reported, must in a great measure depend his chances 
of success. 

Reconnaissance may be considered under the following 
heads : 

1. Reconnaissance in force. 

2. Special reconnaissance. 

3. Patrolling. 

Reconnaissance in Force. — Reconnaissances in force are 
made only by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and the 
force employed generally consists of all three arms. They 
are often made just before an action, for the purpose of dis- 



io 8 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

covering the enemy's strength and dispositions, and frequent- 
ly lead to a battle. The reconnaissance is conducted in the 
same general manner as a regular attack. Artillery is 
brought into action for the purpose of drawing the fire of the 
enemy's guns and thus discovering their position. The out- 
posts are attacked, and, if possible, driven in, and different 
parts of the enemy's line are threatened, or actually attacked, 
by skirmishers in strength according to the result desired. 
Efforts are made while driving in the enemy's pickets to cap- 
ture prisoners. Staff officers, advancing with the skirmish- 
ers, rapidly sketch the different features of the enemy's posi- 
tion, and note his apparent strength at different points. 

Prisoners captured in a reconnaissance in force should 
be questioned as to the regiments, brigades, divisions, etc., 
to which they belong. If prisoners have been captured all 
along the line, their answers will discover the enemy's posi- 
tions and strength. Even if the prisoners should be uniform- 
ly stubborn and untruthful, their regimental badges would 
convey valuable information. 

Cavalry and horse artillery are especially valuable in a 
reconnaissance in force, as they can be withdrawn from ac- 
tion more easily than infantry; and it would be well to limit 
the reconnaissance to these two arms when they are in ample 
force, and circumstances render their action sufficient. To 
be successful, however, a reconnaissance in force should im- 
pose upon the enemy the belief that he is encountering a real 
attack; and this consideration will determine the kind of 
troops to employ and the hour at which the attack should be 
made. If infantry be employed in the attack, it will be hard 
to break off the action ; but if it be not employed, it will gen- 
erally be manifest that the attack is not serious. As to the 
time of making the reconnaissance, if it be made late in the 
afternoon, the troops may be withdrawn under cover of the 



RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE. 109 

darkness; but if made at that hour, the enemy will probably 
suspect the true nature of the operation. If made in the 
morning, the enemy will doubtless believe it to be a serious 
attack; but it may very easily precipitate a battle. 

It is evident, therefore, that a reconnaissance in force is 
a difficult operation. Indeed, it should never be made except 
when other means of getting necessary information about 
the enemy fail. It is open to three serious objections : 

1. It often results in committing the troops so com- 
pletely to action as to bring on a battle through the necessity 
of bringing up other troops to their assistance. 

At Worth a reconnaissance by the 20th Prussian Bri- 
gade developed the enemy; and the other German troops 
"moving to the sound of the cannon," precipitated a battle a 
day earlier than the Crown Prince had intended. 

2. The withdrawal of the troops in pursuance to the 
general plan of the reconnaissance may often present the 
appearance of defeat. 

In 1859 Giulay caused a reconnaissance in force to be 
made by Stadion's Corps. It developed Forey's Division 
near Montebello; and although the Austrians withdrew in 
accordance with the plan of reconnaissance, the moral effect 
of the action on both sides was that of a victory of a French 
division over an Austrian army corps. 

On July 18, 1861, McDowell ordered Tyler to observe 
with his division the roads leading from Centerville to Bull 
Kun, but not to bring on an engagement. Tyler exceeded his 
instructions by making a reconnaissance in force; and,though 
he succeeded in developing the enemy's front in the vicinity 
of Blackburn's Ford, his left flank was turned by the Confed- 
erates, he was forced to fall back, and the apparent defeat 
had a depressing effect upon the raw troops composing the 
Union army. 



IIO SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

3. It is always a costly means of gaining information. 
The Atlanta campaign, conducted mainly in a heavily wooded 
country, where the opposing forces, though always near,were 
often completely concealed from each other, furnishes numer- 
ous examples of reconnaissances in force, which were gener- 
ally very costly ones. These reconnaissances were termed 
demonstrations, and were usually made by a continuous line 
of considerable extent. In advancing, the army was always 
covered by a line of skirmishers, which on halting became a 
line of sentinels. When a demonstration was ordered, the 
sentinels advanced, thus becoming again a line of skirmish- 
ers, and were supported more or less by the troops in rear 
according to the earnestness of the demonstration. 

On June 22, 1864, in order to ascertain the presence and 
position of Johnston's army at»the base of Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, a demonstration was made in front of the 2d Division of 
the IV. Corps. The 97th Ohio Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnes), operating in front of the 2d Brigade of that division, 
encountered the enemy in a strong position, and suffered the 
severe loss of 98 killed and wounded (including 7 officers) out 
of a total strength of 369 — a heavier loss than it incurred in 
any of the great battles in which it was engaged during the 
war.* 

Special Reconnaissances. — Eeconnaissances of this class 
have some limited and definite object in view: to discover 

*The reconnaissance in front of the 1st Brigade, made, at the 
same time, by the 24th Wisconsin Infantry (Major MacArthur), furn- 
ishes an exception to the general rule of severe losses on special recon- 
naissance. The men of this regiment were instructed each to select a 
tree about 50 yards in front of the line, and, at command, to run for- 
ward and halt behind the tree selected. The regiment, thus pushing 
forward by a series of rushes, advanced three-fourths of the distance 
separating it from the enemy, developed his position, and com- 
pletely gained the object of the reconnaissance, with the loss of only 
two men killed and eleven wounded. This happy adaptation of 
tactics to the terrain enabled the reconnaissance on this part of the 
line to be made with an exceptionally small loss. 



SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCES. Iir 

whether a certain point is occupied in force by the enemy; 
whether a bridge is broken, or a defile is fortified; to capture 
a picket, with a view to gaining information ; or to attack a 
post for the purpose of discovering the intentions or morale 
of the enemy. In the latter case, the inference to be drawn is 
that the post is of much or little importance, or that the ene- 
my is confident or dispirited, according to its stubborn de- 
fense or quick abandonment. The post might, however, be 
abandoned solely because of its lack of support by other 
parts of the line. Thus the abandonment of the Turkish posts 
at Balaklava at the first attack was evidence neither of the 
unimportance of the posts nor of the impaired morale of the 
defenders, but it was an indication that the dispositions of 
the Allies were extremely faulty. Though this was not a 
case of reconnaissance, but of the real attack the same result 
might occur in a special reconnaissance. 

The manner of conducting a special reconnaissance de- 
pends upon its object and the circumstances under which it 
is conducted. A good rule in one case might be a fatal guide 
in another. The following instance of a brilliant and suc- 
cessful special reconnaissance shows how the alert intelli- 
gence and personal daring of a commander of a reconnoiter- 
ing party may solve a problem for which no rule can be 
prescribed: 

In the spring of 1863, the First Cavalry Division, Army 
of the Potomac, was ordered to make a reconnaissance to- 
wards Orange Court-House, to develop the position and 
strength of the enemy on the Kapidan ; other troops, infantry 
and cavalry, being detached on similar duty towards other 
points of the enemy's line. When the cavalry division ar- 
rived at the Rapidan, it discovered a weak line of Confeder- 
ate outposts and a long line of earthworks; but was unable 
to ascertain whether the latter was occupied, especially as 



112 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

orders discouraged any considerable engagement or "the sac- 
rifice of men." To induce the enemy to show his force, vari- 
ous expedients were resorted to, but without result. It was 
finally determined to cross the stream at the ford in front, 
and the advance squadron (5th U. S. Cavalry) moved towards 
the crossing. The line of advance gave, at points, a view of 
the interior of the enemy's line, which seemed to indicate that 
it was held by a strong force. Acting with prompt resolu- 
tion, the squadron commander (Captain Ash) quickly placed 
his men behind cover near by, and rode alone along the bank 
of the river at a rapid gallop, looking into the enemy's works. 
A furious fusillade from the earthworks followed his move- 
ment; but he succeeded in making a complete inspection, 
and, waving his hat triumphantly over his head, rode back 
to his command, loudly cheered by the forces on both sides of 
the river, the Confederates mounting their breastworks and 
waving their hats in admiration of the gallant exploit. Thus 
the object of the reconnaissance was gained without the loss 
of a man. 

In an attempt upon a picket of the enemy, the most fa- 
vorable place for crossing his line of sentinels is sought out, 
and the necessary dispositions are made, before dark; the 
attack being made at night or at late dusk. The force should 
ordinarily be divided into two detachments, one of which 
should remain concealed and ready to rush forward to the 
assistance of the other if necessary. The latter endeavors to 
cross the line of sentinels unperceived, advancing silently, in 
close order, without flankers, and with only one or two scouts 
in advance. As soon as the line of sentinels is passed, the 
greatest difficulty is overcome. The detachment moves 
quickly upon the picket so as to attack it on the flank and 
rear. It is imperative that the attack should be prompt and 
impetuous, and made simultaneously from two or more di- 



PATROLLING. 113 

rections. The great object of the attack is, of course, to cap- 
ture prisoners, with a view to obtaining information from 
them. The prisoners are hurried away, and the reconnoiter- 
ing force makes its retreat without delay. 

The force employed in a special reconnaissance varies 
in size from a company or troop to a division. The dividing 
line between a special reconnaissance and a reconnaissance 
in force is often very dim, and in many cases the same opera- 
tion could be designated by either term. On the 4th of July, 
1864, Sherman being in doubt as to the presence of John- 
ston's army at Smyrna Camp-Ground, Howard ordered a 
demonstration, which he describes as follows: 

"I called Stanley, whose division held the front. 'Gen- 
eral, double your skirmishers and press them.' At once it 
was done. The lines sped forward, capturing the outlying 
pits of the enemy, and took many prisoners ; but a sheet of 
lead instantly came from the hidden works in the edge of 
the wood beyond us, and several batteries hurled their shot 
across our lines,some of them reaching our grove and forcing 
us [Sherman and Howard] to retire."* 

This demonstration may with equal correctness be 
termed either a reconnaissance in force or a special recon- 
naissance. The force employed would justify the former 
term, and the limited and special object would render the 
latter proper. 

Patrolling. — Patrols are divided into small patrols and 
strong patrols. A strong patrol varies in strength from nine 
men to a troop of cavalry or a company of infantry. A small 
patrol varies from three men to a squad. A patrol should 
never consist of less than three men; for if it were composed 
of only two, it would be impossible to send back a report of 
anything seen or heard, without leaving one man alone, with- 
out support, in the proximity of the enemy. 

♦"Battles and Leaders- of the Civil War," Vol. IV., p. 313. 



114 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

In our service patrols are also classified as officers', recon- 
noitering, visiting, covering (flanking), and connecting patrols.* 
To these maybe added exploring, harassing, expeditionary, and 
pursuing patrols. The classification into small and strong 
patrols is the important one; for without changing its size, 
and without material modification of its methods, the patrol 
may combine the functions of several of the different kinds of 
patrols contained in the second classification. In fact, the 
latter classification is mainly for convenience of description. 

Officers' patrols are extensively used in connection with 
the cavalry screen, and will therefore be considered in the 
next chapter. Visiting patrols have already been considered; 
they belong exclusively to outposts. 

Exploring patrols have for their object to explore the 
country in front of the army. The nature of this exploration 
and the manner of conducting it belong rather to "Military 
Topography" than to the subject here considered; but the 
following observations of different natural features should 
always be made, and it may not be out of place to mention 
them here: 

Roads. — Their direction; their nature (macadamized, 
corduroy, plank, "dirt," etc.) ; their condition of repair ; their 
grade ; the nature of lateral roads, and the points where they 
leave the main road; their borders (woods, hedges, fences, or 
ditches); the places at which they pass through defiles, across 
heights or rivers, and where they intersect railroads; their 
breadth (whether suitable to column of fours or of platoons, 
etc.). 

Railroads. — Their direction; the number of tracks, sta- 
tions, and junctions; their grade; the nature of the cuts, 
embankments, and tunnels. 

Bridges.— Their position; their width and length; their 

♦Cavalry Drill Regulations, par. 978. 



EXPLORING PATROLS. 115 

construction (wood, brick, stone, or iron) ; the roads and ap- 
proaches on each bank. 

Rivers {and other Streams).— Their direction, width, and 
depth; the rapidity of the current; liability to sudden rises 
and extreme fluctuations in depth, as indicated by drift- 
wood, etc.; fords; the nature of the banks; kind, position, 
and number of islands at suitable points of passage; heights 
in the vicinity and their command over the banks. 

Woods. — Their situation, extent, and shape; whether 
clear or containing underbrush; the number and extent of 
"clearings"; whether cut up by ravines, or containing 
marshes, etc.; nature of roads penetrating them. 

Canals. — Their direction, width, and depth; condition of 
towpath; locks, and means for protecting or destroying 
them. 

Telegraphs. — Whether they follow railroads or common 
roads ; stations ; number of wires. 

Villages. — Their situation (on a height, in a valley, or on 
a plain) ; nature of the surrounding country; construction of 
the houses; nature and width of the streets; means of 
defense. 

Defiles. — Their direction; whether straight or crooked; 
whether heights on either side are accessible or inaccessible; 
nature of ground at each extremity; width (frontage of col- 
umn that can pass through). 

Ponds and Marshes. — Means of crossing; defensive use 
that might be made of them as obstacles against the enemy; 
whether the marshy grounds are practicable for any or all 
arms. 

Springs and Rivulets. — Nature of approaches; whether 
water is drinkable and abundant. 

Valleys. — Extent and nature; towns, villages, hamlets, 
streams, roads, and paths therein ; obstacles offered by, or in, 
the valley to the movements of troops. 



Il6 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Heights. — Whether slopes are easy or steep; whether 
good defensive positions are offered ; whether plateau is wide 
or narrow; whether passages are easy or difficult; whether 
the ground is broken or smooth, wooded or clear. 

Cultivated Ground. — Nature of cultivation and kind of 
crops. 

Good camping-places should always be noted. 

The report should be rendered as quickly as possible 
after the return of the patrol, accompanied, when practica- 
ble, with a map.* 

A patrol of any nature should endeavor to note carefully 
the different features of the ground over which it passes, 
whether required to make a report or not. In every case a 
railroad embankment, a ditch, or any other object that would 
furnish a good defensive position, should be noted. 

Reconnoitering patrols are used to reconnoiter the posi- 
tion and watch the movements of the enemy. 

Harassing patrols are for the purpose of disturbing and 
annoying the enemy, and thus depriving him of sleep and 
rest. 

Expeditionary patrols have for .their mission the capture 
of sentinels or patrols, or the destruction of roads, railroads, 
or telegraphs. 

Connecting patrols are used to preserve communication 
between columns of troops on the march or between different 
bodies in battle. 

Pursuing patrols hang upon a retreating enemy, and ren- 
der prompt information as to his movements, location, and 
morale. 



*For a complete and excellent description of the requirements of 
the kind of reconnaissance here considered, see "The Duties of the 
General Staff," by Bronsart von Schellendorf, Vol. II., p. 249, et seq. 
For technical information in regard to sketching and map-making 
in connection with such reconnaissance, consult Hoot's "Military 
Topography." 



SMALL INFANTRY PATROLS. 117 

Exploring, reconnoitering, harassing, expeditionary and 
pursuing patrols may be either strong or small ; connecting 
patrols are always strong. 

Cavalry is the arm par excellence for patrolling, especially 
when (as is the case with American cavalry) it unites mobility 
and defensive power, and does not need to be hampered with 
a supporting force of infantry. The composition of the patrol 
will, however, depend upon the ground to be reconnoitered, 
the distance to which the reconnaissance is to be extended, 
and the hour at which the patrol is sent out. The union of 
infantry and cavalry is recommended by some military writ- 
ers; but such a measure seems of doubtful value in any case, 
and w T orse than useless when the cavalry can take care of 
itself with its own fire action. Infantry is preferable to cav- 
alry for patrolling only at night, or in a very close and broken 
country. It is often advisable to attach a few troopers to an 
infantry patrol merely as mounted orderlies, but no further 
union of the two arms on this service should ordinarily be 
contemplated. 



SMALL INFANTRY PATROLS. 

The conditions under which small infantry patrols are 
sent out differ very much. If possible, the following rules 
should be observed- 

Composition. — Experienced soldiers should be detailed, 
and if no non-commissioned officer is available, an intelligent 
private should be selected to command the patrol, and the 
others ordered to obey him. It is desirable that at least one 
member of the patrol should be able to speak the language 
of the country in which the army is operating. 

Preparation and Inspection. — The patrol commander 
should be given clear and definite instructions in regard to 



Il8 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

the duty to be performed, and he should be required to repeat 
them to the members of the patrol in the presence of the offi- 
cer giving them. These instructions should inform him of 
the object of the reconnaissance, what is known about the 
enemy, the nature of the ground to be reconnoitered, whether 
he is to reconnoiter in one direction or in several, how long 
he is to remain out, where his reports are to be sent, and, if 
other patrols are sent out at the same time, the particular 
route which he is to follow. For instance — 

Captain (to sergeant of patrol) : Do you know the coun- 
try in front? 

Sergeant: No, sir. 

Captain: Well, you see that hill half-a-mile out — the 
road forks there. Small parties of the enemy are suspected 
in that vicinity. Move out and observe the fork and the open 
fields to the left. Don't reconnoiter the ground at the right 
of the fork; another patrol will take care of that. If you see 
this patrol, don't mistake it for the enemy. Remain out until 
dark. Report to me at No. 2 Picket. Don't fire unless you 
have to. 

The patrol commander must be sure that he understands 
his instructions. If he has the slightest doubt about it, he 
must ask for a repetition. 

He then inspects the patrol, being careful that each man 
has the proper amount of ammunition, and that none are sick, 
intoxicated, or foot-sore. If any man has a cold which causes 
him to cough, he must be replaced by another man, even 
though he be not on sick-report. The patrol commander also 
sees that the arms and accouterments of his men are so ar- 
ranged as neither to rattle nor to glisten in the sunlight. He 
also points out to the members of the patrol the positions of 
troops of their own army, and a place of assembly for men 
who may be detached or become separated from the patrol, 



FORMATION OF PATROLS. 119 

choosing, if practicable, some prominent landmark. He 
next gives the men their general instructions, cautioning 
them especially that they must neither talk nor smoke, and 
explains, if they be not already familiar with them, the sig- 
nals by which they are to communicate. 

Signals. — In addition to the signals described in the 
Drill Regulations, the following should be used: 

Attention, or, Do you see anything? Wave the hand 
across the face, or whistle once. 

Affirmative signal : Eaise and lower the arm vertically 
twice, or whistle twice. 

Negative signal: Extend the arm horizontally thrice, 
or whistle thrice. 

Enemy in sight or hearing: Hold the rifle horizontally 
above the head with both hands, holding it steadily if the 
enemy is in small bodies, and raising and lowering it repeat- 
edly if he is in force. To signal by whistle, whistle four times. 

To ask for reinforcements: Extend the arm horizon- 
tally and wave it rapidly with a circular motion, or give a 
long, continuous whistle. 

In a very close country, in foggy weather, or at night, the 
whistle must be relied upon, but at all other times its use 
should be avoided. In giving the signals, the whistle must 
be used softly, as a loud noise might be heard by the enemy. 
In every case, except when asking for reinforcements, the 
note should be short. If the men are not provided with whis- 
tles, they should give the whistle signals by mouth. Many 
different signals may be devised, such as waving the hat or 
handkerchief , striking the butt of the piece with theknuckles, 
etc. No signals should be made unnecessarily, and when 
near the enemy the greatest care should be exercised that the 
signals be not detected by him. 

Formation. — The disposition of the patrol while on the 



120 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

march can not be definitely prescribed. The patrols should 
have the general formation of main body, advance guard, 
rear guard, and flankers, even when each can be represented 
by only one man. If the patrol consists of less than five men, 
the rear guard or one or both flankers may be dispensed with ; 
but the advance guard should always be retained. It is gen- 
erally better to do without one, or even both, of the flankers 
than without the rear-guard man, whose vigilance prevents 
the patrol from being attacked in the rear and cut off. On 
nearing the enemy, the patrol should generally extend in line 
to facilitate observation. Figures 1 to 6, Plate X., give typ- 
ical formations of a small patrol. 

It must be borne in mind that these typical formations 
are merely hints, the formation of the patrol always depend- 
ing upon its object, the nature of the ground, and the charac- 
ter and position of the enemy. The only definite rule that 
can be laid down is the following : The patrol must always be 
so formed as to facilitate the gaining of information, and to in- 
sure, if possible, the escape of at least one man', if the patrol 
should be cut off. Any disposition that complies with this rule 
is right. 

The distances and intervals between the members of the 
patrol depend upon circumstances. They are rarely less 
than twenty-five or more than one hundred yards. The men 
should be close enough to see and hear each other's signals, 
and for mutual support. On the other hand, they should not 
so crowd together that the patrol could not see more than a 
single man could — a fault to which men are prone through 
anxiety about being cut off. The commander should not lose 
sight of the point, and the other members should keep the 
same man in view; or, in the case of a large patrol, or one on 
an extended front, each man should endeavor to keep in sight 
the man next him towards the point. The point should, when 



PLATE X. 



Ficff 



PATROLS. 

— Ftg.2.— 



— Fig 3. 

* 



3 men 



4- men 



5' men 



Distances " and intervals vary from 
25 to 100 yards according to circumstances. 






Fig 3. 



Fi 3 6 



* * ♦ 






6 men 



Y men 



8 men 



— Fy?. 



Fig.8. 



Fig 9. 








learGuard 

15 men .marching along 
road, with passage on 
the flanks. 



CONDUCT OF PATROL. 1 23 

practicable, consist of two men, in order that one may scout 
vigilantly towards the enemy while the other watches for 
signals from the men on the right and left and from the com- 
mander. The signals from the other members of the patrol 
are generally transmitted to the commander through the 
point. To assemble the patrol, the commander signals to the 
point to halt, and moves up to it, followed by the rear-guard 
man. The other men at once close in on the point, conform- 
ing their pace to that of the commander. 

Conduct of Patrol. — The patrol moves cautiously, but not 
timidly, along hedges, walls, ditches, ravines, etc., seeking in 
every way to see without being seen. It halts frequently to 
listen, and to make careful observation of the ground. At 
each halt the men should note their bearings relative to cer- 
tain landmarks, and the commander should frequently turn 
about to observe the general appearance of the landscape and 
note particular objects, in order that he may not lose his way 
even if compelled to make a hasty retreat. It may be well in 
some cases to mark the route by blazing the trees, fastening 
wisps of straw to posts, or marking the path by dropping 
small stones; but such methods are open to the objections 
that they take time and might betray the trail of the patrol 
to the enemy.* 

It is advisable for a patrol to return by a different route 
from the one followed on advance, if it be practicable for it 
to do so, as it thus extends its reconnaissance and lessens the 
danger of being cut off; but a small patrol rarely goes more 
than three-quarters of a mile beyond the force which sends 
it out, and in this limited distance it does not often have a 
choice of more than one road. 

Generally, thepatrol should avoid moving on great roads 

* These methods have, however, the sanction of such good author- 
ities as Shaw and the Guide Manuel du Chef de Patrouille. 



124 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

and entering villages and inhabited places. But this does 
not mean that observation of great roads is to be neglected. 
On the contrary, they are the very ones that should be most 
carefully watched; for they are the routes that must be fol- 
lowed by any bodies of the enemy whose movements are real- 
ly worth reporting. The patrol, while moving across fields 
and along such objects as have been already mentioned, 
should endeavor to keep a constant watch on the great roads. 
Inhabited places should be turned and carefully observed, 
but should not ordinarily be entered by a small patrol. At 
night, or in a fog or snow-storm, the patrol must of necessity 
move on the great roads, in order to avoid losing its way, un- 
less it is moving over ground with which it is perfectly 
familiar. 

The patrol should not halt to rest before its return, 
unless circumstances render it imperatively necessary to do 
so. In such case it should rest in concealment in some place 
which offers advantages for defense,and from which a retreat 
can be easily effected. In the case of a small patrol, the lat- 
ter consideration is the more important. The position chos- 
en should not be near any habitation. During the day it 
should be on high ground, from which an extensive view may 
be obtained; at night it should be on low ground, so as to 
bring approaching people into view on the sky-line. 

If another patrol of the same army, or any other friendly 
force, is met, the patrol commander should exchange informa- 
tion with it, and inform himself of its strength, its destina- 
tion, and the name of its commander, in order that he may 
report the same on his return. Friendly patrols should rec- 
ognize each other without noise; but at night, the one that 
first discovers the other must challenge and demand the 
parole and countersign. 

Encountering the Enemy. — The patrol should exercise the 
utmost vigilance from the moment of its departure; but, un- 



ENCOUNTERING THE ENEMY. I 25 

less it has received orders to return immediately upon dis- 
covering hostile troops, its real work begins when it touches 
upon the enemy. If a small hostile patrol is discovered, it is 
generally better to remain in concealment than to attack; 
for the noise of combat might cause enough mischief to more 
than counterbalance all that could be gained by defeating 
the hostile patrol, even if prisoners were captured. If the 
patrol is discovered by the hostile patrol, and finds itself 
unable to escape without fighting, it should attack boldly, 
and should endeavor to take prisoners. 

When a hostile patrol has penetrated so far as to make 
it probable that it has gained important information, an 
attempt should be made to ambuscade and capture it. If 
surprised, a patrol should fight resolutely, unless the enemy 
be in such force as to make resistance hopeless. In the 
latter case, or if defeated in any case, the patrol should dis- 
perse, each man making his way back to the rendezvous des- 
ignated beforehand. It should then, after uniting, continue 
its reconnaissance, sending one man back to the command 
with a report. It should be an invariable rule not to quit the 
reconnaissance until some result has been obtained. If the 
enemy is near at hand and in force, the patrol must open fire, 
and keep up a lively fusillade in retreat, as the only means of 
giving prompt warning of impending danger. 

If, notwithstanding its prudence, the patrol falls into an 
ambuscade, it should boldly attack; for courage and coolness 
may wrest success from the most adverse circumstances. If 
a sentinel or patrol of the enemy is suddenly encountered in 
the dark, no answer should be made to his challenge, but the 
patrol should remain halted and silent. The enemy may 
think himself mistaken and pay no further attention.* 



*The following remarkable instance is mentioned by Dufour: 
"At the siege of Luxembourg, Vauban, wishing to ascertain, by per- 
sonal observation, the real condition of affairs, as was his custom, ad- 



126 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

If the challenge is repeated, the patrol should sneak 
away as quickly as possible, unless it has orders to capture 
prisoners, in which case a sudden rush upon the sentinel 
might enable the patrol to overpower him and carry him off 
before he could receive assistance. If some members of the 
patrol can speak the language of the sentinel, they may suc- 
ceed in completely allaying his suspicions with a plausible 
answer to his challenge.* 

Inhabitants. — Whenever the approach of people is sig- 
nalled, the patrol remains concealed in observation. If they 
prove to be civilians coming from the direction of the enemy, 
they should be questioned carefully, as they may sometimes 
give valuable information. They should be asked whether 
they have seen any of the enemy's soldiers; where they were, 
what they were doing; whether they were infantry, cavalry, 
or artillery; whether they were regular troops or militia; 
what kind of uniforms they wore; whether the horses and 
men were in good condition, or seemed to be worn out and 
fatigued; how the troops of the enemy behaved themselves; 
how the road leading to the enemy is situated, and its condi- 
tion; whether the enemy has scouting parties out; whether 
he seems to be vigilant; whether he has taken any guides 
from the village, etc. Ignorance is more likely to be encoun- 

janced under the escort of a few grenadiers, who were left in rear ly- 
ing npon the ground. He was crossing the glacis alone, under cover 
of the twilight darkness, when he was discovered. He beckoned with 
his hand to the sentinels not to fire, and continued to advance instead 
of retiring. The enemy took him for one of themselves, and Vauban, 
having seen what he wished, retired slowly, and was saved by his 
admirable coolness." 

*When, in the retreat from Moscow, Eugene was executing his 
perilous march across Milaradowitch's front, under cover of the dark- 
ness, the moon suddenly emerged from a heavy cloud, and at the same 
moment a Russian sentinel challenged. A Polish officer with the 
French ran up to the sentinel, and coolly said to him, in Russian, in 
a low tone: "Be silent! don't you see that we belong to the corps of 
Ouwaroff, and that we are going on a secret expedition?" The sen- 
tinel, thus assured, kept quiet. (Segur.) 



INHABITANTS. I 27 

tered than untruthfulness, and even information given sin- 
cerely will probably be more or less inaccurate. Military 
terms should be avoided when questioning country people. 
It is best to ask them when the enemy's troops began arriv- 
ing, when they all got in, etc., and thus get data from which 
to compute the enemy's strength; for the estimates of coun- 
try people as to the numbers of a military force are almost 
sure to be worthless. In a report, dated Gettysburg, June 30, 
1863, General Buford says: 

"I entered this place to-day at 11 a. m. Found everybody 
in a terrible state of excitement on account of the enemy's 
advance upon this place. He had approached to within half 
a mile of the town when the head of my column entered. His 
force was terribly exaggerated by reasonable and truthful 
but inexperienced men."' 

Rumors among the inhabitants of important movements 
by the enemy should not be discarded as worthless because of 
their seeming improbability, but should be investigated with 
care. When, in 1859, Napoleon III. was following the Aus- 
trians in their retreat to the Mincio, a French ameer on recon- 
naissance was informed by an old peasant woman that the 
enemy was advancing. Her story was ridiculed, as the Aus- 
trians had been retreating for a number of days, and it was 
known that they had withdrawn across the river. Neverthe- 
less, the apparently absurd report was strictly true, for the 
Austrians had retraced their steps, and the two armies met 
the next day in the great battle of Solferino. 

New's travels by word of mouth with incredible rapidity; 
and though it is always more or less distorted, and may, in- 
deed, be grossly exaggerated, it generally has a kernel of 
truth which is well worth seeking. Von der Goltz is author- 
ity for the statement that the country people in the neighbor- 
hood of Metz had news of the march of MacMahon to the re- 



128 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

lief of Bazaine at a time when the movement was still in 
embryo, and days before the great battles around Sedan had 
been fought.* "Something," says the same author, "can al- 
ways be learned; and it is by no means necessary that the 
country-scouring patrols should succeed in finding traitors 
to give important information. Each person, when asked, 
will, in order to put an end to the cross-questioning that is 
annoying him, prefer to say only what appears to him to be 
unimportant. But from a hundred unimportant things one 
important piece of news may be composed. 1 ' 

Questions formulating a statement to which the person 
questioned may answer yes or no, should be avoided. The 
questions should be such as to draw out a narrative from the 
person interrogated. It should always be borne in mind that 
the questions asked may be repeated to the enemy, and the 
questioner must, therefore, be careful so to frame them that 
they will not give a key to his designs. When several persons 
are questioned, they should be examined separately. 

The matter of questioning civilians, employing guides, 
and examining prisoners, is more applicable to cavalry than 
infantry patrols, and to strong rather than small ones. This 
seems, however, to be the most convenient place to consider 
these subjects, and, in fact, they are applicable to all patrols. 

People going in the direction of the enemy should be 

*It is well known that among the North American Indians news 
is carried by word of mouth with great rapidity. In 1876 the first 
news of Custer's defeat was received at the headquarters of the De- 
partment of Dakota, St. Paul, Minn., ten days after the battle, this 
news having- come overland to the mouth of the Big Horn River, thence 
by steamer down the Yellowstone and Missouri rivers to'* Bismarck, 
from which point it was sent by telegraph. The day before the re- 
ceipt of this news at Department Headquarters, Lieutenant John B. 
Rodman ,the adjutant of the 20th Infantry, stationed at Fort Snelling, 
near St. Paul, was informed of the battle by Waumadaka-Wanich, an 
old Mendofa Indian, who stated that all the soldiers had been killed. 
Within nine days the news of the battle had been conveyed by the 
Indians, by word of mouth, from the Little Big Horn River to the 
Mississippi, a distance of more than 700 miles, measured in an air- 
line. 



RECONNAISSANCE OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF GROUND. 1 29 

halted, and never allowed to proceed, unless they have un- 
doubtedly genuine passes from, proper authority. If they 
are contumacious, they must be threatened, and sometimes 
roughly handled. It may be necessary in some cases to tie 
them to trees or posts, or even to gag them or threaten them 
with death if they cry out; but it should be an invariable 
rule never to resort to harsh measures when gentler means 
will secure the same end. 

Guides. — If it be necessary to take a guide from among 
the people of the country, he should be kindly treated, but 
warned that he will pay with his life the penalty of treachery. 
The degree of intelligence and education possessed by the 
guide will decide the measures proper to employ with him ; 
but he must always be carefully guarded, and must not be dis- 
charged until there is no longer danger of his betraying the 
patrol. No one but the commander should communicate 
with the guides, and the soldiers should not, under any cir- 
cumstances, be allowed either to> chaff or threaten them. 
Drovers, peddlers, livery-stable employes, and country doc- 
tors will generally be the best guides. If a man can be found 
who has served as a guide to the enemy, so much the better." 
Many people, in order to escape service as guides,will declare 
that they know nothing about the country. If they appear to 
be intelligent, it is best to take them along in spite of their 
pretended ignorance, if better guides are not manifestly avail- 
able, and keep them until their want of knowledge seems to 
be more than a sham. 

Reconnaissance of Different Kinds of Ground. — The man- 
ner of reconnoitering different kinds of ground depends main- 
ly upon the circumstances of each individual case, and no 
rigid rule can be prescribed. There are, however, certain 
general methods of reconnoitering various places, which may 
be given as the result of centuries of warfare, and which are r 



130 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

in some respects, common to the armies of the most enlight- 
ened nations and the warriors of savage tribes.* The follow- 
ing suggestions are offered; but the student must bear in 
mind that each case presents its own problem, to be solved 
according to its own circumstances. 

Whenever possible, the men composing the patrol should 
keep under cover. If there is a bank or cover of any kind 
parallel to the line of march, they will keep it between them 
and the supposed position of the enemy. If the different 
features affording cover lie perpendicular to the line of 
march, the patrol will halt a moment behind each, peer cau- 
tiously about, and then pass rapidly to the next, the men 
moving one at a time, stooping and running. No country is 
so open that small folds of ground affording some degree of 
concealment can not be found. 

Cross-roads. — When the patrol comes to a cross-road, two 
men should be sent along it on each flank until they come to 
the first turn, the patrol halting. If the men see nothing 
suspicious, they return, and the patrol pushes on. If any- 
thing suspicious is seen, one man rushes back quickly to the 
patrol, while the other remains in observation. If the patrol 
is very small, two men should be sent first to one side and 
then to the other, in preference to sending a. single man in 
each direction. 

Heights. — If the patrol is large enough to admit of de- 
taching them, one or two men climb the slope on either flank, 
keeping in sight of the patrol if possible. In any case, one 
man moves cautiously up the hill, followed by the others in 
single file at such distance that each can keep his predecessor 
in view. 

Defiles. — If time permits, the heights on either side 

*For remarks upon the methods of scouting in use among the 
Indians, see Chapter IX. 



RECONNAISSANCE OF WOODS AND INCLOSURES. 131 

should be reconnoitered by flankers before the patrol enters 
the defile. If the heights are inaccessible, or time is urgent, 
the patrol pushes through, in single file, at double time, the 
distance being the same as in ascending a hill. The same 
method should be adopted in reconnoitering a railroad cut or 
sunken road. 

Bridges or Fords. — The front of the patrol is contracted 
so as to bring all the men to the passage. The patrol then 
crosses rapidly, and takes up a proper formation. A bridge 
is first examined, to see that it is safe and has not been tam- 
pered with by the enemy. 

Woods. — The patrol enters in skirmishing order, the 
intervals being as great as may be consistent with mutual 
observation and support on the part of the members of the 
patrol. On arriving at the farther edge of the wood, the pa- 
trol should remain concealed and carefully look about before 
passing out to the open ground. When there is such a growth 
of underbrush as to make this method impracticable, a road 
through the wood must be reconnoitered as in the case of a 
defile, though not usually at double time. If in this case a 
cross-road is found in the wood, the patrol must be assembled 
and the lateral road reconnoitered (see "Cross-roads") before 
passing beyond it. 

Inclosures (Gardens, Parks, Cemeteries). — The leading pa- 
trollers first examine the exterior, to make sure that the 
enemy is not concealed behind one of the faces of the inclos- 
ure. They then proceed to examine the interior. Great care 
should be taken in reconnoitering and entering an inclosure, 
as an imprudent patrol might find it a veritable trap. 

Houses. — When a house or farm-building is approached 
by a patrol, it is first carefully reconnoitered from a distance, 
and if nothing suspicious is seen, it is then approached by 
two! men, the rest of the party remaining concealed in ob- 



132 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

servation. If the patrol is large enough to admit of it. four 
men approach the house, so as to examine the front and back 
entrances simultaneously. Only one man enters the door, 
the other remaining outside to give the alarm, should a party 
of the enemy be concealed in the house. The patrol should 
not remain in the vicinity of the house any longer than neces- 
sary, as information relative to its numbers and movements 
might be given to the enemy, if a hostile party should subse- 
quently visit the place. 

Villages. — If the village is seen to be in possession of the 
enemy, the patrol must be content with reconnoitering it 
from the outside. If the presence of the enemy is not appar- 
ent, the patrol should enter the village, being disposed in any 
way conforming to the general rule. A formation suitable 
in many cases would be in single file at proper distances for 
observation and support, each man being on the opposite 
side of the street from his predecessor. The patrol should 
push through the village as rapidly as possible; and when it 
has reached the opposite side, two of the party might be de- 
tached, if expedient, to reenter the village to seek further 
information, the rest of the patrol remaining in some position 
affording good observation and secure retreat. 

If the patrol is strong enough, it should seize the post- 
office, telegraph office, and railroad station, and secure all 
important /papers that may be there. If the patrol is part of 
an advance guard, it should seize the mayor and postmaster 
of the place, and turn them over to the commander of the van- 
guard with the papers seized. It must not be supposed that 
only the official papers are of value. Information of great 
importance is sometimes obtained from private letters from 
officers or soldiers. Though the writer may give merely what 
he deems items of friendly gossip, and though he may have 
but slight knowledge of the military operations, his corre- 



RECONNAISSANCE OF ENEMY IN POSITION. 1 33 

spondence may convey valuable news in regard to the bodies 
of troops with the army, what commands have arrived, what 
troops have departed, and the direction that they have taken. 
Above all, it is likely to convey a fairly accurate idea of the 
morale of the army. On Lee's retreat from Richmond, the 
capture of a letter written to a Southern lady by her son, who 
was an officer in the retreating army, gave Sheridan proof of 
the despondency of the Confederates and their belief that 
their army was rained.* 

At night, a village must be even more cautiously ap- 
proached by a small patrol than by day. The patrol should 
glide through back alleys, across gardens, etc., rather than 
move along the main street. If a light is seen in a window, 
two of the men should approach, look in, and listen. If there 
are no signs of the enemy, they should knock and make in- 
quiry. If no light is seen, and it seems imprudent to rouse 
any of the people, the patrol must watch and capture one of 
the inhabitants, and get from him such information as he 
may possess, t 

The best time for a patrol to approach a village is at 
early dawn, when it is light enough to see, but before the 
inhabitants are up. 

Cities and Towns. — It is dangerous in the extreme for a 
small patrol to enter a village, unless it is certain that it is not 
occupied by the enemy; for the men could be easily shot 
down by a fire from windows, cellarways, etc., or entrapped 
and captured. As a rule, cities and large towns should not 
be entered by a small patrol, but should be merely watched 
from the outside. 

Reconnaissance of Enemy in Position. — The patrol endeav- 
ors to ascertain the direction and extent of the line of obser- 



* "Sheridan's Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 178. 
tVoii Mii-us. 



134 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

ration, how its flanks are supported, the positions of the senti- 
nels, their number, the number of pickets, the places where 
the line may be penetrated with the least risk of discovery, 
the strength of hostile patrols, and the routes taken by them. 
It is also of great importance to ascertain whether good roads 
extend laterally behind the enemy's pickets, as such roads 
could be used by a force sent out to capture them. If the 
enemy's line of sentinels is penetrated, the patrol may, per- 
haps, approach near enough to the picket to overhear the 
countersign and parole; but it must be certain that the ad- 
vantage to be gained is worth the risk, as the patrol will be in 
great danger of capture. If a point can be found on the flank 
of the enemy's position from which a view of his dispositions 
in rear of the line of sentinels can be obtained, the com- 
mander of the patrol endeavors to gain such point, and, con- 
cealing his patrol near at hand, makes careful observation. 
The best time for such observation is at daybreak, and the 
selected point should be gained before dawn, so as to enable 
the patrol to observe the relieving of the outpost. The longer 
the patrol remains, the more it will see, but the greater will 
be its danger of being discovered. The patrol commander 
should have sufficient courage to remain long enough to gain 
valuable information, and sufficient prudence to withdraw 
in time to escape capture. 

If any important movements are observed, such as the 
withdrawing of the sentinels, the changing of their positions, 
preparations for advance or retreat, etc., the patrol com- 
mander sends a man back at once with a report of what has 
"been seen. 

Reconnaissance of Enemy on the March. — If the enemy is 
on the march, the patrol should conceal itself close to the 
hostile column, but far enough away to escape discovery by 
the enemy's flankers. Conspicuous places should be avoided, 



SIGNS A.ND TRAILS. 135 

even if at some distance from the column, as they would prob- 
ably be carefully searched. The best place is a ditch or wal- 
low, which will conceal the patrol and not be visible even at a 
short distance. The patrol carefully observes the progress 
of the column, noting its breadth of front, its rate of march, 
and the time it takes to pass a given point. A given point is 
passed in one minute 1 by about 200 infantry in column of 
fours ; by about 150 cavalry in fours at a walk, or, if in rear 
of the infantry, by about 100; by about 260 cavalry in fours 
at a trot, and by about 4 guns if in rear of infantry. If the 
whole column can be seen, and its length can be ascertained 
by the known distance between any two points which it 
passes, its strength can at once be estimated by allowing one 
yard for every two infantry soldiers, one yard for each cav- 
alry soldier, and twenty yards for each gun or caisson. An, 
allowance of from one-fourth to one-half must be made for 
opening out, depending upon the state of the roads and 
weather and the discipline of the troops composing the col- 
umn. Reports will be sent in, from time to time, by the com- 
mander of the patrol, who will not hesitate, if necessary, to 
send back his last man with a report. 

Signs and Trails. — The patrol must carefully watch for 
all signs and trails of the enemy, as information of the great- 
est value is thus sometimes obtained. The different indica- 
tions to be looked for are almost innumerable. The follow- 
ing are among the most important: 

If boats in great number are seen assembled on the bank 
of a stream, it is an indication of preparation to cross. If 
they are found burned, it is an indication of retreat If im- 
portant bridges are found broken, it is a sign of a long re- 
treat. If at some distance above the point where we are pre- 
paring to throw a bridge, large boats heavily laden with 
stone are found, it is an evidence of the enemy's intention to-< 
destroy the bridge and oppose the crossing. 



J36 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

If at night the flames of the enemy's camp-fires disap- 
pear and reappear, somethingis moving between the observer 
and the fires. If smoke as well as flame is visible, the fires 
are very near. If the fires are very numerous and lighted 
successively, and if soon after being lighted they go out, it is 
probable that the enemy is preparing a retreat and trying to 
deceive us. If the fires burn very brightly and clearly at a 
late hour, the enemy has probably gone, and has left a de- 
tachment to keep the fires burning. If, at an unusual time, 
much smoke is seen ascending from the enemy's camp, it is 
probable that he is engaged in cooking preparatory to mov- 
ing off. 

The rumbling of vehicles, cracking of whips, neighing of 
horses, braying of mules, and barking of dogs often indicate 
the arrival or departure of troops. The braying of mules is 
an almost infallible indication of arrival instead of departure. 
If the noise remains in the same place, and new fires are 
lighted, it is probable that reinforcements have arrived. If 
the noise grows more indistinct, troops are probably with- 
drawing. If, added to this, the fires appear to be dying out, 
and the enemy seems to redouble the vigilance of his out- 
posts, the indications of retreat are very strong. 

The whistling of locomotives within the enemy's lines 
should be carefully noted. One long whistle generally de- 
notes arrival, and two short ones, departure. If after the ar- 
rival of a railroad train hurrahing is heard, it is probable 
that reinforcements, a commander of high rank or great pop- 
ularity, or much-needed supplies have come in. Hurrahing is 
generally an indication that the troops are in good morale. 
The indications furnished by the whistling of locomotives 
and the hurrahing of troops may, however, easily be a ruse, 
and corroborative or contradictory indications should be 
carefully sought. The noise of heavy explosions is generally 



SIGNS AND TRAILS. 137 

an indication of the destruction of supplies by the enemy, pre- 
paratory to a retreat. If in addition to such explosions, large 
fires are seen, the indications of retreat amount almost to a 
certainty. 

The noise made by a strong column on the march is dis- 
tinct and continuous; that of a small body, feeble and inter- 
rupted. The distance at which the noise of marching can be 
heard depends upon the nature of the ground marched over, 
the direction of the wind, and the presence or absence of 
other sounds. On a calm night, a company of infantry, 
marching at route step on a hard road, can be heard at a dis- 
tance of 500 or 600 yards ; a troop of cavalry at a walk, 600 
or 700 yards; a troop of cavalry at a trot or gallop, artillery, 
and heavy wagons, 900 or 1,000 yards. 

The dust raised by the march of a column furnishes an 
indication not only of the direction of the march, but the 
strength and composition of the column. When infantry is 
marching, the dust is low and thick. With cavalry, the dust 
is higher; and as this arm moves rapidly, the upper part of 
the cloud is thinner and disappears more quickly than in the 
case of infantry. The clouds of dust raised by artillery and 
wagons are unequal in height and disconnected. Hence, by 
noting the length of a line of dust and the intervals in it, the 
strength and composition of the column may be estimated. 
The effect of the wind in dissipating the dust must, however, 
be taken into consideration. 

If the reflection from the weapons of marching troops is 
very brilliant, it is probable that the troops are marching 
towards the observer; otherwise, it is presumable that they 
are marching in the other direction. If the rays of light 
slant from left to right downwards, the troops are marching 
to the observer's right; if the rays slant from right to left 
downwards, the column is marching to the observer's left. 



138 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

A man with good vision should be able, on a clear day> 
to distinguish objects on the sky-line as follows: 

At a distance of 9 to j2 miles, church spires and towers. 

At a distance of 5 to 7 miles, windmills. 

At a distance of 2 to 21 miles, chimneys of light color. 

At a distance of 2,000 yards, trunks of large trees. 

At a distance of 1,000 yards, single posts. 

At 500 yards the panes of glass may be distinguished in 
a window. 

Troops are visible at 2,000 yards, at which distance a 
mounted man looks like a mere speck; at 1,200 yards infantry 
can be distinguished from cavalry; at 1,000 yards a line of 
men looks like a broad belt; at GOO yards the files of a squad 
can be counted, and at 400 yards the movements of the arms 
and legs can be plainly seen. 

The larger, brighter, or better lighted an object is, the 
nearer it seems. An object seems nearer when it has a dark 
background than when it has a light one, and closer to the 
observer when the air is clear than when it is raining, snow- 
ing, foggy, or the atmosphere is filled with smoke. An ob- 
ject looks farther off when the observer is facing the sun 
than when he has his back to it. A smooth expanse of snow> 
grain-fields, or water makes distances seem shorter than 
they really are. 

Optical illusions are not uncommon, and must be guard- 
ed against. 

The trail of the enemy furnishes excellent means of gain- 
ing information about the direction, strength, and composi- 
tion of his column, and sometimes even of the object of his 
march. If the ground is evenly trodden, the column was 
composed of infantry alone. If there are many prints of 
horse-shoes, the column also contained cavalry. If the wheel 
tracks are deep and wide, artillery was in the column. Each 



SIGNS AND TRAILS. 1 39 

arm was more numerous in proportion to the number and 
plainness of its indications. If the trail is fresh, the column 
has recently passed. If the trail is narrow, the troops felt 
secure, as they were marching in column of route; if broad, 
they expected an action, as they were marching in column of 
platoons or companies, ready to deploy. If the fields on each 
side of the road are cut up with many tracks, the cavalry 
marched on the flanks of the column, and the enemy was 
pushing on with his troops well in hand for action. A re- 
treating army makes a broad trail across fields, especially 
before the rear guard is formed and the retreat is regularly 
organized. This indication was strangely ignored just after 
the battle of Salamanca, when Wellington, thinking that the 
retreating French were making for the ford of Huerta, pro- 
ceeded thither in person with his left wing, failing to note 
that he was marching through standing grain where no ene- 
my could have preceded him. The French retreated upon 
Alba without molestation, and Wellington found nothing at 
Huerta.* 

Indications of a camp or bivouac are found mainly in the 
remains of camp-fires. These will show, by their degree of 
freshness, whether much or little time has elapsed since the 
enemy quitted the place, and the quantity of cinders will give 
an indication of the length of time he occupied it. They will 
also furnish a means of estimating his force approximately, 
the nature of the weather and the supply of fuel being con- 
sidered. In cold weather an allowance of ten men to each 
fire will give a rough estimate of the strength of the force; 
while in warm weather the fires are generally limited to the 
requirements of cooking, and rarely exceed one to each 
company. Other valuable indications in regard toi the 
length of time the position was occupied and the time when 

♦Napier's "Peninsular War," Book XVIII , chap. 3. 



140 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

it was abandoned may be found in the evidences of care or 
haste in the construction of huts or shelters, and in the fresh- 
ness of straw, grain, dung, or the entrails of slaughtered 
animals. 

Abandoned clothing, equipments, or harness will give a 
clue to the arms and regiments composing a retreating force. 
Dead horses lying about, broken weapons, discarded knap- 
sacks, abandoned and broken-down wagons, etc., are indica- 
tions of its fatigue and demoralization. Bloody bandages 
lying about, and many fresh graves, are evidences that the 
enemy is heavily burdened with wounded or sick. Graves 
which seem to have been made with much care are probably 
those of officers of rank. A head-board at a new grave may 
sometimes give valuable information. 

The manner and bearing of the inhabitants in a hostile 
country should be carefully noted. If they are gloomy and 
anxious, it is an indication of a want of confidence in their 
cause, or that their troops are distant. If they are excited 
and insolent, it is an indication that their army is strong and 
near, and that they anticipate success. If they are friendly 
and pleasant in their demeanor, it is probable that the war is 
not popular, and that the government lacks cordial support. 

Reports. — Reports should be sent in whenever anything 
of importance is seen, or anything happens which should be 
known by the officer who sent out the patrol. Trivial mat- 
ters should not be reported; but if there is a doubt as to the 
importance of something seen or heard, a report should be 
made; for it is better to report an insignificant matter than 
to let one of great moment go unheeded. 

Reports may be either verbal or written. If a verbal 
report is sent in, it should be intrusted to> an intelligent man, 
and he should be required to repeat it before starting, so as 
to be sure that he understands it. The man who carries the 



SIGNS AND T.PAILS. 141 

report should, if possible, himself deliver it to the officer for 
whom it is intended. If the country is dangerous and care- 
fully watched by the enemy, the same report should be sent 
in by several men, each taking a different route. In this case 
a verbal report is better than a written one, as the enemy can 
not get possession of it by capturing the bearer, and the re- 
port of each man will be a check upon the accuracy of the 
others. 

The indispensable qualities of a written report are scru- 
pulous accuracy as to facts, simplicity, clearness of diction, 
legibility of handwriting, and correct spelling of proper 
names. Surmises should never be given as facts, and the 
person making the report should carefully separate what he 
himself knows from what has been told him by others. Brev- 
ity is desirable, but not at the price of obscurity: a report 
should not be expressed ambiguously in ten words when it 
can be stated clearly in twenty. When the spelling of proper 
names does not correspond with their pronunciation by the 
people of the country, their phonetic spelling should also be 
given in parentheses. Thus : "The enemy is reported in force 
at Saguache (Siwash), and we have seen small hostile parties 
on the Cebolla (Savoya)."* Foreign or peculiar proper 
names should be written in detached letters or "printed"; 
thus, Petitcodiac, Shubenacadie. 

A convenient form of report (reduced to one-fourth size) 
is given on page 142. 

If practicable, the commander of the patrol should be 

furnished with a pad of printed order blanks similar to this 

model. The receipt should be signed, torn off, and given to 

the bearer of the report as his voucher for its delivery. A 

report, either written or verbal, should invariably be made 

whenever the patrol returns. 

*These names will be recognized by officers who have served in 
Southwestern Colorado. 



142 



SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 



Sending 

Detachment 


Location 


Day 


Mo. 


Hrs. Min. 
a. m. or p. m. 












Received, 
To 








Detachment No. 

Received Hr. Min. 


Report No. 
M., 189.... 








(Rank) 



STRONG INFANTRY PATROLS. 

The foregoing principles are nearly all quite as applica- 
ble to strong patrols as to small ones — some of them more so. 
The limits of the strength of a strong patrol have already 
been given. The strength of a strong patrol should always 
be proportionate to the object to be effected by it and gen- 
erally to the distance it is to go. It should neither be so 
weak as to be obliged to retire before small parties of the 
enemy, nor so strong as to attract attention. The object for 
which the patrol is sent out should be distinctly specified, 
and the commander should be provided with a good map, by 
means of which he may select his route. But if he chooses 
his route by map, it is none the less imperative that he pay 



EXPEDITIONARY PATROLS. 143 

careful attention to the various features of the ground (not 
always clearly indicated by the best maps), with a view to 
utilizing them in approaching the enemy, in avoiding him, 
in retreating, or in defense. 

The larger the patrol, the less secret are its movements, 
and the more nearly does its formation correspond to that of 
a column on the march, or a line deployed for action, as the 
case may be. As a rule, at least half the strength of the pa- 
trol should be in the main body; but its point, flanking, and 
rear groups each constitute, a small patrol, and are each 
guided by the principles already laid down for the conduct of 
a small patrol, modified by their dependence on the main 
body. A strong patrol may extend its reconnaissance far- 
ther than a small one; being careful, however, not to go so 
far as to incur unnecessary risk of being cut off by the enemy. 
It is generally practicable for it to return by a different route 
than the one by which it advances; as the extent of its opera- 
tions is usually such as to give a choice of several roads. 

Some typical formations of a strong patrol are given in 
the last three figures on Plate X. Figures 7 and 8 explain 
themselves. In Figure 9 the men detached to reeonnoiter 
and guard the bridge would ordinarily be sent out from the 
point, their places being taken, at double time, by men from 
the main body of the patrol. The patrol moves slowly, or 
halts if necessary, while the bridge is being reconnoitered. 
After the patrol has passed on, the detachment follows as 
rear group, the former rear group closing up to the main body 
of the patrol at double time. The detachment may in some 
cases be left to guard the bridge.* 

Expeditionary Patrols. — These are generally strong pa- 
trols, though in some cases the object in view may be better 

*This explanation of Fig. 9 must not be understood as a rule; it 
is merely a suggestion as to the method which might be adopted. 



144 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

attained by small ones. The object of an expeditionary 
patrol is always a special one, and the operations of a force 
of this kind generally differ from a special reconnaissance 
only in the size of the force employed. 

If the object in view is the capture of a sentinel, the pa- 
trol should ordinarily be a small one. A sentinel is chosen 
whose post can apparently be easily approached, who ap- 
pears to be isolated, and who, as far as can be judged, is not 
in plain sight of his picket. The patrol cautiously steals up 
close to the sentinel's post, being extended as circumstances 
may require, and, upon a pre-arranged signal, rushes forward, 
and endeavors to surround the sentinel and seize him before 
he can fire. Even if he fires, the patrol can probably run him 
off before he can receive assistance, if he has been surprised. 
If the object is the capture of a patrol, the expeditionary 
force should be a large patrol. It must prepare an ambus- 
cade, or take up a position such that it can surround the 
enemy's patrol, or at least cut off its retreat. If the opposing 
patrol is equal or superior in numbers, the attack must be a 
surprise, must be audaciously pushed, and the surviving 
members of the enemy's party must be hurried away before 
they can be succored by their friends. 

In all cases when a large patrol is charged with the cap- 
ture of prisoners, its commander must seek a place of obser- 
vation for himself and a place of concealment for his men; 
the two places being either coincident or near each other. 
He then waits until one or a small party of the enemy draw 
far enough away from their camp or column to be beyond the 
reach of prompt assistance, and waylays or gives chase to 
them. In these expeditions the prime object is to bring in the 
prisoners, and harsh measures to hasten their march are 
excusable. 

Prisoners are a most valuable source of information. In 



EXPEDITIONARY PATROLS. 145 

his description of the battle of The Wilderness, General 
Humphreys says that an examination of prisoners during the 
night of May 5, 1864, drew from them the statement that 
Longstreet was expected to be up in the morning to attack 
the Federal left, and that his force was about 12,000 men. 
Hancock was thus enabled to prepare to receive the attack 
which Longstreet made the following morning.* 

''Napoleon often complains, in his 'Correspondence,' of 
the lack of accurate news of the enemy because of the ab- 
sence of prisoners. He frequently enjoins the cavalry corps, 
and notably Murat, to neglect no means of capturing them. 
This shows the extreme importance which he attached to in- 
formation obtained from prisoners. The most favorable 
moment for questioning prisoners is when they have just 
been captured. They are then agitated and have not suffi- 
cient self-control to deceive. 

"The longer the questioning is postponed, the more eva- 
sive and studied will their answers become. Their answers 
at the place of capture may to a certain extent be verified. 
Such is not the case after the lapse of some time and in an- 
other place. The prisoners are questioned at once by one of 
the officers of the detachment which captures them. Their 
replies are written down and transmitted with the prisoners 
to the Department of Intelligence, where they are questioned 
more at length." f 

Prisoners have very diif erent values. It is more desira- 
ble to capture an officer than an enlisted man; an officer of 
high rank rather than a subaltern; a staff officer + rather than 

*"The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65, v page 37. 

t*Lewal, "Tactiqne ties Renseignements" Tome I, p. 88. 

% The term "staff officer" is here used in what the author conceives 
to be its proper sense — i. e., an officer of the Adjutant General's or 
Inspector General's Departments, or one belonging to the staff of a 
general officer. 



146 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

a line officer. In brief, the object should be to capture those 
who are likely to possess the most extended information. It 
is to be remarked, however, that those who possess the most 
complete information will generally be the ones most skillful 
in concealing it. If enlisted men are captured, they should 
be questioned in regard to their regiments, brigades, and 
divisions; the length of time they have been in the position; 
whether their rations are satisfactory; whether certain com- 
manders are popular and have the confidence of their men; 
whether there are many men on sick report; what news has 
lately been received in camp, and what the rumors are — in 
brief, all questions calculated to elicit information in regard 
to the enemy's position, movements, and morale. If tact be 
exercised in questioning, much information may be gained; 
for the prisoner will probably consider the questions as 
prompted merely by natural curiosity. 

When the object is the destruction of roads, railroads, 
or telegraphs, the expeditionary patrol should generally be a 
large one; but in some cases a small patrol may answer the 
purpose better, as it can move to its destination more secret- 
ly, and the use of high explosives gives it a great destructive 
power. In any case, the patrol should endeavor to reach its 
objective unseen, and part should be on the alert watching 
the enemy while the rest of the men are engaged in the work 
of destruction.* 

A patrol may be sent out to gain information by "tap- 
ping" a telegraph line. In this case, a telegraph operator, 
using a small pocket instrument, taps the line and learns the 
messages passing over it. The rest of the men, carefully con- 
cealed, look out for the enemy. An expeditionary patrol for 
the purpose of tapping a telegraph line is generally a cavalry 

*For the method of destroying railroads, telegraphs, bridges, etc., 
see Beach's "Manual of Military Field Engineering." 



HARASSING PATROLS. 1 47 

patrol, sent out from the cavalry screen or from a raiding 
column. In addition to learning the enemy's movements, the 
operator can often give him false information — order him to 
concentrate on wrong points, and work mischief to him 
generally. 

Harassing Patrols. — These patrols are generally strong; 
for, their object being not to seek information, but to annoy 
the enemy, they must be prepared to fight. In some cases, 
however, better results may be obtained by reducing the size 
and increasing the number of the patrols. When an army 
halts in a position to await reinforcements, or because of the 
irresolution of its chief, the opposing commander (even if his 
army be inferior in numbers) may often raise the morale of 
his own troops, and impair the courage and efficiency of those 
of his adversary, by causing frequent alarms, destroying the 
enemy's rest; compelling the hostile outposts repeatedly to 
rush to arms, and exciting their sentinels to such a degree 
that they fancy a foe in every shadow, and imagine a hostile 
attack in every rustling leaf. The method of operating with 
a harassing patrol will depend upon circumstances, but in 
every case the attack should be of the nature of a surprise. 
If the patrol is small, the enemy's sentinels should be shot 
down or captured in a noisy rush. If the patrol is large, the 
attack should be made upon the enemy's pickets; the object 
being the creation of alarm and the infliction of loss rather 
than the capture of prisoners. If many small harassing pa- 
trols are employed, strong patrols should be sent out, from 
time to time, to make vigorous attacks on the pickets; as the 
enemy would otherwise find it sufficient merely to redouble 
the vigilance of his sentinels and patrol to the front. The 
method of attack should be continually changed, and the 
point selected, the size of the assailing force, and the hour 

of attack should all be variable. 
to — 



I48 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Jackson's defense of New Orleans furnishes an illustra- 
tion of the effective use that may be made of harassing pa- 
trols. Between the night battle of December 23, 1814, and 
Pakenham's defeat sixteen days later, the British were in- 
cessantly annoyed by small parities of Americans. 

"The plain between the two hostile camps was alive day 
and night with small parties of foot and horse, wandering to 
and fro in pursuit of adventure, on the trail of reconnoiterers, 
stragglers, and outpost sentinels. After a while there grew 
up a regular science in the conduct of these modes of vexing, 
annoying, and weakening the enemy. It was as follows: A 
small number of each corps, being permitted to leave the 
lines, would start from their position, and all converge to a 
central point in front of the lines. Here they would, when 
all collected, make quite a formidable body of men, and would 
proceed to attack the nearest British outpost, or advance 
in extended lines, so as to create alarm in the enemy's camp, 
and subject them to the vexation of being beaten to arms, 
in the midst of which the scouting party would be unusually 
unlucky if it did not succeed in 'bagging' one or two of the 
enemy's advance sentinels. In such incessant scouting par- 
ties and volunteer operations a majority of Jackson's com- 
mand were engaged during the greater part of the night. So 
daring were these attacks that on more than one occasion 
the six-pounders were advanced from the lines and drawn 
within cannon shot of the outposts, when they would be dis- 
charged at the sentinels or any living object, generally with 
some effect, and always with great terror to the British camp, 
causing a general apprehension that the Americans were ad- 
vancing to attack them in full force."* 

Flank Patrols. — These are always strong patrols, and 

*This description is condensed from Walker's account, quoted in 
Parton's "Life of Andrew Jackson." 



THE ADVANCE GUARD PASSING THROUGH A TOWN. 1 49 

usually operate on roads parallel to the line of march of the 
main body. They reconnoiter denies, farms, woods, etc., at 
some distance from the flanks of the main column. They 
usually consist of from ten to twenty men (but may contain 
the maximum strength of a patrol), and are generally de- 
tached for a specific reconnaissance, with orders to rejoin the 
main body at a designated rendezvous, when the object of the 
reconnaissance has been gained. The patrol should be guid- 
ed by the general principles already laid down for patrols, 
and should avail itself of every practicable opportunity of 
communicating with the main column. 

Flanking patrols of the maximum strength are often de- 
tached from a marching column to reconnoiter and guard 
roads crossing the line of march during the passage of the 
main body. They are sometimes called covering patrols. The 
forces employed on this duty are, however, generally larger 
than patrols, and are covering detachments charged with the 
duties of a containing force. 



THE ADVANCE GUARD PASSING THROUGH 
A TOWN. 

Having discussed the details of patrolling, we may now 
consider the manner in which an advance guard would pass 
through a town. 

On approaching the village or town, the advance guard 
halts, and the advance party moves forward to reconnoiter ; 
the point, well in advance, acting as already prescribed for a 
small patrol. If the enemy's presence is suspected, the vil- 
lage must be, turned by a portion of the advance party or 
support, and entered simultaneously by the front and flank. 
If, on the contrary, all seems well, the point signals to the 
rear and advances up the principal street, the advance party 



150 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

following at a suitable distance, its flankers working up the 
side streets, always keeping up communication with the ad- 
vance party and with the flank patrols — if there be any. The 
support follows at a suitable distance, the reserve remaining 
at the edge of the village until the patrols have gone through. 
If the point discovers that the village is occupied by the 
enemy, it falls back quickly and quietly to the advance party, 
whose commander immediately sends information to the rear. 
The support at once comes up, and the commander of the sup- 
port, in the case of a large advance guard, or of the advance 
guard, in the case of a small one, makes dispositions for a 
reconnaissance of the village, with a view to ascertaining the 
most practicable point for forcing it. 

A village is approached at night in the same manner as 

by day, with the exception that the distances and intervals 

between the different parts of the advance guard are less. 

A strong patrol jreconnoiters and enters a village in the 

same manner as the advance guard of a larger force. 

In considering the details relative to the reconnaissance 
and attack of villages, most writers on minor tactics have in 
view the conditions presented by European villages, whose 
streets are generally narrow and crooked, and whose houses 
(usually built of stone or brick) are well adapted to defense. 
The broad streets of American villages, and the inflammable 
material of which their houses are mostly constructed, make 
them much more difficult to defend than European villages, 
and an advance guard might, consequently, enter them with 
less risk. 

By way of illustration of the manner of reconnoitering 
and entering a town, let us suppose that an advance guard is 
approaching Franklin, Tennessee, from the south, on the 
Columbia Pike. (See Plate XI.) 

The advance guard halts from a half to a quarter of a 



FL.RTE. XI. 




CAVALRY PATROLS. 1 53 

mile from the town, and two patrols are detached from the 
support to the right and left respectively. The advance 
party continues its march to the edge of the town, where it 
halts, the point continuing to advance. The point moving 
up Main street to Indigo street, signals that all seems well, 
and the advance party follows it up Main street, the flankers 
advancing along Church street and Bridge street. The right 
patrol from the support reconnoiters the railroad cut, and 
proceeds along the railroad. The left patrol reconnoiters the 
valley of the brook west of the town, and advances along 
North Margin street. The advance guard takes up its march, 
the reserve halting at the edge of the town. The patrols com- 
municate as they pass Indigo, Main, Cameron, and East Mar- 
gin streets. If any one of the patrols fails to be seen, the 
others halt until communication is established, the advance 
being as expeditious as possible. On passing through the 
town, the advance party seizes the bridge, which is first re- 
connoitered by the point. The right patrol crosses the rail- 
road bridge, where it halts and rejoins the support on the 
arrival of the latter on the north bank of the Harpeth. The 
left patrol crosses the bridge in rear of the advance party 
and rejoins the support. The reserve passes through the 
town as soon as it receives signal that the patrols are all 
through. The hills on the north bank are occupied promptly, 
as they command the town and the passage of the Harpeth. 



CAVALRY PATROLS. 

The principles governing the action of infantry patrols 
are, in the main, equally applicable to patrols composed of 
cavalry : but there are some points of difference which must 
be considered. 



154 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Owing to the greater mobility of cavalry, the distances 
and intervals separating the scouts from each other, and 
from the main body of the patrol, are greater than in infantry. 
In very open country the cavalry scouts may sometimes be 
as far as 1,000 yards apart. Another essential difference in 
the conduct of infantry and cavalry patrols, depending also 
upon the superior mobility of the latter, is the detaching of 
scouts from strong cavalry patrols. These scouts are not 
merely detached after the manner of the flankers, or even the 
flank patrols, of an advance guard; but work quite independ- 
ently, joining the main body of the patrol at fixed rendezvous, 
or maintaining connection w r ith it by occasionally sending in 
reports to its commander. These detached scouts usually 
work in pairs, one man being in command, and may be sent 
as far as five or six miles from the main body of the patrol. 
Each scout should understand what he is to look for, and 
how and where he is to make his report. 

Intelligent and well-mounted soldiers should be selected 
for patrol duty. Before starting out, the patrol is carefully 
inspected by its commander, who, in addition to seeing that 
his men are in proper condition and properly equipped and 
supplied, assures himself that his horses are in good condi- 
tion and well shod. The same precautions in regard to 
arms and accouterments are taken as in the case of an in- 
fantry patrol. 

As in the case of infantry, no rules for the formation of 
the patrol can be positively prescribed, except the general 
and important one, that the patrol must always be so formed 
as to facilitate the gaining of information, and insure, if 
possible, the escape of at least one man if the patrol should 
be cut off. It may be said, however, that every patrol, how- 
ever small, should, if possible, have a scout detached as ad- 
vance guard, and another as rear guard. When the size of 



CAVALRY PATROLS. 155 

the patrol permits, flankers should also be thrown out. All 
the men of a small patrol, and the point, flankers, and rear 
guard of a strong one, should have their carbines loaded and 
advanced, or the pistol at the position of "raise" or "lower." 
The distances and intervals between different parts of a 
patrol depend upon circumstances. They should not be so 
great that the commander could not easily convey his com- 
mands by voice or signal, and would rarely exceed 100 yards 
•except in open country. At night, the flankers and detached 
scouts should always be drawn in, unless their communica- 
tion with the main body of the patrol is perfectly secured. 

The signals for a cavalry patrol are the same as in the 
case of the infantry (substituting carbine for rifle), with the 
exception that in the signal "Enemy in sight" the carbine is 
held up in one hand by the small of the stock, and to ask for 
reinforcements the arm is extended horizontally, holding the 
piece vertically, and given a circular motion several times. 

On open ground the following signals may sometimes 
be found useful : 

Enemy in sight : Move in a circle at a walk, and halt : 
to the right, if the hostile troops are cavalry; to the left, if 
they are infantry. For a mixed force, describe a figure eight. 
This movement may be repeated as often as necessary, but 
the halt should always be distinct. 

Enemy advancing: Same as above, except that the cir- 
cling is continuous and at a trot. If the enemy is advancing 
rapidly or in heavy force, make the signal at a gallop. 

As the movements of the scout, while making these sig- 
nals, would probably be seen by the enemy, they should be 
used only when the signals with the carbine might, owing to 
distance, be misunderstood. 

At night, a patrol must rely mainly upon its sense of 
hearing. Strict silence should be maintained, and smoking 



156 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

should be prohibited. Each scout should watch his horse 
for indications of danger, not only at night, but at all 
times; and if the animal pricks up his ears attentively or 
snorts excitedly, the warning should never be neglected, but 
the cause should be investigated. 

Though exercising the utmost vigilance, and endeavor- 
ing to avoid being discovered, a cavalry patrol must move 
along turnpikes and good roads. To do otherwise would be 
to follow by-paths and traverse difficult ground, where the 
horses would often have to be led. The mobility which gives 
a cavalry patrol its special value would thus be lost, and the 
patrol would not be worth as much as one composed of in- 
fantry; for the horses would become a mere burden. The 
patrol should, however, always move upon soft ground or 
sward at the side of the road, if it be practicable to do so, and 
should always move with the least possible noise. De 
Brack says that, in the campaign in Portugal, the French 
cavalry patrols, having to march on rocky and resounding 
roads, wrapped the hoofs of their horses with sheepskin,, 
tied around the pastern, with the wool inside; and that they 
thus approached very close to the English vedettes without 
being heard. Rustow recommends this measure to cavalry 
patrols under similar circumstances. This incident does: 
not, however, seem to be of any value further than illustrat- 
ing the ingenuity which patrols are called upon to exercise. 

The patrol commander should carefully select his route 
before starting out, and should adhere to it unless driven 
away by force. He should clearly indicate the places of ren- 
dezvous, and explain to the scouts, as far as practicable, how 
to reach them. "Nothing," says Shaw, "can be more discon- 
certing to the commander of a patrol than to miss his scouts 
at the time or place at which they should come in. He does 
not know whether they have lost their way, or whether they 



CAVALRY PATROLS. 1 57 

have fallen into hostile hands, and his further action is often 
dependent upon their reports, which he does not receive. 
The position also of the scouts who have lost their way, or 
who have not hit olf their party at the place of rendezvous, 
is one of difficulty. In the attempt to find their commander, 
they constantly wander about in an aimless manner and end 
by losing themselves altogether.'' 

The general manner of reconnoitering different kinds of 
ground is the same as in the case of infantry patrols; but 
the following details should be noted: Scouts should peep 
around every corner or turn in the road before riding on. If 
they come to an object too extensive to be reconnoitered 
without assistance, they must signal for reinforcements, or 
one man must ride back and report to the patrol commander, 
while the others remain in observation. If obstacles are en- 
countered on the road, such as barricades or felled trees, the 
patrol must, if possible, move round them and continue its 
reconnaissance. If the patrol can remove the obstacle, it 
does so; otherwise, or if a bridge is broken, word must be 
sent back, if a column is following. 

In ascending a hill, a scout should not ride quite to the 
top; but, unless time is urgent, should halt at a short dis- 
tance from the crest and then advance with caution. It may 
often be well for two scouts to approach the crest together, 
one of them dismounting and reconnoitering the crest on 
foot while the other holds his horse. 

A cavalry patrol or advance guard approaches a town 
or village in practically the same manner as corresponding 
bodies of infantry. A city or large town should ordinarily 
be avoided by a reconnoitering party; but after a victory, 
when the enemy is demoralized, more may be dared than 
would otherwise be possible. After the battle of Worth* 
Nancy, a city of 50,000 inhabitants, was entered by six 



158 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Uhlans; and twenty-six others, who followed later, occu- 
pied the railroad station and tore up a portion of the track. 
The whole squadron (150 men) then assembled and marched 
through the city. 

As a rule, a patrol should not halt at inhabited places, 
taverns, etc., or enter an enclosure. If it is necessary to halt 
to feed or water the horses, some secluded place should be 
selected, which could be guarded by sentinels in concealed 
positions. A neglect of this precaution has more than once 
been the cause of disaster. In 1846, Captain Thornton, re- 
connoitering with a troop of dragoons, imprudently entered 
a corral with his command. The result is thus described 
by/Rjiple)y: 

"Hardly had the rearmost files entered when the alarm 
was given. The squadron was in confusion; but Thornton, 
taking the lead, dashed at once at the only opening of the 
inclosure. That was already shut and defended by a large 
body of Mexicans, and the passage was impracticable. In 
searching for a passage to the right, the dragoons encoun- 
tered a galling fire, which increased the confusion, and 
Thornton's horse falling wounded upon his rider, the whole 
party gave back to the center of the corral. Captain Hardee, 
who succeeded to the command, rallied the men, and, after a 
pain endeavor to find an opening, surrendered. In this 
affair Lieutenant Mason had been killed, and sixteen non- 
commissioned officers and men had fallen dead or wounded."* 
A similar occurrence at Pont-a-Mousson on the night of 
the 12th-13th of August, 1870, is thus described by Borb- 
staedt : 

"The detachment, consisting of sixty dragoons and hus- 
sars, was received by the inhabitants in the most friendly 
manner: so that the soldiers for the most part dismounted 

*"The War with Mexico," Vol. I., page 107. 



CONNECTING PATROLS. I 59 

and put their horses into stables, while the commandant, 
accompanied by a few men, rode out to reconnoiter. All of 
a sudden, two squadrons of Chasseurs d'Afrique and Spahis, 
most probably sent for by the inhabitants from Metz, dashed 
into the town, surprised the dragoons and hussars in the 
stables, and took the greater part prisoners, the townspeople 
now turning on the Germans, and giving their ready assist- 
ance to the French cavalry."* 

As a rule, patrols do not fight, except to escape capture; 
but when there is a line of patrols whose front is covered 
with detached scouts, each scout and each patrol may be 
charged with a certain amoi*ut of resistance, in order to gain 
time for the bodies in rear. This will be considered more at 
length in the next chapter. 

Connecting Pati^ols. — These patrols are always composed 
of cavalry. The patrols keep in the intervals between the 
different bodies, and detach scouts to the front and flanks. 
The scouts to the front watch the enemy : those on the flanks 
observe all movements and changes of position of the body 
of troops nearest them, with which they keep in constant 
communication. The commander of the patrol keeps the 
body of troops on either flank informed of the movements of 
the other. If the army is moving on parallel roads, in a 
close country, the connecting patrols must be detached from 
the cavalry at the head of each column. In this case they 
communicate at each lateral road, and each column is thus 
kept informed of the progress of its neighbor, and of the con- 
dition of affairs along the entire front. If the army is march- 
ing on parallel roads in a sufficiently open country, a chain 
of patrols extends along its front, thus linking, as it were, 
the different columns. Connecting patrols are always; 
strong. 

♦"History of the Franco-German War," page 357. 



l6o SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Pursuing Patrols. — These are always composed of cav- 
alry, and may be either small or strong. They keep on the 
trail of the enemy, do not lose contact with him, and keep 
their own army fully informed of his movements. They 
should have definite orders as to the distance to which they 
are to pursue, and the matters which it may be specially de- 
sirable to report. For instance, the. pursuing patrols the 
day after the battle of Ligny doubtless had special instruc- 
tions to report everything that would indicate whether the 
Prussians were retreating upon Namur or upon Wavre. Pur- 
suing patrols must not be confounded with a pursuing force 
following headlong upon the heels of a routed army to com- 
plete the destruction of battle. They merely follow, watch, 
and hang on an army that is retreating without demoraliza- 
tion, in order that touch with it may not be lost. To gain and 
transmit information are the objects of a pursuing patrol, 
and the capture of prisoners, or the picking up of stragglers, 
must be sought only with a view to gaining information. 



CYCLIST PATKOLS. 

On good roads and favorable terrain, cyclist patrols can 
generally operate more effectively than patrols composed of 
either infantry or cavalry. Though they cannot move so 
stealthily as infantry, they can move with much greater 
rapidity. They have an advantage over cavalry patrols 
inasmuch as their movements are practically noiseless, raise 
very little dust, and cannot be betrayed by the clatter of 
hoofs and the neighing of horses. Should it be necessary to 
leave the road and operate on rough and unfavorable ground, 
theipatrol could easily conceal its bicycles in ditches or be- 
hind bushes, and proceed on foot. In this case the wheels 



BALLOON RECONNAISSANCE. l6l 

would at least be safer than the horses of a mounted patrol 
operating in a similar manner. For patrolling duty, the 
bicycles should have solid tires, and should be bronzed and 
devoid of all glitter. The formation and conduct of a cyclist 
patrol should be practically the same as those of one com- 
posed of cavalry. 

BALLOON RECONNAISSANCE. 

For more than a century, balloons have been used at 
various times in military reconnaissance. In fact, they were 
first employed for this purpose only eleven years after the 
first ascent of a human being in a balloon; the information 
gained by the French in a balloon reconnaissance at the 
battle of Fleurus (1794) having, it is said, contributed 
greatly to their victory. A balloon corps accompanied 
Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, and balloons were used by 
the French in the Italian War of 1859, by the United States 
army in the War of Secession, and by the French in 1870-71. 
From various causes, but little of importance seems gener- 
ally 10 have been accomplished in balloon reconnaissances; 
but the great improvements made in aerial navigation in 
recent years leads to a general belief that greater results 
will follow this method of reconnoitering in future. 

The three kinds of balloons used in reconnaissance are 
free, captive and dirigible balloons; the nature of each being 
expressed by its name. Free balloons are rarely used, as the 
impracticability of controlling their movements renders the 
gaining of information uncertain and its transmission prob- 
lematical. Such balloons might indeed pass over the enemy 
in an extended theater of operations, and land in friendly 
territory, whence information could be sent back by tele- 
graph or by means of carrier pigeons. But the issue of such 
reconnaissances is too doubtful to make them of much prac- 
tical use. 



1 62 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

The principal reliance in aerial reconnaissance is on the 
captive balloon. Its usual elevation is about 650 yards, at 
which height the different arms of the service can be distin- 
guished with a field-glass at a distance of nine miles, or, in 
very clear weather, after a rain, at fifteen miles. The 
balloon can,, however, easily ascend as high as 2,000 yards, 
from which height the field of view is greatly extended. 

The balloon train consists of six wagons, one of which is. 
used to transport the balloon already inflated, the others 
conveying necessary equipments in the form of windlasses, 
cables, hydrogen tubes, two steam engines, motors and 
dynamos for electric lighting, etc. By means of the hydro- 
gen tubes, the balloon can be inflated in half an hour. As 
a matter of safety, there should be at least two anchoring 
cables to the balloon. 

That the balloon reconnaissance may be of any value, it 
is necessary that the reports should be clear and intelligent, 
and that they should be promptly transmitted. The first 
requisite can be secured only by having the reconnaissance 
made by a well-qualified professional soldier, not by a mere 
aeronaut. The second is gained either by passing the mes- 
sages down to the ground in rings which slip over the anchor- 
ing cables; by telegraphing them directly from the car of 
the balloon; by means of signal flags; or by the use of the 
telephone. A photographic apparatus should also! be a 
part of the equipment of the balloon, by means of which cor- 
rect representations of the topography or the enemy's posi- 
tions may be obtained. 

The danger to be apprehended from the fire of the 
enemy upon the balloon is not great. Above 1,650 yards 
the balloon is safe from hostile fire; and, if struck by a pro- 
jectile at a lower distance, the descent will generally be suf- 
ficiently gradual to be harmless. 



BALLOON RECONNAISSANCE. 1 63 

In a balloon reconnaissance it is, of course, impossible 
to observe the general principle of "seeing without being 
seen." Indeed, so able a military writer as Dragomiroft* 
condemns the use of the balloon in reconnaissance, because 
it betrays the presence and approximate location of the 
troops using it. This objection can not!, however, be re- 
garded as a serious one; for balloons, with their somewhat 
cumbersome train, will never be used by any but large com- 
mands, whose presence can not be concealed, and whose 
position can not be betrayed to any hurtful degree by the 
location of one or two balloons. On the other hand, the 
sight of a balloon in the air causes an uneasy feeling on the 
part of the enemy, who is thus made aware that he is being 
watched, and compels a degree of anxiety on his part that 
more than outweighs the disadvantage of any information 
that he may gain from the situation of the balloon.* When 
the balloon is provided with an electric search-light, and the 
reconnaissance is conducted at night, this annoyance and 
uneasiness on the part of the enemy will be greatly 
increased. 

The perfection of the dirigible balloon will vastly en- 
hance the value of balloon reconnaissances, and will doubt- 
less, at the same time, present a new danger. It is claimed 
that Germany, France, and England each possess at present 

*In this connection, the remarks 01" General E. P. Alexander, of 
the Confederate army, are interesting. In his paper on "Artillery 
Fighting at Gettysburg" he says: "I was particularly cautioned in 
moving the artillery, to keep it out of sight of the signal station upon 
Round Top." And he adds in a foot-note: "This suggests the remark 
that 1 have never understood why "the enemy abandoned the use of 
military balloons early in 1863, after having used them extensively 
up to that time. Even if the observers never saw anything, they 
would have been worth all they cost for the annoyance and delays 
they caused us in trying to keep our movements out of their sight. 
That wretched little signal station upon Round Top that day caused 
one of our divisions to lose over two hours, and probably delayed our 
assault nearly that long. During that time a Federal corps arrived 
and became an important factor in the action which followed."— "Bai- 
zes and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. III., p. 358. 
— 11 



164 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

dirigible balloons that can be easily moved in any direction. 
The field of reconnaissance will thus be greatly enlarged; 
but if the easy navigation of the air becomes practicable, 
the armed opposition of balloon to balloon will introduce a 
new element which it has not heretofore been necessary to 
consider. 

Reconnaissances with captive balloons will not usually 
be made from any position more advanced than the reserve 
of the outpost. A more advanced position would place the 
balloon train in some jeopardy, and would not increase the 
field of view sufficiently to justify the increased danger. 

While the value of balloon reconnaissance is still some- 
what problematical, this method of gaining information of 
the enemy presents so many possibilities that it cannot be 
safely ignored. 



THE CAVALRY SCREEN. 1 65 

CHAPTER V. 



THE CAVALRY SCREEN. 



The cavalry is the eye with which the army sees. The activity 
of this arm can best ascertain with clearness the measures and inten- 
tions of the enemy. — Von der Goltz. 

The employment of the cavalry as a reconnoitering screen 
in advance of the army was habitual in the wars of the Con- 
sulate and First Empire, though the details of the manner in 
which the French cavalry performed the duty of screening 
and reconnoitering have not, unfortunately, been preserved. 
We know only that (excepting the campaign of 1813,in which 
the cavalry, destroyed in Russia, had not been re-created) the 
movements of Napoleon's armies were always covered by a 
screen of cavalry pushed forward to a considerable distance. 
Davoust's famous flank march from Ratisbon to Abensberg 
was screened by cavalry; and in the Russian campaign Mu- 
rat's cavalry covered the front of the French army, being 
sometimes fifty miles in advance of it. The campaigns of 
1806 and 1814 furnish brilliant examples of the use of a cav- 
alry screen by Napoleon ; and the conduct of Katzler's con- 
tact squadrons, and the extended use of covering detach- 
ments of Cossacks, show that the Allies had learned the 
lesson of screening and reconnoitering from their great 
opponent. 

In the long period of peace from Waterloo to the Crimea 
(scarcely broken by the insignificant hostilities of 1823, 1832, 
and 1849) the principles of war as demonstrated by the 
greatest of military leaders were forgotten or neglected in a 
mass of theoretical tactical details; and in the Crimean and 



1 66 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Italian wars the commanders, as a rule, were ignorant of 
everything that took place beyond their chain of sentinels. 
In the War of Secession the art of screening and reconnoiter- 
ing was revived by the American cavalry, and brought to a 
high state of development, notably by Sheridan and Stuart.* 
In 1866 the Prussians began to evolve from their own experi- 
ence principles already demonstrated in America, but ig- 
nored in Europe; and in 1870-71 the results obtained by the 
German cavalry screen were so striking as to command the 
attention of the military world. 

The. cavalry screen may be said to constitute the strate- 
gic advance guard of the army ; each column in rear furnish- 
ing what may be termed its own tactical advance guard. The 
screening may be performed either by the corps cavalry or 
the cavalry divisions. f In the former case the head of each 
division or corps is covered by its own cavalry : in the latter, 
the cavalry divisions cover the front of the entire army. In 
our service it is probable that, following our own traditions, 
the corps cavalry would be reduced to a minimum, and that 
the cavalry divisions, united into a cavalry corps, would be 
intrusted with the duty of screening the front of the entire 
army. During the Peninsula campaign, Cooke's cavalry 
screened the advance of the Army of the Potomac to the 

*This duty was also well understood and efficiently performed by 
Cooke, Stoneman, and Pleasonton. 

tThe corps cavalry is the force attached to the army corps; gen- 
erally in the proportion of 400 to 600 sabers to each infantry division. 
The cavalry divisons are bodies under the command of cavalry gen- 
erals, subject only to the orders of the commander of the army, or the 
chief of cavalry if there be one. In the German army the cavalry 
attached to the army corps is termed "divisional cavalry," a part 
being assigned permanently to each infantry division. The term 
"divisional cavalry" was formerly applied to the cavalry attached to 
an army corps in our service (see Cavalry Drill Regulations of 
1891, paragraph 972), but the designation has since been changed to 
the more appropriate term "corps cavalry." The French have, in this 
respect, an organization similar to our own, the cavalry being assigned 
to the army corps instead of being attached to the divisions. 



DISTANCE OF THE SCREEN FROM THE ARMY. 1 67 

Chickahominy, and masked its flank march to the James 
River. Stoneman performed a like service for Hooker in the 
masterly movement which preceded the battle of Chancel- 
lorsville ; and had the cavalry not been detached on a boot- 
less raid, the surprise of the Eleventh Corps by Stonewall 
Jackson would have been impossible. In the Gettysburg 
campaign the screening and reconnoitering duty was excel- 
lently performed by Pleasonton's cavalry corps. 

In the Wilderness and Appomattox campaigns similar 
duty was similarly performed by Sheridan's cavalry; and in 
the Eed Eiver campaign the Union cavalry so completely 
screened the movements of the rest of the army, that Taylor, 
a few hours before the battle of Sabine Cross-Roads, reported 
to Kirby Smith that no advance had been made in his front, 
except by cavalry. In these campaigns no divisional caval- 
ry existed. If a division were acting independently, it 
would, of course, be necessary to attach some cavalry to it; 
in which case the operations of the cavalry detachment 
would be regulated by the general principles that govern the 
conduct of a screen in front of an army. 

Distance of the Screen from the Army. — The distance of 
the cavalry screen from the main army will depend upon 
many considerations, chief of which are the distance and 
character of the enemy. If the enemy is at a distance, or if 
his cavalry is cowed and demoralized, the screen may safely 
be pushed much farther to the front than when he is nearer 
and his cavalry is bold and enterprising. In 1870-71 the 
German cavalry "overflowed the country miles, and even sev- 
eral marches, ahead of the main body of the infantry."* The 
screen was rarely less than 15 or 20 miles in front of the 
army, and during the march from the battle-field of Sedan to 
Paris it was always several marches ahead. In the Gettys- 
*Hohenloke. 



1 68 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

burg campaign, however, where the enemy was enterpris- 
ing, aggressive, and confident, Buford's screening cavalry 
was habitually less than ten miles in advance of the army. 
The cavalry screen should be, as a rule, at least one march 
in advance of the main force; but as it betrays, to a certain 
extent, the presence of troops behind it, it may sometimes be 
advisable to draw it in close to the main body with a view to 
deceiving the enemy. Thus, in 1814, Napoleon directed 
Marmont to execute this device for the purpose of mislead- 
ing the Allies. 

It is, therefore, impossible to prescribe definite rules for 
the distance of the screen from the army. While the armies 
are concentrating, the cavalry may generally be pushed far 
ahead of the army, patrols being extensively and vigorously 
used; but when the armies begin their advance, the distance 
is usually reduced to not more than 15 or 20 miles, diminish- 
ing after contact to 5 or 6 miles, and finally disappearing 
altogether when tactical operations begin. In general 
terms, it may be stated that contact with the enemy is the 
first consideration, and that this will largely and generally 
influence the distance of the screen from the forces in rear. 

Frontage of the Screen. — The object of the cavalry screen 
is two-fold : namely, (1) To gain information of the enemy, 
and (2) To prevent him from gaining information of one's 
own army. The methods necessary to gain these two objects 
necessarily conflict. To reconnoiter, the greatest dispersion 
of front is desirable; but if the screen be too widely ex- 
tended, it will be everywhere weak, its concentration will be 
difficult, and the enemy will be able easily to rupture it. 
The front covered by the advanced cavalry will, therefore, 
depend upon circumstances; such as the nature of the coun- 
try (open or intersected); the number of roads parallel to 
the advance (as affecting the prompt transmission of intelli- 



FORMATION OF THE SCREEN. 169 

gence to the rear) ; and the number of lateral roads (as facili- 
tating the concentration of the screening troops). Above all 
is the consideration of rapid concentration. 

In the advance from the Saar to the Moselle the front 
of the German screen averaged from five to six miles to a reg- 
iment;* a division of six regiments covering a front of 30 
miles, and a force of ten regiments reconnoitering on a front 
of 60 miles. The screen was thus very weak at all points; 
and its success was mainly due to the weakness and ineffi- 
ciency of the French cavalry. Trench is of the opinion that 
a cavalry divison (3,600 sabers) should, in open country, 
cover a front of 20 to 25 miles, when there is no reason to 
apprehend the close proximity of large bodies of the enemy; 
and that in a close country, where the scouting parties would 
have to work much nearer to each other, the front should be 
reduced to two-thirds or half of that distance. Bonie takes 
from 11 to 121 miles for the front of a division. While em- 
phasizing the statement that no fixed width of front can be 
prescribed, it may be assumed that the front covered by an 
American brigade in screening and reconnoitering would 
average ten or twelve miles, f 

Certain bodies of the enemy will generally be assigned 
as the objective of the brigade; or, when still at a distance 
from the opposing army, a certain zone of country will be 
assigned to it ; and the front to be covered by the brigade 
will thus be incidentally determined. To form an efficient 
screen, there should be about a brigade of cavalry for each 
army corps in the force covered. 

Formation of the Screen. — The main body of the cavalry 

employed in screening duty should be kept concentrated 

*A German cavalry regiment numbers 600 sabers. 

t A cavalry brigade in the U. S. Army consists of three regiments, 
and would accordingly have a war strength of 3,000 sabers— exactly 
the strength of a German division. 



I JO SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

and well in hand. It is a mistake to fritter away the force 
in small groups which could not concentrate in time for 
fighting, however much such a plan might facilitate recon- 
naissance. The strength of the detachments should be ad- 
justed to the nature of their duty; and it may be stated, in 
general terms, that the small patrols are charged with the 
service of information; and the larger bodies, with that of 
security. 

It must be frankly stated that the question of the proper 
formation and employment of the cavalry screen has not yet 
emerged from the realms of theory. The best European 
writers on the subject base their ideas upon the experience 
of a single war, in which the successful cavalry was not re- 
sisted by a worthy opponent; and these ideas may, more- 
over, be said to be based upon the results rather than upon 
the methods of the Franco-German conflict; for there was no 
uniformity in the screening and reconnoitering methods of 
the Germans in 1870-71. The student must, therefore, re- 
gard the following typical formations as suggestions, and 
not as authoritative prescriptions. In any case, the com- 
mander must make his dispositions in accordance with cir- 
cumstances rather than diagrams; and in almost every case, 
some modification of the typical formations will be rendered 
necessary by the nature of the country, the direction of the 
roads, or the character, proximity, or strength of the enemy. 

If the brigade is operating in an open country, one regi- 
ment constitutes the reserve, and is preceded by a squadron 
of each of the other regiments at a distance of about two and 
a half miles. These squadrons, constituting the supports, 
are separated by an interval of not more than six miles, the 
reserve being situated centrally in their rear. About two 
and a half miles farther to the front is the second squadron 
of each advanced regiment, either in one column, or in two 



FORMATION OF THE SCREEN 171 

columns of two troops each. These may be termed the inter- 
mediate squadrons. They are separated by about the same 
interval as the squadrons composing the supports. About 
two and a half miles farther to the front, the remaining 
squadron of each regiment is distributed along the front in 
contact troops, which are preceded at suitable distances by 
patrols, detailed either from the contact troops, the inter- 
mediate squadrons, or the supports. When necessary, these 
patrols detach scouts still farther to the front. (See Plate 

xn.) 

When the enemy is at a distance or lacking in aggres- 
siveness, the intermediate squadrons may be placed in the 
contact line; thus extending the front at a time when "in- 
formation" is to be considered more than "security." If the 
enemy is close and enterprising, the intermediate squadrons 
may be merged with the supports, the front being contracted 
and distances diminished, owing to the paramount import- 
ance of "security." 

The intervals between the contact troops! are such as 
to admit of covering the front assigned to the brigade. In 
a close country, the number of contact bodies and the inter- 
vals between them depend upon the number of available 
roads within the front occupied. On some roads there might 
be one troop; on others, two or three; or the whole squad- 
ron might have to march on a single road. As a rule, a 
greater number of columns would be requisite in a close 
country than in an open one. Each of the contact troops, 
each intermediate squadron, and each support, as well as 
the reserve, has its own advance guard, and keeps in con- 
stant communication with the bodies on its right, left, front, 
or rear. The major commanding the contact troops of each 
regiment may accompany any troop, but is habitually with 
the second. The colonel of an advanced regiment is habit- 



172 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

ually with, the support, but may accompany any one of his 
squadrons. The brigade commander is habitually with the 
reserve, but goes wherever his presence seems necessary. If 
the reconnaissance is likely to lead to a battle, it may be well 
for him to be with the contact line. 

A battery of horse artillery should be attached to the 
brigade, and should habitually accompany the reserve, 
marching in rear of the leading squadron.* 

The battery should not, in any case, be placed so far to 
the front that the leading troops could not maneuver or fall 
back without exposing it to capture. If the cavalry is pur- 
suing the enemy, the battery should be with one of the lead- 
ing regiments; but guns should not be detached from the 
battery except in unusual emergencies — for instance, in the 
case of a village held by a hostile, but undisciplined, popu- 
lation, upon whom the moral effect of a few shells would be 
great. If a considerable cavalry fight is expected, the bat- 
tery should always be with the reserve. If a force of in- 
fantry in wagons accompanies the brigade, it forms part of 
the reserve. 

When the brigade is marching on two parallel roads, 
the reserve follows the regiment that seems most likely to 
need assistance. If the extent of front is too great to admit 
of the reserve moving promptly to the assistance of either 
wing, the unsupported wing must be given great independ- 
ence, and, if necessary, must adopt a separate line of retreat. 

When the brigade is forced to march in a single column, 
the contact troops, the intermediate squadron, and the sup- 

*As the American cavalry brigade is equal in numerical strength 
to a French, German, or Austrian cavalry division, it would seem, at 
first, that it should have a number of horse batteries equal to those 
of the Continental cavalry division. The condition of our roads, and 
the general nature of the terrain in any of our probable theatres of 
operations, are not, however, favorable to the extended use of artil- 
lery; and the Cavalry Drill Regulations (paragraph 753) are undoubt- 
edly right in assigning only one battery to the cavalry brigade. 



PLATEXII. 



Caval ry Screen consisting of 1 Brigade - - 3 R e giments 



Patrols 



JPatroL 



Contact Troops "IS " '' S " /' fi * " * A . t /' 5 * /' g '' f /' I <1 /' £ 
1st- Squadron 7th Cav. \ 1st Squadron 9tk Cav 



Zrtd Sq'dn ?th Cav. * 


E 


\A 

Zrtd Sq'dn. 9th Cav. 




Supports Cl {%.--'■ 6 

3rd Sq'dn ?lA Cav 


s 

l -miles ../?.JJ /f 

^ «3?-rf Sq'dn. 9th Cav. 

■I 




r 
t r 


T 

r 


t 
t t 

1st Sqicadron 




Preserve, 5th Cavalry 


I 1 

A 

A 


2-rvd. Squadron 
\3rd Squadron 




t 


f * 
ft 

e 










-*? 



FORMATION OF THE SCREEN. 1 75 

port are all furnished by the leading regiment. A strong 
patrol should be pushed out well to the front, and a troop 
should be detached to a considerable distance to either flank. 
These distances cannot be definitely prescribed: they should 
be great enough to give the column warning in time to pre- 
pare for action, but not so great as to expose the detach- 
ments to imminent danger of being cut off by an enterpris- 
ing enemy. The immediate front should be covered by two 
contact troops. 

When the ground permits, and no serious engagement 
is expected within the next twenty-four hours, all three regi- 
ments may march on the same front, the brigade thus having 
twelve contact troops and no reserve. This formation is de- 
sirable whenever it can be adopted, as it promotes celerity 
of movement, facilitates foraging, and increases the front of 
reconnaissance. This formation may be adopted even when 
the several columns are a short day's march from each other; 
as the concentration on the center column could then be 
easily effected within twenty-four hours. 

The duty of contact troops being very arduous, they 
must be relieved as often as practicable. 

A rear guard is always provided from the reserve. It 
generally consists of two troops, and is charged not only 
with the arrest of stragglers and the preservation of order, 
but also with keeping a careful watch for all suspicious in- 
dications in the rear. If clouds of dust are seen, the cause 
must be investigated; and villages and prominent points 
must be watched after the column has passed, to see that no 
signals are given out to the enemy. 

The topography of most of the States of the Mississippi 
Valley, with their absolutely parallel roads a mile apart, 
and with lateral communication at every mile, would proba- 
bly lend itself admirably to the typical formations suggested 



176 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

above; but in many of the more wooded and broken regions 
of the United States and Canada, where the roads are fewer 
and less regular, the following formation, based upon the 
experience of the War of Secession, would doubtless be 
much better:* The brigade, if practicable, operates on not 
more than two roads, about five miles apart; a regiment 
and two squadrons on one road, and a regiment and one 
squadron on the other. (See Plate XIII.) Each body de- 
taches a squadron about two miles to the front. In advance 
of these, patrols, pushed out to suitable distances, cover the 
entire front, maintaining communication with the center, 
and forming a line of patrols extending about three miles 
beyond the roads used by the brigade. This gives a line of 
patrols about eleven miles long, sixteen patrols being em- 
ployed — eight from each advanced squadron. The advanced 
squadron on each road may either be held together or broken 
up into supports for the patrols, as circumstances may re- 
quire. In some cases each patrol may even be supported by 
a half-troop. Each flank of the line is strongly supported 

*'Tn the Shenandoah Valley the roads leading in the direction of 
the enemy were generally not more numerous than two, each of 
which was important enough to occupy with a brigade, or oftener 
with a division, of cavalry. The enormous distances to which the 
German cavalry was sent apply to conditions that would not exist in 
the presence of an enterprising and efficient opposing cavalry."— Gen- 
eral Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., in response to inquiries by the author 
on this subject. 

"It remains yet to be proved by the contact of equal foes, whether 
the immense spread of the German cavalry in 1870, radiating in de- 
creasing subdivisions from a common center, can be maintained, to 
its full extent, in the presence of an equally active cavalry foe. It is 
more likely that to obtain the information which in '70 was brought 
in by small groups of horsemen, fearlessly riding over the country at 
a great distance from their regiments, it will be found necessary to 
hold them somewhat more in hand and push forward on every avenue 
of approach to the enemy a self-supporting body of cavalry of consid- 
erable size, trained to fight under all conditions. So it is that the 
careful study of the expeditions of cavalry against cavalry, so fruitful 
of good results in 1863, '4 and '5, is of the first importance to us as 
students of cavalry progress."— Major J. B. Babcock, U. S. A. in Jour- 
nal of the United State's Cavalry Association. 



plate znr 



Cavalrj/ Screen consisting of / J3r1ga.de on Two Roads 



: f 



Squadron Sen Cavalry 



4th Cavalry 



4 V 




Squadron 8th Cavalry 



1st Cavalry 

ana 

One Squadron 

cf 8th Cav. 



PATROLS. 1 79 

by nearly half of the brigade; and any small force of the 
enemy penetrating the center of the line would be caught 
between the two columns. No road practicable for a large 
force should be between the columns, unless timely informa- 
tion and speedy concentration were so sure as to leave no 
danger of a large hostile force separating the two parts of 
the brigade. 

If parallel roads do not exist at suitable distances, the 
force must be held in a single column in rear of the center 
of the line of patrols, two squadrons, if necessary, being de- 
tached to the front. In fact, whatever alterations circum- 
stances may demand in any of the foregoing dispositions, the 
main body of the brigade should, in any case, be on, or near, 
the principal route by which the enemy may advance, and 
must *be as concentrated as possible. Lateral roads must 
be reconnoitered, and, if necessary, occupied by covering 
patrols. 

Patrols. — Scouting patrols are sent out in advance of 
the contact troops to such distances as circumstances may 
require. They are either small patrols or officers' patrols; 
the latter being always under the command of an officer, and 
generally varying in strength from two to ten men — some- 
times consisting of one or two officers alone. Larger de- 
tachments may be necessary for particular objects; but, as 
a rule, the patrols should be small, as they would otherwise 
be too conspicuous, and would lack the mobility essential 
to the proper performance of their duties. As a general rule 
for the size of a detachment, it may be said that if it is to 
fight, it can not be too strong; if it is merely to observe, it 
can not be too weak. If, however, in the latter case, it is 
likely to encounter similar parties of the enemy, it should be 
strong enough to hold its own against a hostile patrol of five 
or six men, such as are most frequently met. 

12 — 



l8o SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

The scouting patrols are taken generally from the con- 
tact troops, though they may be taken also from the inter- 
mediate squadrons, or even from the supports, when exten- 
sive reconnaissance is necessary. The number of these pa- 
trols will depend entirely upon circumstances; but they 
would rarely exceed two to each contact troop. In Bonie's 
system these patrols are termed "points," each consisting of 
an officer, a corporal, and six men. The point may be di- 
vided into two equal groups, the officer retaining immediate 
command of one and assigning the corporal to the command 
of the other. As a formation suited to secure the escape of 
at least one man, in case the patrol should meet with disaster, 
he suggests the following: The officer with the first group, 
preceded at some distance by a trooper; the corporal with 
the second group, followed correspondingly by another 
trooper, the distance from the leading to the rear trooper 
being about a third of a mile. 

A patrol rarely goes more than six miles from the con- 
tact troops, and detached scouts do not often go more than 
the same distance from the patrol; but they may be called 
upon to make very long and exhausting rides, and the men 
and horses should, therefore, be carefully chosen. Each 
patrol should keep informed of the positions of the patrols 
on its flanks, and of its own squadron. Each troop and 
squadron should always have similar knowledge of the posi- 
tions of corresponding bodies and the reserve, and each 
squadron and troop commander should know where to send 
his reports and where to establish connecting posts, if such 
posts are to be used. 

The patrols explore not only to the front, but on the 
flanks of the brigade; the flanking patrols being generally 
taken from the reserve, on account of the heavy demands 
made on the advanced squadrons for other patrols. 



PATROLS. l8l 

The patrols should be given great freedom of action. 
It is their duty to gain and keep contact with the enemy, and 
in their movements everything should be subordinated to 
the one object of gaining information. They make no at- 
tempt to provide for the security of the troops in rear (ex- 
cept indirectly by furnishing timely information); do not 
think of fighting, except to escape capture; and if compelled 
to retreat, they choose such a line as to them seems best, re- 
gardless of the troops in rear. Neighboring patrols com- 
municate their discoveries to each- other, and, if they do not 
fall back upon the contact squadrons, join for the night, 
when practicable, in order to economize vedettes, and, at the 
same time, have the increased strength that comes from in- 
creased numbers. 

If the scouting patrols are driven away by the enemy, 
they return as quickly as possible and continue their recon- 
naissance. "They may," says Bonie, "best be Compared to 
flies, which one keeps constantly trying to drive away, but 
without effect, as they again and again return with an ener- 
vating persistence." The conduct of the German scouts in 
1870 is thus described by the same author: "At noon, on 
the 8th of August, we received orders to saddle and mount, 
because the enemy's cavalry was in view. Some scouts were 
mistaken for the head of numerous columns. We then re- 
tired. From that moment until we reached Luneville, their 
scouts watched us incessantly. Linked to their army by 
horsemen, they gave an exact account of our positions, of our 
halts, of our movements ; and as they watched us from some 
little distance, incessantly appearing and* disappearing, they 
spread uneasiness." 

These scouts, by their mere presence, appearing and dis- 
appearing, manifestly watching, invariably eluding pursuit, 
and returning to their impudent intrusion, produced upon 



l82 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

the French much of the annoyance caused by harassing pa- 
trols. Hohenlohe says: 

"It is necessary to have seen it, as I did the day before 
the battle of Beaumont, before one can realize how our cav- 
alry swarmed round the enemy's columns on the march, just 
as bees swarm out of their hives against an intruder. I saw 
one corps, which, as it marched by me during many hours, I 
reckoned at forty batallions, continually annoyed and de- 
layed by our troublesome Uhlans. Sometimes whole com- 
panies broke out in anger from the column of march and 
fired volleys at single patrols, who then quickly fell back, 
and, as far as possible, avoided loss. The result of all this 
was indescribable fatigue for the enemy's infantry. They 
reached the end of their march as night fell, utterly tired out, 
and neglected, from very weariness, the most ordinary pre- 
cautions as 1 to outposts around their miserable bivouacs, 
while our infantry, quite near them, but without their knowl- 
edge, was comfortably housed in villages." 

As a rule, officers' patrols are detailed for each of the 
main routes and the flanks, the intervening country and les- 
ser roads being intrusted to small patrols under non-com- 
missioned officers. If detached from a contact troop, the 
officer's patrol will have for its duty part of the general re- 
connoitering duty of the troop; if detailed otherwise, the 
patrol will probably be intrusted with a special mission — 
such as to open communication with some portion of the 
command which is not in contact with the brigade; to ascer- 
tain whether the enemy is present in a certain village; or to- 
reconnoiter a distant village or defile. Officers' patrols thus 
sent out may go very much farther than the ordinary scout- 
ing patrols, depending while gone entirely upon their own 
resources. Officers are sometimes detached singly to watch 
the enemy or particular points, rejoining when their object 



PATROLS. 183 

is accomplished or they are driven in by the enemy. A pa- 
trol sent out on a special mission should return the moment 
its object is accomplished, without undertaking other ob- 
jects ou its own responsibility. Care should be taken that 
neither too many missions nor too great an extent of ground 
be assigned to a single patrol. 

Having in view the possibility of falling into the hands 
of the enemy, the officers should not have on their persons 
any papers that could give information 'to the enemy. They 
should commit their orders to memory, and then destroy the 
printed or written copy.* 

Owing to the superior celerity and efficiency of officers' 
patrols, they are especially valuable in seizing postoffices, 
telegraph stations, etc. In entering a village or town in the 
enemy's country, the greatest safety s found in the sudden 
appearance and prompt disappearance of the party. The 
patrol should quickly gain the desired information, or seize 
the persons or documents constituting its object, and should 
disappear before the inhabitants recover from their aston- 
ishment sufficiently to appreciate how small, or how isolated, 
the party is. 

The general rules for the conduct of the scouting patrols 
have already been considered in the subject of reconnais- 
sance ; and but little remains to be said about them. While 
independence of action must be given to these patrols; while 
no attempt must be made to rally them every night on the 

*Tliis rule might sometimes be profitably adopted by officers when 
not on duty with patrols. General J. G. Walker, formerly of the Con- 
federate army, in speaking of Lee's "Special Orders, No. 191," a copy 
of which accidentally fell into McClellan's hands, says: "On receiv- 
ing my copy of the order I was so impresssed with the disastrous 
consequence which might result from its loss that I pinned it securely 
in an inside pocket. In speaking with General Longstreet on this 
subject afterward, he remarked that the same thought had occurred 
to him, and that, as an absolutely sure precaution, he memorized the 
order and then 'chewed it up.' " — Battles and Leaders of the Civil 
War," Vol. II., page 607. 



184 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

advance guards of the contact troops; they will, as a rule, 
if driven back, rally upon the troops immediately in their 
rear. Indeed, it is impossible to get good scouting service 
unless the patrols are supported by a sufficient force to in- 
sure some degree of protection from the assaults of the 
enemy's cavalry. In the retreat from Spicheren, General de 
Cissey ordered a regiment of cavalry to drive away the Ger- 
man patrols which were pertinaciously hanging upon the 
rear of the Frencli. A squadron quickly drove back the 
patrols, but coming upon the squadrons in rear, it was de- 
feated and driven back with loss, and the annoying scouts 
were again seen hovering around the retreating army. 

In this case the French attacking force was too small; 
and, in general, it may be said that the only way to get rid of 
the enemy's annoying scouts, when they are properly sup- 
ported, is by inflicting a heavy defeat upon his cavalry. 
When (some days after his victory at Fisher's Hill) Sheridan 
withdrew down the Shenandoah Valley, he was followed by 
Early, whose parties of cavalry, as soon as they gained con- 
tact, hung upon the Union army much after the manner of 
the Prussian patrols described above. Sheridan, "resenting 
this boldness of an army so lately routed," halted the next 
day, and launched his entire cavalry force against that of the 
enemy. A spirited engagement of two hours' duration 
(known as the battle of Tom's Brook) resulted in the com- 
plete defeat of the Confederate cavalry, Lomax being driven 
in flight nearly thirty miles by Merritt, while Rosser was 
routed by Custer. So thoroughly was the Confederate cav- 
alry used up that nothing further was seen of Early's contact 
parties. 

The movements of the scouting patrols will depend on 
those of the enemy; for they must never lose contact with 
him, unless ordered to do so. The contact troops must al- 



TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE. 185 

ways be ready, if possibly to lend prompt support to the 
patrols; and we thus have the movements of the leading 
squadrons entirely contingent upon those of the enemy. The 
patrols on the flanks of the brigade must endeavor to work 
round the flanks of the enemy; and for this purpose they and 
the supporting contact troops must be given considerable 
independence of action, both in advancing and in falling 
back. 

Separation of the Duties of Security and Information. — 
The duties of security and those of information thus come 
into direct conflict. The cavalry screen acts as the advanced 
outpost of the army, and the contact troops constitute the 
outpost for the main body of the cavalry thus employed. 
Now t , an outpost must not be pushed so far in advance of the 
main body as to be beyond prompt support ; and, on the other 
hand, scouting parties and contact troops must touch upon 
the enemy in order to get information. It follows, then, that 
when the opposing armies are at a distance of several days' 
march from each other, the duties of security must be sepa- 
rated from those of information ; and this is usually effected 
by intrusting the latter duties to detached patrols. During 
the first concentration of the armies on the theater of opera- 
tions, these detached patrols are generally small officers' 
patrols; celerity of movement and intelligence in reconnoi- 
tering being here even more necessary than usual, as (the 
regular cavalry screen not having yet been formed) the pa- 
trols are without support. 

Transmission of Intelligence. — All information gained by 
the cavalry screen is promptly transmitted to the headquar- 
ters of the commander-in-chief. In case the screening force 
consists of corps cavalry, the reports ar.e made to the 
corps commander. The commander of the screen keeps 
up constant communication with the commanders of the ad- 



1 86 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

vance guards of the columns in his rear, and keeps them 
posted in regard to matters in their front which they should 
know. Staff officers from the headquarters of the army, or 
of the army corps immediately in rear, are frequently sent 
with the screening force, moving with the most important 
detachments. Thus, in the operations just preceding the 
battle of Mars-la-Tour, the chief of staff of the Xth Corps 
accompanied the 5th Cavalry Division. Many similar in- 
stances occurring in the same war might be cited. 

Contact and Fighting. — On gaining contact with the ene- 
my, concentration is the first consideration; for fighting will 
now be necessary, either to break his screen or to preserve 
our own, and victory should rest with that cavalry which is 
in the best formation for combat. The cavalry should be 
concentrated on two or more parallel roads, in supporting 
distance, ignoring the enemy's scouts and patrols, and push- 
ing through to his reserves.* If the enemy has been more 
intent upon "information" than "security," and has his force 
disseminated, his reserves will be crushed, and the rest of 
his screen, finding a concentrated body of hostile cavalry in 
its rear, will collapse and seek safety in a rapid retreat by 
the flanks. If the enemy has his force concentrated, our cav- 
alry must also be concentrated to avoid ruin. The follow- 
ing may, therefore, be given as an invariable rule : From the 
outset spare no means of gaining information; but on touch- 
ing the enemy, shape everything to the end of being ready to 
fight. The best way to screen an army is by defeating the op- 
posing cavalry. 

If the patrols perform their duty properly, the presence 
of large forces of the enemy should be known in time for the 
necessary orders for concentration to be given; but if the 
contact troops find themselves in the presence of large hos- 

*This was Sheridan's plan of action at the battle of Tom's Brook. 



CONTACT AND FIGHTING. 1 87 

tile bodies, advancing or deployed for battle, they fall back 
upon the supports,* even though no orders to that effect have 
been given. Unless the contact troops are themselves sur- 
prised (which is absolutely without excuse), they fall back 
slowly; and when they have joined the supports, the united 
force falls back upon the reserve, or the latter is moved up 
to reinforce the former. If there is no special reserve, the 
threatened troop or squadron closes in upon a neighboring 
one, warning it quickly beforehand. 

The concentration effected, the action of the cavalry de- 
pends upon circumstances. If the enemy's cavalry covers 
his front, it should be vigorously attacked. If the hostile 
screening force has been driven away from, or has volun- 
tarily uncovered, the front of its army, our cavalry should 
remain in observation of the enemy's front only until our 
army is ready for battle, when it should withdraw to one or 
both flanks of the corps or army, taking up a position to 
check the attempts of the enemy to attack or reconnoiter. 
During the movement to the flanks, and in all movements of 
concentration, unceasing reconnaissance of the enemy is 
kept up by officers' patrols. 

In an attempt to break through our screen, the enemy 
(especially if accompanied by artillery) must generally ad- 
vance on one of the main roads perpendicular to its front — 
a road upon which our cavalry should itself be advancing. 
Good cavalry, under an efficient leader, should never be sur- 
prised by such a movement ; for if provision for mutual sup- 
port by the different bodies has been made beforehand; if 
communication has been maintained, and scouting has not 
been neglected; the enemy's movements should be quickly 
perceived and. promptly met. If, however, the cavalry is 

*It is presumed that at this stage the intermediate squadrons are 
■merged with the supports. 



1 88 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

driven in by the enemy, the direction of its retreat will gener- 
ally depend upon the seeming designs of the enemy and the 
direction of his advance. The retiring cavalry may find it 
expedient to draw the enemy after it in a false direction, in 
order to obtain favorable conditions for its own army. But, 
in order to act judiciously in such cases, a correct apprecia- 
tion of the state of affairs and a sound judgment as to what 
will be advantageous are necessary.* 

The cavalry screen may sometimes find it necessary to 
act as a veritable advance guard, and fight a delaying action 
to hold an advantageous position and cover the deployment 
of the army; just as Buford held the position at Gettysburg 
until the arrival and deployment of the First Corps, keeping 
in check with his two small cavalry brigades Heth's Confed- 
erate infantry division. In such a case the chief reliance 
should be placed on dismounted fire action, and the cavalry 
should not hesitate to resort to the intrenching tool. 

In combating the opposing cavalry screen, the judgment 
of the commander must decide whether the saber or the car- 
bine should be used. This question will largely depend on 
the nature of the ground and on the action of the opposing 
force. It may be said that where suddenness of action is de- 
sirable, the saber should be used whenever possible; and the 
penetrating force should, therefore, be partial to its employ- 
ment. On the other hand, the resisting force should incline 
to the use of the carbine, unless it has been able to concen- 
trate as rapidly as its opponent, and thus has reason to ex- 
pect favorable results from a counter-charge. Cavalry must 
always be ready for effective fire action ; for it may find its. 

*Von Schmidt. 



PROTECTING THE INFANTRY. 1 89 

progress opposed by infantry or partisan troops sheltered in 
villages or behind breastworks.* 

When the enemy is defeated, the cavalry resumes its 
place in advance of the other troops. Its mode of action 
then can not be better described than in the words of Bo- 
guslawski: 

"Immediately after these actions [Spicheren, Weissen- 
burg and Worth], the cavalry divisions again led the way. 
Their mission was, above all, to pursue and keep in contact 
with the enemy. They threw forw T ard strong detachments, 
which everywhere forced the enemy back and sought to dis- 
cover the direction of his march or his new position. If they 
found their way clear before them, they sent on officers' pa- 
trols, with orders to push forward at any risk until they 
came upon the foe. These parties were dispatched in all 
directions, and performed their duties generally with equal 
ability and determination. It is they who spread the fear of 
les Prussiens many miles in front of the army corps' advance 
guards; to them cities like Nancy opened their gates with- 
out an attempt at resistance; and if here and there a cavalry 
patrol some days' march in advance of the division was dis- 
persed or cut off, one or two horsemen generally made their 
way back to give intelligence, which was what was wanted." 

It is not often, however, that the cavalry, even of a vic- 
torious army, can have its own way so completely. It is only 
w T hen the cavalry has beaten its opponent mto a sense of 
hopeless inferiority that such audacious reconnaissance can 
be successfully carried out. 

Protecting the Infantry. — The work of the infantry is 

*It seems incredible to American cavalrymen that in December, 
1870, a German cavalry brigade was stopped at the village of Vibray 
by twelve riflemen. The lesson taught by this humiliating check was 
not lost on the Germans; and the arms and training of their cavalry 
are now sush that a repetition of such an occurrence would be im- 
possible. 



190 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

greatly lightened when a cavalry screen in advance per- 
forms its duty efficiently and has gained the upper hand of 
the opposing cavalry. In 1870-71 the German infantry was 
not disturbed by any apprehensions in regard to the enemy, 
but marched and rested in security, knowing that the coun- 
try was reconnoitered so far ahead that the cavalry could 
give warning of the enemy's advance a full day before the 
attack could be made. During the entire war, the German 
infantry was not once alarmed by the enemy, and its marches 
were made as easily as in "autumn maneuvers." 

Seizing Important Points. — In addition to screening the 
movements of its own army and discovering those of the 
enemy, the advanced cavalry is often required to seize passes, 
heights, or bridges, the possession of which is important, and 
which must be gained quickly, and held until the main army 
can arrive. In this operation, celerity of movement and 
fighting power are prime considerations. 

In 1863 Rosecrans moved against the Confederate army, 
which occupied the line from Wartrace, through Shelbyville, 
along Duck River. His plan was to menace Bragg's left, 
and then turn his right by way of Hoover's Gap and Man- 
chester. Thomas' corps, which constituted the center, moved 
out on the Manchester road, covered by Wilder's brigade of 
mounted infantry. A Confederate corps under Hardee was 
in cantonments about three miles back of Hoover's Gap, and 
it was the intention of that commander, as soon as he should 
hear of an advance of the United States forces, to push for- 
ward and hold the gap at its northern entrance, where the 
ground was favorable for defense, but unsuited to camping. 
Striking the Confederate outposts on the hither side of the 
gap, Wilder pressed them so vigorously as to drive them 
through at a run. He then took up a position at the south- 
ern outlet of the gap, where he had the same defensive ad- 



FORAGING. 19 F 

vantages that the enemy would have had at the northern end. 
Attacked here by greatly superior numbers, he held his 
ground until the arrival of reinforcements enabled him defin- 
itively to repulse the enemy. Thus with a loss of less than 
100 men was secured a position which General Thomas ex- 
pected to gain only at the cost of many lives. 

Foraging. — Another mission of the advanced cavalry is 
to furnish and cover foraging parties. The cavalry screen 
generally moves over an untouched country, and can thus 
easily supply itself: moreover, considerations of mobility de- 
mand that its train should be light, if it can not dispense with 
a train altogether. The contact troops should not be accom- 
panied by wagons of any description, but should carry the 
necessary rations and forage either on their own horses or on 
requisitioned animals; and, to the greatest possible degree, 
the supplies needed by them should be obtained by "forag- 
ing liberally on the country." 

The train of the brigade, limited to the barest require- 
ments, and preferably composed of pack mules, marches 
with the reserve. Special foraging parties are detailed from 
the intermediate squadrons or the supports. These parties,, 
acting under the orders of the commander-in-chief, and under 
the general supervision of a commissary officer, generally 
operate on a line with, or in rear of, the supports, and inci- 
dentally cover the front and flanks of the reserve to such dis- 
tances as may be expedient. The supplies gathered in ex- 
cess of the needs of the cavalry are collected at convenient 
points for the use of the troops in rear. 



192 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

CONNECTING POSTS. 

Without means for its speedy transmission to the rear, 
the information gained by the cavalry screen would be of but 
little value. Scouts ride back to their patrols with informa- 
tion, and the latter constantly transmit intelligence to the 
contact troops, who, in turn, maintain communication with 
the intermediate squadrons, the supports, and each other, by 
means of communicating patrols or single scouts. Commu- 
nication back to the reserve is also generally effected by 
means of patrols or single scouts; but between the reserve 
and the main body of the army, and sometimes between the 
reserve and the supports, it should be maintained by means 
of connecting posts. 

Connecting posts are generally about five miles apart; 
but their number will depend largely on the number of well- 
marked points on the route; such as cross-roads, taverns, 
etc. Each post should ordinarily consist of one non-commis- 
sioned officer and six men. This would admit of two men 
being sent in each direction without denuding the post. One 
officer should have charge of four posts. 

In a dangerous country, or when the number of men 
available for the duty is limited, the connecting posts may 
be larger and farther apart; often consisting of a half -troop 
under a lieutenant. If the country is very dangerous, the 
post should be concealed in a position selected with a view 
to defense and retreat, men being detached on the road to 
keep watch for couriers. 

Two horses and men should be kept ready for immediate 
departure, and a sentinel must be constantly on the alert at 
the post. When an orderly arrives, he gives his dispatches 
to the commander of the post, who receipts to him for the 
same, and sends them forward bv a fresh courier. The time 



CONNECTING POSTS. 



193 



of arrival and departure should be noted on the envelope con- 
taining the dispatches. When a dispatch is delayed or lost, 
the officer sending it must be notified at once. The orderly 
bringing the dispatch will, ordinarily, rest for a time at the 
post; remaining, except in case of emergency, until the ar- 
rival of a courier from the opposite direction, in order that 
he may carry dispatches back with him, if any are brought 
in. On leaving a post the orderly is given careful instruc- 
tions as to the road he is to follow and the pace at which he 
is to go ; the rate of travel being noted on the envelope con- 
taining the dispatches. The orderly must always carry the 
dispatch on his person, so that it may not be lost in case of 
any accident befalling his horse. To prevent the dispatch 
from becoming illegible from wet, it should be enclosed in 
two envelopes. 

A convenient form of envelope, reduced to one-fourth 
size, is represented below. The form of report given on 
page 142 could be used without the appended receipt, the 
envelope being duly signed and returned to the bearer as 
a voucher for the delivery of the message. 



To 


DEPARTURE 
RATE OF SPEED 


ARRIVAL 


This envelope will be returned to bearer. 



A register should be kept at each connecting post, and 
frequently inspected by the superintending officer. It should 
show the time of arrival of each courier, whence he came, 
whither he went, the time of his departure, from whom his 



194 SKCURITY AND INFORMATION. 

dispatches came, and to whom they were addressed. Other 
remarks might be added when necessary. 

If the posts are moving, the general rules for their con- 
duct are the same as when they are stationary. Each com- 
mander who may have occasion to make use of a post should 
be kept informed where it is to be found : for instance, "till 
noon, at Beverly; till 6 p. m., at Bee Creek; till midnight, at 
Platte City." 

When a force is stationary or moving directly upon a 
fixed objective, connecting posts should be practicable; but 
otherwise it is not always possible to establish them. The 
routes of the contact troops being entirely, and that of the 
whole brigade largely, dependent upon the movements of 
the enemy, it is not always possible to know where the chain 
of connecting posts is to begin or end. It must also be prac- 
ticable to relieve the posts and rally them upon their re- 
spective troops, and they must not be exposed to great dan- 
ger of capture by the enemy. Failing these conditions, con- 
necting posts can not be considered, and dispatches must be 
sent through on the responsibility of a single messenger. 
Connecting posts will generally be found practicable from 
the reserve of the cavalry brigade back to the rear; but to 
the front of the reserve, towards the contact troops, they will 
generally be out of the question. At any rate, the contact 
troops must not establish them, as these troops will have 
enough to do in watching the enemy. The bodies in rear 
must be held responsible for preserving communication with 
the contact troops. 

A REGIMENT AS A SCREENING FORCE. 

When a single regiment of cavalry is required to screen 
the front of a considerable force, its frontage is necessarily 
such that it can have but slight power of resistance. Its 



CONCLUSIONS. 195 

duty consists almost entirely in reconnaissance of the enemy, 
and it can contribute but little to the security of the force 
in rear, except by keeping it informed of the condition of 
affairs in front. It is out of the question to give it sufficient 
power of resistance for advance guard duties by adding in- 
fantry to it, as its mobility — its most valuable characteristic 
— would thus be destroyed. In some cases, however, in- 
fantry in wagons might take the place of the reserve. 

The reserve of the regiment (one squadron) may be from 
five to ten miles in advance of the force which it covers. The 
other squadrons are pushed forward and to the flanks about 
two and a half miles, each sending forward two contact 
troops and retaining two troops in support. The distance 
between the contact troops and the supports is about two 
and one-half miles. 

The following alternative formation has been devised 
by General Guy V. Henry, U. S. A., to use when it is desira- 
ble to keep a strong reserve well in hand. The reserve, con- 
sisting of six troops, is preceded by the rest of the regiment 
in columns of two troops each ; the distance from the reserve 
and the intervals between the columns being each generally 
about two and a half .miles, but varying as circumstances re- 
quire. In each column each of the two troops in turn throws 
patrols to the front, which send forward detached scouts as 
may be necessary ; each column covering its own front. The 
general principles regulating the screening and reconnoiter- 
ing duties of a regiment are the same as in the case of a 
brigade. 



CONCLUSIONS. 

The general rules for the conduct of the cavalry screen 
may be summarized as follows: 

13 — 



196 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

1. Explore the country well to the front with small 
patrols, which must not lose contact with the enemy. 

2. Keep the supporting bodies well in hand, so as to be 
.able to concentrate rapidly. 

3. Always maintain a reserve when near the enemy. 

4. Keep up constant communication between all parts 
of the screen and with the troops in rear. 

5. Always form and maneuver the screen with a view 
to beating the opposing cavalry. This is the paramount 
consideration. 



REAR GUARDS. I 97 

CHAPTER VI. 



REAR GUARDS. 



Retreats of great generals, and of armies inured to war, have 
always resembled the retreat of a wounded lion, and such is, undoubt- 
edly, also the best theory. — Clausewitz. 

When an army has been engaged in a stubborn battle, 
its defeat invariably causes, to a greater or less degree, a 
disruption of its organization and a shattering of its disci- 
pline. Different battalions, regiments, and brigades are 
mingled together; the artillery is separated from its ammu- 
nition; baggage wagons are mixed up with the retreating 
forces; confusion takes the place of order, and subordina- 
tion is lost in the instinct of self-preservation. If the army,, 
while in this condition, be vigorously pursued by intact 
forces of the enemy, the disaster of battle will be completed 
by the havoc of pursuit, and the results of the action will be 
decisive. 

But such pursuits as those which followed the battles 
of Jena and Waterloo are rarely practicable. In the former, 
the large body of comparatively fresh troops at the disposal 
of Napoleon, and in the latter, the late arrival of the Prus- 
sians on the battle-field, made possible a prompt and vigor- 
ous pursuit. As a rule, however, victorious armies are too 
much exhausted to pursue immediately with energy; and 
recent wars are peculiarly barren in instances of vigorous 
pursuit of a defeated enemy. General Johnston declares 
that his raw troops at Bull Run were as much demoralized 
by victory as their undisciplined opponents were by defeat. 
At Gettysburg a fierce struggle of three days left the Army 



198 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

of the Potomac in poor condition to follow promptly its re- 
treating antagonist. At Koniggratz the Prussians were 
thrown into such confusion by the concentric nature of their 
attack and the intermingling of their armies, that they were 
unable to resume their advance for nearly twenty-four hours, 
and were for three days completely in the dark as to the di- 
rection of the Austrian retreat. At Gravelotte the victori- 
ous Germans remained immovable for an entire day. 

Whatever may be the extent of the confusion and de- 
moralization attending their defeat, good troops need only 
to shake themselves loose from the enemy, and have a brief 
respite from molestation, to recover from their confusion and 
regain their morale. The protection needed for these ends is 
furnished by a rear guard. 

Duty of a Rear Guard. — The duty of the rear guard can 
not begin until the battle has ended. On the field itself the 
withdrawal is covered by the artillery and cavalry, especial- 
ly the latter when the ground favors its action ; and it is only 
when the first halt is effected that the rear guard can be or- 
ganized and a regular retreat begun. In thus protecting 
the army by a fraction of itself, it must be remembered that 
the enemy must change from order of battle to order of 
march to pursue, and that he can at first bring only the heads 
of his columns against the rear of the retreating force. 

The rear guard must be organized as soon as possible,, 
even at the expense of a delay comparatively near the enemy; 
for to trust to speed entirely in escaping would be to make 
such long and continued forced marches as to ruin the effi- 
ciency of the army and disintegrate it by straggling. 

The rear guard must profit to the utmost by the defen- 
sive features of the ground, and at every opportunity take up 
a strong defensive position. The enemy will then have but 
two courses of action open to his choice: either to attack 



STRENGTH OF THE REAR GUARD. 199 

with the heads of his columns, or to deploy for action. In 
the former, his advanced troops should be easily repulsed, 
as Murat's cavalry, attacking with "thoughtless ardor/' was 
invariably beaten back by the hostile rear guards in the Rus- 
sian retreat to Moscow;* in the latter, the enemy will be com- 
pelled to lose time in deploying, while the rear guard (which 
should wait until the enemy's dispositions for attack are 
about completed) should quickly ploy and disappear from his 
front, only to repeat the operation at the next favorable 
ground. In the meantime, the enemy, unable to advance 
quickly in deployed lines, again loses time in changing to a 
marching formation, and the main body of the retreating 
army steadily continues on its way without halting. The 
duty of the rear guard is thus epitomized by Napoleon : "The 
art of a general of a rear .guard is, without compromising 
himself, to check the enemy, to delay him, and to oblige him 
to consume three or four hours in going a league."f 

Ney's method of handling the rear guard in the retreat 
from Moscow may be taken as a typical example. Count 
Segur thus describes it: "Every day, at five o'clock in the 
evening, he took his position, stopped the Russians, allowed 
his soldiers to eat and take some rest, and resumed his march 
at ten o'clock. During the whole of the night he pushed the 
mass of the stragglers before him, by dint of cries, of en- 
treaties, and of blows. At daybreak, which was about seven 
o'clock, he halted, again took position, and rested under arms 
and on guard until ten o'clock; the enemy then usually made 
his appearance, and he was compelled to fight until the even- 
ing, gaining as much ground to the rear as possible." 

Strength of the Rear Guard. — The strength of the rear 

*For Davoust's strictures on Murat's method of combating the 
Russian rear guard, see Segur's "History of the Expedition to Rus- 
sia," Book VII.. Chapter II. 

-fMaximes de Guerre. 



200 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

guard depends upon the nature of the country, and the 
strength and character of the pursuing force. In a broken 
country, full of good defensive positions, it would be less 
than in an open country; and it would be greater when the 
pursuit was vigorously pushed in force than when it was 
feebly conducted by small parties. As a rule, it corresponds 
to the strength of an advance guard on a forward march; 
and would, consequently, vary from one-eighth to one-third 
of the entire force — generally consisting of about one-sixth. 
Care and good judgment are necessary in determining the 
strength of the rear guard. If it were too large, too many 
troops would be kept upon a peculiarly trying duty, and the 
object of the commander to withdraw quickly as many men 
as possible to a place of safety would be thwarted. If it 
were too small, it would be continually driven in upon the 
main body, to which it would communicate alarm and confu- 
sion; and the latter might even be compelled to halt and 
fight for the protection of the rear guard. 

Morale. — Everything should be done to raise the morale 
of the rear guard. The best troops should be selected ; gener- 
ally those which have suffered least in the battle, or which 
have gained therein some local success. At the battle of 
Bull Run, Sykes' battalion of regulars, which alone remained 
undemoralized, was selected to cover the retreat; Blenker's 
division, which had not been engaged at all, being after- 
wards detailed as a rear guard. After the battle of Nash- 
ville, Forrest's cavalry corps, which had been detached at 
the time of the battle, was hurried back to act as a rear 
guard for Hood's army. 

It rarely happens that an army is defeated on every part 
of the field, and troops, finding everything prospering in 
their front, are often perplexed and indignant at an order to 
withdraw, the necessity for which they do not understand. 



OFFENSIVE RETURNS. 201 

These are the troops to select for the rear guard ; and their 
morale should be still further raised, if practicable, by occa- 
sional ambuscades or offensive returns against the enemy, 
whenever an opportunity of taking him at a disadvantage 
occurs. 

Offensive Returns. — The offensive returns should not, 
however, be pushed far ; for their result, at best, can only be 
a moral one, and the distance between the main body and the 
rear guard must not be dangerously increased. 

Offensive returns on the part of the rear guard may be 
necessary for its relief when closely pressed by the enemy at 
a bridge, defile, or ford. At Smolensk the bridge over the 
Dnieper was choked with a mob of stragglers, and the French 
rear guard, being at the same time closely pushed by the 
Russians, found itself in danger of being thrust into the 
river. Ney accordingly ordered De Fezensac to attack the 
enemy with his regiment. The attack was made in a spirited 
manner; the Russians were thrust back, and the rear guard 
filed across the bridge, which it immediately destroyed. 

A similar incident at Boonsboro, Md., in 1862, is worth 
noting, especially on account of the ingenious and successful 
tactics employed. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry brigade was cov- 
ering the retreat of D. H. Hill from South Mountain. The 
pressure upon Lee's rear was so heavy, as he was passing 
through Boonsboro, that it became necessary to make an 
offensive return with one regiment, in order to cover the 
withdrawal of the others. 

The attack was made by the 9th Virginia Cavalry (Col. 
W. H. F. Lee), which, owing to the narrowness of the street, 
charged in column of fours with a considerable interval be- 
tween the squadrons. As one squadron, broken by the col- 
lision, retired to form again in rear of the regiment, the next 
squadron took up the charge, thus giving the Union column 
a succession of shocks. The 9th Virginia was finally pushed 



202 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

back through Boonsboro with considerable loss; but not 
until it had gained time for the rest of the brigade to take up 
a position west of the town.* 

Commander of the Rear Guard. — The commander of the 
rear guard should be a man of resolution and fertility of re- 
source. He should be as prudent as a man can be without 
being timid, and as brave as a man can be without being rash. 
He should constantly present a bold front to the enemy, and 
should ever be ready to fight, even to the extent of sacrificing 
himself and his entire command if necessary; but he should 
remember that the great duty of the rear guard is to gain 
time, and he should know when to withdraw. He should be 
able to distinguish the enemy's preparations for a serious 
attack from insignificant demonstrations, and he should nev- 
er allow the enemy to force him into a fight contrary to his 
own interests and intentions. He should never expect as- 
sistance, and should feel disgraced if the main body should 
be obliged to suspend its retreat to come to his aid. 

Distance from the Main Body. — As the main body seeks 
to withdraw from the enemy as rapidly as possible, while 
the rear guard endeavors to delay him and watch his move- 
ments, it is clear that the distance between the two bodies 
can not be definitely prescribed. In general terms it may 
be said to be usually about the same as that of the advance 
guard from the main body on advance. It the distance were 
too great, the rear guard would be in danger of being cut off: 
if the distance were too small, the main body would be sub- 
ject to constant alarms, and each reverse of the rear guard 
would quickly affect the main body, whose retreat would be 
constantly harassed by the enemy. In marching at night, 
the rear guard draws near the column, especially if the night 
is dark, the enemy near, and the inhabitants inimical. 

*Soe McClellan's "Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry," page 125. 



FORMATION AND COMPOSITION OF REAR GUARD. 203 

Formation and Composition of the Bear Guard. — The for- 
mation of the rear guard is that of an advance guard re- 
versed. Nearest the main body is the reserve, after which 
follow the support and the rear party, the extreme rear be- 
ing composed of a point. The distances between the various 
bodies composing the rear guard are the same as those be- 
tween the corresponding bodies of the advance guard. 
Flankers are thrown out as in the case of an advance guard, 
but they are more numerous, and the line joining them is a 
more pronounced curve, for the reason that flank attacks are 
more to be feared than in the case of an advance guard, and 
the flanks must, therefore, be more, carefully covered. In an 
advance, an attempt against a flank of the advance guard 
might easily result in the assailing troops being themselves 
struck in flank by troops from the main body; but in a ret- 
rograde movement the main body is moving away from, in- 
stead of towards, the covering detachment, and thus a flank 
attack upon the rear guard must be met by the rear guard 
itself, or else the main body must halt and march back to its 
assistance. According to circumstances, a portion or the 
whole of the rear guard will march in readiness for action. 

The composition of a rear guard is practically the same 
as that of an advance guard. It is generally composed of all 
three arms; but if there are enough cavalry and horse ar- 
tillery to admit of the rear guard being composed exclusively 
of those arms, it would be best, except in a very close and 
rugged country, to leave the infantry with the main body. 
There should be as many guns with the rear guard as can be 
effectively used and freely maneuvered. The effective use of 
artillery may obviate the necessity of deploying the other 
arms of the rear guard, the deployment of the enemy at a 
distance being compelled by the fire of the guns. The fire of 
the artillery at short range should be as rapid as is compati- 



204 



SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 



ble with its cool and intelligent action : when the rear guard 
is pressed by the enemy, it is necessary to fire as many shots 
as possible, and still more necessary that each one should 
count. If it becomes necessary to abandon the guns, the 
equipments and breech-blocks should be carried away, and, 
if practicable, one wheel should be removed from each and 
run to the rear, so that if the pieces are recaptured they can 
be at once used. If there seems to be no hope of recovering 
the lost pieces, the guns should be burst and the caissons 
blown up; or, at least, the breech-blocks should be broken 
off, damaged, or thrown into a stream or well. The danger 
of losing a few guns must never be made an excuse for a pre- 
mature withdrawal. If the guns, by remaining until the 
last moment, exact a heavy price in blood from the enemy, 
and contribute largely towards checking pursuit, they are 
profitably sold, and their loss is an honor. 

The cavalry of the rear guard can charge bodies of the 
enemy that have been thrown into confusion by the ardor of 
pursuit, or by the fire of the artillery; but its chief reliance 
should be in dismounted fire action. It can take up almost 
any position that the infantry can, and thus compel the de- 
ployment and retardation of the enemy, while its superior 
mobility enables it rapidly to diminish the distance between 
the main body and the rear guard, always dangerously in- 
creased by a stubborn stand of the latter. Good cavalry of 
the American type is the life of a rear guard. A rear guard 
entirely without cavalry, except in a region where that arm 
can not be used, is at an enormous disadvantage, unless the 
enemy is also without mounted troops. In the retreat from 
Moscow, the destruction of Napoleon's cavalry by cold and 
starvation left the French rear guard exposed to the attacks 
of the Cossacks, who, though unable to break a single square 
of infantry, annoyed it incessantly, and cannonaded it with 
small guns brought up on sleds. 



FORMATION AND COMPOSITION OF REAR GUARD. 205 

When a rear guard is composed of all arms, the infantry 
should be with the reserve, and tne cavalry with the support 
and rear party. If the cavalry is not in sufficient strength 
for the entire support, the deficiency must, of course, be 
made up from the infantry. The artillery should be with 
the reserve; but horse artillery may sometimes accompany 
the support. The engineers should be at the rear of the re- 
serve or at the head of the support. Machine guns may be 
used with effect by the rear guard, being always used de- 
fensively. They should generally be with the support. 

The rear guard should, if possible, be entirely free from 
impedimenta, in order that, if separated from the main body 
by a considerable distance, it may close up by forced 
marches. If its baggage can not be sent forward to the main 
column, all that is not absolutely necessary should be de- 
stroyed, if the pursuit is vigorous, and the remainder kept 
with the reserve. 

Plates XIV. and XV. show typical formations of a rear 
guard. It will be observed that the rear guard is merely a 
reversed advance guard with more flankers. Thus, in the 
case of a company of infantry (Plate XIV.), flankers are 
thrown out from the reserve. In the case of a troop of cav- 
alry (Plate XV.), the reserve throws out a double patrol on 
each flank, similar to the one thrown out from the support 
in the case of an advance guard, the larger patrols being 
on the more dangerous flank. The support sends out flank- 
ing groups which march at a distance of about 600 yards 
from the line of march of the column. Ordinarily, a line 
passing through the point and flankers of an advance guard 
forms a semicircle: a similar line in the case of a rear guard 
forms about two-thirds of an ellipse. These typical forma- 
tions are, of course, merely suggestive: they must be modi- 
fied to suit the circumstances of each case. Eear guards 



206 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

composed of larger bodies are similarly formed. In an open 
country the reserve may sometimes be advantageously 
formed in two parallel columns. 

Withdrawal from Action. — The manner of withdrawing a 
rear guard from action will depend entirely upon circum- 
stances. As a rule, only a portion should withdraw at a 
time, taking up, if necessary, a new position, to cover the 
withdrawal of the rest. The guns especially must not all 
withdraw at once, as the total cessation of artillery fire would 
betray the movement. Whether the withdrawal should be 
by alternate battalions, or whether it should begin at the 
center or at a flank, would depend upon the direction and 
progress of the attack and the topography of the field. Gen- 
erally, the infantry and a portion of the guns withdraw first; 
and when they are again in position or en route, they are 
followed by the remaining guns and the cavalry. The with- 
drawal should never be a difficult matter if it has not been 
delayed too long. 

Communication between the Several Parts of the Rear 
Guard and with the Main Body. — Uninterrupted communica- 
tion must be maintained between the several parts of the 
rear guard and the main body. The road should be care- 
fully marked, so that the rear guard may not lose its way. 
The trail of a retreating force is usually only too plain ; but 
it is well to leave a patrol at cross-roads, etc., with orders to 
rejoin the main body as soon as the proper road has been 
taken by the rear guard. Similar precautions must, when 
necessary, be taken by the reserve to insure the proper di- 
rection being taken by the support. 

Protection of Flanks. — Patrolling must be carried on 
with vigilance and energy, especially on the flanks. The 
enemy, finding a firm front opposed to all his direct attacks, 
will undoubtedly attempt to cat in on the flanks*, where, in 







PLATE XT. 




/z/ry ^ J-te<i r Guard. 


' 


■— \,omn.cinw of jnfa 




Jtfain Body 1 


I 




•• , ' ' 


.,> 




V V 


,r-'' 




iPlatoon ■ 


*' Reserve 




r" i 


"> 




■f Section i 


% Support 




* 1 


"V* 


• 


. 1 Section . 4* /iVar /??«iy ^ 

4-crr isdyis ^. 'So'yc/s::.-.-.^ 

Poifflf 


A/.*. 



PLA TEXZ 



Troop of Cavalry as Rear Guard 

A 



\& • 



60° f 



JtiaXn Body 



I 



2 Reserve 



G& Support 



* g. 30OycLs | 3O0ycts 

f t ^ Hear .Party 



^ 



^<*r 



* 



S 

s 

* 4 



4 
4 

-4 4 
i* 

* 4 



CONDUCT OF THE REAR GUARD. 211 

fact, always lie his most promising hopes of success; for if 
he can cause the rear guard to form front to a flank, any 
assault by which it can be pushed off the road will uncover 
the rear of the main body, and will be only less disastrous to 
the retreating army than the destruction of the rear guard 
itself. Prompt notification of attempts against the flanks 
should be given by the patrols (w T ho are often warned of 
them by a diminution of the enemy's forces following in rear), 
and the rear guard should then endeavor with celerity to 
slip past the menaced point; failing in this, it should form a 
strong front towards the attacking force. 

Conduct of the Rear Guard. — If the two armies are of 
approximately equal strength, the rear guard will be about 
as strong as the advance guard of the force pursuing it, and 
the advantage of a good defensive position should give it a 
superiority over the latter. But this superiority will be 
only temporary at best; for the advance guard is receiving 
constant accessions of strength from the rear, while the dis- 
tance between the rear guard and the main body of the re- 
treating force is constantly increasing. Hence, the longer 
the rear guard remains in its position, the greater will be 
the odds against it. If it does not remain long enough, the 
enemy's advance will not be seriously delayed; while if it 
remains too long, it will suffer heavily in the engagement. 
In Massena's retreat from Portugal, Ney made the one error 
of his brilliant rear-guard operations, by remaining too long 
on the left bank of the Ceira, which mistake cost him five 
hundred men, though he succeeded in withdrawing the great- 
er part of his force across the stream and blowing up the 
bridge. 

The pursuing army will always be in more or less doubt 
as to the strength of the force which it finds barring its way, 
and it must act with prudence, or run the risk of a serious and 



212 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

costly repulse. At Redinha, Ney, with a rear guard of about 
5,000 men, made such skillful dispositions as to compel Wel- 
lington to deploy 40,000 men, and incur a delay of several 
hours. The morale of the retreating force is also a matter of 
uncertainty to the pursuers, and this consideration also for- 
bids rash action. Sir John Moore at Coruna and McClellan 
at Malvern Hill each turned and gave his pursuer a knock- 
down blow at the termination of a retreat. 

The rear guard has an advantage over the pursuing 
force in not being obliged to reconnoiter the ground over 
which it has to march. All necessary information as to the 
roads is furnished from the front, and a well-qualified staff- 
officer with the main body should select defensive positions 
for the rear guard, and furnish its commander with a descrip- 
tion (and, if possible, a topographical sketch) of the same. 
The positions would be ridges, sunken roads, villages, woods, 
bridges, or defiles. 

The rear guard must not be tempted by the great natu- 
ral strength of a position to occupy it at the expense of being 
separated at too great a distance from the main body, nor to 
hold it so long as to become compromised in a regular en- 
gagement. The amount of resistance to be made by the rear 
guard will depend upon the judgment of its commander, or on 
the orders of the commander-in-chief. At very important 
positions, the latter should join the rear guard, if necessary, 
superintending its formation for resistance, or even con- 
ducting its action. Sir John Moore, on his famous retreat, 
personally directed the movements of the rear guard. This 
is generally neither practicable nor desirable; but the com- 
mander-in-chief should always know what his rear guard is 
about, and whether it is judiciously handled. He should, 
above all, see that it is never forced to fight superior num- 
bers of the enemy at too great a distance from succor. It is 



THE INTERMEDIATE BODY. 213 

best, however, never to interfere with the commander of the 
rear guard, if he understands his business and performs his 
part properly. The nature of his duty requires that he should 
have even greater independence of action than the com- 
mander of an advance guard. 

The Intermediate Body. — The advance guard of the pur- 
suing force, its strength constantly increasing, can act 
boldly to the flank ; and the rear guard is in danger of being 
intercepted, and finding a force of the enemy barring its 
way at some one of the positions selected for its own defen- 
sive stand. This danger increases with the stubbornness of 
the stand made by the rear guard. In view of these consid- 
erations, Eiistow recommends an important difference in the 
composition of advance guards and rear guards, by giving 
to the latter an intermediate body, which should march mid- 
way between the reserve of the rear guard and the main 
body. It w r ould thus be in a position to hold important 
points until the arrival of the reserve, which points it might 
even have time to fortify, while preparing at the same time 
for the destruction of the passages at the selected positions. 
This intermediate body should have artillery, especially if 
the country is open and the enemy's forces are able to make 
turning movements with celerity. Riistow recommends fur- 
ther, when the enenry shows a particular tendency to execute 
flank movements, with the intention of separating and cut- 
ting off the different detachments, and the country is such 
as to favor his movements, that the principal column leave a 
detachment to hold an important position until the arrival 
of the intermediate body. Under some circumstances, the 
detachments recommended by Riistow might be imperative- 
ly necessary; but the system is open to the objection that 
the detachments, unless composed of cavalry, would be un- 
able to rejoin the main body, which would thus be constantly 
reinforcing the rear guard. If composed of cavalry, they 



274 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

might, perhaps, better be with the rear guard in the first 
place, and be sent forward to hold the positions in question. 
They would thus at least be continually and definitely under 
the orders of the rear guard commander. 

Contact with the Enemy to be Preserved. — Contact with 
the pursuing force should not be lost, but its movements 
should be continually watched; otherwise the army might 
be flying from a mere phantom,* or it might be deceived as 
to the objective point of the enemy's attack. The enemy 
might continue the pursuit with a small force on the main 
route, and move the bulk of his army on a parallel road, 
whence, after making unobstructed progress to the front, he 
might move in to cut off the rear guard or assail it in flank. 
In Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, Miloradowitch, with a 
Russian advance guard of 25,000 men, moving on a road par- 
allel to the French retreat, cut in between the main body and 
rear guard at Wiasma, and would have wrought irretrieva- 
ble disaster to the retreating army if he had been properly 
supported by the main body of the Russians. 

A similar movement was more effectively executed 
against Lee in his retreat to Appomattox Court-House. Pur- 
suing on a parallel road, Sheridan, with the cavalry corps, 
cut in on the Confederate line of retreat at Sailor's Creek, 
interposing between the main body and the rear guard. 
Holding the latter in check until he was reinforced by the 
Sixth Corps, he compelled its surrender, capturing five gen- 
eral officers and all that remained of Ewell's corps, f 

*History presents a number of instances of armies turning their 
backs upon each other in mutual flight. Thus Napoleon and Kutus- 
off both retired from Malo- Jaroslawitz ; the troops of Braddock and 
Beaujeu both fled from the Monongahela, and tne Federals and Con- 
federates both retreated from Big Bethel. 

t Gordon's corps orginally formed the rear guard of Lee's army; 
but Gordon having been defeated by Humphreys and deflected to the 
right in retreat, Ewell's corps was left as the real rear guard of the 
retreating army. 



DEFILES. 215 

If the pursuit seems to slacken or cease, contact must 
be maintained by strong patrols, each patrol generally con- 
sisting of a platoon under command of an officer. Small 
patrols could not drive back any but the most insignificant 
forces of the enemy, and could not, therefore, learn whether 
the pursuit were conducted by a large force or merely by 
small parties. The patrols should be given great liberty of 
action, and, after having been informed of the route to be 
taken by the main body in retreat, and given such general 
orders as may be necessary, they should be left quite inde- 
pendent of the rear guard. It will often be necessary to act 
vigorously on the offensive with the cavalry, in order to as- 
certain the nature of the pursuit. If the enemy's advanced 
troops, when repulsed, fall back upon larger bodies in rear, 
the enemy is evidently pursuing in force; if, on the contrary, 
they are driven back in rapid flight, and are not supported, 
the enemy either is not attempting a serious pursuit, or is 
moving on a parallel road. 

Defiles. — Defiles offer the greatest opportunities to an 
energetic pursuer and to an able rear guard commander. To 
the former they afford a chance of cutting off the rear guard 
by interposing a force at the entrance of the defile. To the 
latter they afford a double opportunity of administering a 
check to the enemy, who is compelled to narrow his front. 
In defending a defile, the main body leaves a detachment to 
hold the heights on each side until relieved by the infantry 
of the rear guard. The artillery is generally stationed at the 
entrance of the defile, and the cavalry in the best position for 
dismounted fire action — always at that part of the line which 
is to withdraw last. As soon as the enemy has not only de- 
ployed for attack, but is well committed to the assault, the 
artillery fires its parting round of shrapnel, and withdraws 
rapidly through the defile, followed by the infantry. The 



2l6 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

cavalry covers the withdrawal of the other arms, mounting 
at the last moment, and retreating rapidly through the defile, 
its retreat being protected, if practicable, by infantry skir- 
mishers lining the crest on either side of the interior of the 
defile. 

The outlet of the defile always affords a better position 
for opposing the enemy than the entrance; for in making a 
stand with a defile at its back the rear guard runs the risk, 
in case its flank is turned, of being cut off altogether. In 
making a stand at the farther side, the artillery is posted so 
as to rake the defile : and the infantry, so as to bring a con- 
verging fire on its outlet, detachments of infantry also hold- 
ing the crest; while the cavalry is stationed so as to be able 
to charge the enemy in fiank as he emerges from the defile. 
Enough of the enemy should be allowed to pass to enable the 
assault upon him to be more than a mere stroke at the head 
of his column; but the mistake of allowing too many to pass 
would be a fatal blunder. Here the judgment of the rear 
guard commander must come into play, and no rule or sug- 
gestion can aid him. The enemy having been severely han- 
dled and thrown back into the defile, the rear guard with- 
draws without delay. 

If practicable, the position at the entrance of the defile 
should be convex towards the enemy, so as to admit of ready 
withdrawal by the flanks. At the outlet, the position should, 
on the other hand, be concave, so as to bring a converging 
fire upon the enemy. 

Negative Measures. — The measures taken by the rear 
guard to delay the enemy may be classed as positive and 
negative ; the former relating to the delays caused by actual 
or threatened combat, and the latter including all measures 
to impede his progress by blocking his path, destroying 
bridges, etc. The positive measures have already been con- 



NEGATIVE MEASURES. 217 

sidered: the negative measures are diverse in their nature, 
and afford a wide field for ingenuity. Bridges may be burned, 
blown up, or torn down. In the first case, if time permits, 
the timbers should be coated with tar, or saturated with coal 
oil, by troops from the main body or the reserve, and fired 
by the last men of the rear detachment who cross; in the 
second case, the charge should be similarly placed and ex- 
ploded; and in the third case, the planks should be loosened 
by troops in advance, and thrown into the river by the rear 
point. In all cases, the preparation for destruction should 
be made by the main body or reserve, and the consummation 
should be the work of the last men who cross. Loaded shells 
placed under the heaps of combustibles would, by bursting 
at intervals, prevent the enemy from approaching to extin- 
guish the flames. 

Fords can be obstructed by planting therein pointed 
stakes, broken bottles, or harrows, plows, and scythes, so 
arranged that the sharp sides and points are uppermost. An- 
other expedient is to throw in trees with the branches to- 
wards the enemy and weighted down with stones in sacks. 
In addition to these measures, the banks may be scarped, 
and an epaulement with artillery established on the side 
opposite the enemy. • Boats should be taken to the far side 
and either burnt or sunk. Boads can be obstructed by fell- 
ing trees across them, or blowing up the road-bed; and gate- 
ways and passages can be blocked with heavily laden carts 
dovetailed together, one wheel being removed from each. 

Villages may be fortified in some cases, but generally 
it will be more expedient to burn them, and thus place a 
barricade of fire, so to speak, between the rear guard and 
the enemy; but this measure will, manifestly, be of value 
only when the enemy is following close upon the heels of the 
rear guard. Thus Ney burned Bedinha and Condeixa in the 



2l8 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

face of Wellington, delaying him in each case. The com- 
mander-in-chief should give general instructions as to the 
extent to which bridges, villages, etc., are to be destroyed, 
and no wanton or unnecessary destruction should ever be 
permitted. 

Other expedients will suggest themselves to a good 
commander. Of Johnston's retreat to Jackson, Miss., in 
1863, General Sherman, in his "Memoirs," says: "On the 
8th [July], all our troops reached the neighborhood of Clin- 
ton, the weather f eat-fully hot, and water scarce. Johnston 
had marched rapidly, and in retreating had caused cattle, 
hogs, and sheep to be driven into the ponds of water, and 
there shot down; so that we had to haul their dead and 
stinking carcasses out to use the water." Any means of pro- 
ducing suffering and inconvenience to the pursuers, such as 
to cause them to delay, should be resorted to by the rear 
guard, stopping only at such measures as are condemned by 
the laws of war. 

But these negative measures are, after all, merely helps, 
and the safety of the retreating force must depend upon the 
resolute action of the rear guard itself. When it is essential 
that the army should put distance between itself and the 
enemy, the rear guard must make use. of 'every good defensive 
position to delay the pursuers ; but no halt should be made 
for fighting when the necessity of checking the enemy and 
gaining time is not imperative. 

Sick and Wounded. — The rear guard should collect all 
stragglers and compel them to move on, and it should not 
allow the sick or wounded to be left behind, unless they 
prove a dangerous encumbrance. When necessary, trans- 
portation must be requisitioned for the sick and wounded, 
and they should, if practicable, be sent forward to the main 
column every night. When it is found necessary to aban- 



HALTS. 219 

•don them, they should be formally transferred to the authori- 
ties of some village or town, and one or more medical officers, 
with a liberal supply of medical stores and money, should be 
Jeft with them. With the exception of such medical sup- 
plies, no stores of any description that could be of value to 
the enemy should be left behind; what can not be carried 
along must be destroyed. 

Halts. — When the rear guard halts, it chooses a good 
defensive position, and establishes its outposts towards the 
enemy. It is desirable that the position should not only be 
strong, but that it should command an extended view. On 
halting for the night, the rear guard should, when practica- 
ble, be relieved by other troops. The new guard should be 
halted at a suitable distance from the point selected for the 
camp or bivouac of the main body, and established as an out- 
post. When it is passed by the old rear guard, the former as- 
sumes its duties, and the latter joins the main column. In the 
case of either an advance guard or a rear guard, the distance 
of the outpost from the main body will depend mainly upon 
the time required for the troops to turn out and form at the 
designated rendezvous;* in the latter case, however, the 
1:ime required for the longest column to march out in resum- 
ing the retreat must be added, no allowance being made for 
time gained by the resistance of the rear guard. The dis- 
tance of the outpost from the main body will, therefore, be 
greater in the case of a rear guard than in the case of an ad- 
vance guard. 

Retreating by Parallel Roads. — When an army is retreat- 
ing by several parallel roads, each column will have its own 
rear guard, each rear guard having its own chief, and all be- 
ing united, when practicable, under the command of one 
common superior. Connection should be maintained be- 

* Provided, of course, that the distance is not determined by con- 
siderations of artillery fire. 



220 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

tween the several columns, and between the different rear 
guards, by connecting groups or patrols. If retreating by a 
single route to which several other roads are near and par- 
allel, it may sometimes be advisable to place a secondary 
rear guard on each. This would practically amount to a 
subdivision of the rear guard, which should, consequently, 
be of a greater strength proportionately to the main body 
than would otherwise be the case. The necessity for these 
secondary rear guards would be greatest when there were 
many lateral roads joining the parallel routes, and such 
roads, conversely, would be necessary in order that a second- 
ary rear guard might not be left entirely without support. 
Generally, vigilant scouting to the flanks will obviate the 
necessity of secondary rear guards. 

When Line of Retreat is Changed. — When the line of re- 
treat is changed, it may sometimes be advantageous to leave 
the rear guard on the old route for the purpose of deceiving 
the enemy. Artillery should then accompany the rear guard,, 
not only to add to its defensive power, but to give it the ap- 
pearance of a force of respectable size. A small rear guard 
should follow the main body in the new direction. 

Rear Guard in Retrograde Movement which is not a Re- 
treat. — It is not only in a retreat that a rear guard becomes 
necessary for the purpose of holding the enemy in check. A 
retrograde movement may be designedly made for the pur- 
pose of leading the enemy into a theater where the condi- 
tions will be more favorable for the retiring army; or a 
movement may be undertaken against one of the enemy's, 
armies in such a way as to expose the rear to another. Thus, 
in Wilkinson's march against Montreal, in 1813, a rear guard 
was necessary for the protection of the American army from 
the attacks of the British from Kingston, though the enemy 
was sought in the opposite quarter. In the first case, the 



REAR GUARD IN FORWARD MARCH. 221 

rear guard would be conducted in the manner already de- 
scribed. In the latter (unusual) case, the advance and rear 
guards would be of equal importance. In the latter case, in 
fact, it would be better to leave a containing force to hold 
one of the hostile armies in check while proceeding against 
the other. 

Rear Guard in a Friendly Country. — In a movement in a 
friendly country the duties of the rear guard are much less 
difficult and onerous than in a hostile one. In the former, 
the rear guard easily finds subsistence; guides are obtained 
without difficulty; the inhabitants aid in obstructing or 
destroying roads and passages; they assist in enterprises 
against the enemy; and they remove all supplies upon his 
approach. 

In a Hostile Country. — In a hostile country, however, 
foraging is difficult for the rear guard, as it must pass over 
a country already exhausted by the main column; and the 
inhabitants, far from rendering assistance to the rear guard,, 
are ever ready to turn against it, and are quite sure to throw 
all manner of annoying obstacles in its way. 



THE REAR GUARD IN A FORWARD MARCH. 

The rear guard should never begin its march until all 
the baggage has moved off. The provost-marshal and pro- 
vost guard generally march with the rear guard, which takes 
charge of all prisoners arrested by them. No duty is more 
disagreeable than that of a rear guard in a forward march. 
Wolseley says of it: 

"It is sheer hard work, without any excitement or glory. 
Under the most fortunate circumstances the men composing 
such a rear guard can not expect to be in camp for some hours 
after the main body. It is most fatiguing to march in the 



222 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

dusty wake of an army, but it is on such occasions that offi- 
cers show their true metal ; any man can be cheerful and zeal- 
ous with an advance guard, or even with a rear guard dur- 
ing a retreat, but it is only those who have the keenest pro- 
fessional feelings who can throw all their energies into every 
little duty, irrespective of its being agreeable or otherwise."* 

If marching in a hostile country, the rear guard is 
charged with the protection of the baggage from the forays 
of guerrillas, and if the country is suited to partisan warfare, 
and the enemy's raiding parties are enterprising, its duty 
greatly increases in importance. It should carefully watch 
the flanks of the baggage train with patrols, of a number and 
size suited to the danger to be apprehended, and should be 
ready to repel attacks on the flanks as well as on the rear of 
the train. 

*"Soldiers' Pocket Book," page 346. 



SPIES. 223 



CHAPTER VII, 



SPIES. 



Too much attention can not be given to spies and guides. Monte- 
cuculi says that they are as necessary to a general as the eyes are to 
the head.— Marshal Saxe. 

Although the method of gaining information from spies, 
deserters, prisoners, newspapers, etc., does not strictly be- 
long to the domain of tactics, it seems too important a sub- 
ject to be omitted from consideration in this work. The 
questioning of deserters and prisoners has already been con- 
sidered in the chapter on "Keconnaissance"; the other meth- 
ods require additional notice. 

Spies may be primarily divided into two classes: mili- 
tary and civilian. The first class consists of officers or sol- 
diers who, from patriotism or a sense of military duty, as- 
sume a disguise, and penetrate the enemy's lines to gain in- 
formation. They are often men of the most exalted charac- 
ter and distinguished courage, and deserve a better fame, 
and a better fate if captured, than that usually accorded to 
spies. To this class belong Captain Hale and Major Andre"; 
and the War of Secession adds to the list two names more 
illustrious and more successful. General Nathaniel Lyon 
visited in disguise the Confederate camp near St. Louis the 
day before he attacked and captured it; and Colonel Turner 
Ashby, in the guise of a country horse-doctor, visited the 
Union camp at Chambersburg, in 1861, and returned safely 
with a great deal of valuable information. 

The second class consists of men who often deserve all 
the obloquy so freely cast upon spies in general ; though in- 



224 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

stances are not lacking of civilian spies actuated solely by 
motives of disinterested patriotism. But whatever may be 
their motives or individual characteristics, spies are indis- 
pensably necessary to a general; and, other things equal, 
that commander will be victorious who has the best secret 
service. 

The services of spies are most valuable during the con- 
centration of armies on the theater of operations, and during 
the investment of fortified places. During active opera- 
tions, the information brought by them, however accurate it 
may be, generally arrives too late to be of much value. 

Spies should be carefully selected from people whose 
occupations are such as to enable them to enter the enemy's 
lines without exciting suspicion; such as peddlers, drivers 
of public vehicles, strolling players, etc. Women are often 
the best of spies; but their means of gaining information is 
generally in direct proportion to their lack of character, and 
accordingly proportionate to their lack of credibility.* A 
marked expression of distrust on the part of his employers 
may sometimes protect a spy from the enemy's suspicion. In 
1863, General Hurlbut expelled a man from Memphis for 
uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. The fact of 
his expulsion under the circumstances recommended him to 
the favorable consideration of Johnston, to whom he offered 
his services as a spy. The expulsion had been a mere ruse; 
and, some months later, the man brought to Grant an impor- 
tant message from Johnston to Pemberton, which placed the 
Union commander in possession of his opponent's plans. 

*"Les femmes galantes.et surtout les lilies publiques servent 
beaucoup dans l'espionnage, qnand elles offrent quelques garanties de 
fidelite. Le general von Decker dit a ce sujet: Si le partisan sait ac- 
qnerir de rinfluence sur les femmes, il se gardera de negliger ce 
moyen: c'est a ce sexe qn'il devra ses renseignements les plus cer- 
tains. Un secret qui ne peut se savoir ni par les femmes ni par les 
homines d'eglise, ne se revelera probablement jamais."— Lewal, 
Taetique des Renseignements," Tome /., page 105. 



SPIES. 225 

A spy should be intelligent, conscientious, and faith- 
ful — qualities hard to find in a man whose very occupation 
bespeaks habitual deceit and a want of principle — and in 
proportion to his possession of these characteristics will he 
be valuable. The motives which induce him to play the 
part of a spy should be ascertained. Men banished from 
their country, smarting under a sense of injustice, exasper- 
ated by ill-treatment, embittered by jealousy, or influenced, 
in short, by any strong passion calculated to incite a spirit 
of hatred and revenge against the enemy, are almost certain 
to be faithful and energetic spies. Spies should always, 
when practicable, be tested with unimportant missions be- 
fore being entrusted with matters of great moment. It is a 
good plan to require them at first to report upon matters 
that are already known, as a means of testing their relia- 
bility and accuracy. The services of a spy permanently at- 
tached to a command are likely to be much more valuable 
than those of one who is employed only for the single occa- 
sion, and whose efforts are not stimulated by a hope of profit- 
able employment in the future. 

It is clear that the only trustworthy spies are, as a rule, 
those who serve voluntarily; nevertheless it is sometimes 
necessary to force men to act as spies for a particular object 
and on a single occasion. Bugeaud thus describes the sys- 
tem of which he himself made use in Spain, but which cer- 
tainly should not be copied unless circumstances were so 
extraordinary as to justify its brutality: 

"When spies are lacking to procure news of the enemy, 
to carry letters to a distance through the hostile lines, or to 
gather information by visiting places occupied by the foe, 
rich countrymen should be taken from the villages passed 
through, and having been given a certain mission, they 
should be threatened with the burning of their houses and 



226 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

captivity of their wives and children if they fail to execute 
their charge faithfully. This is a good method of giving 
false information to the enemy. To this end, the messenger 
is given letters containing the misleading statements, ad- 
dressed to the commandant of some place, or the chief of 
some body of troops supposed to have arrived at some point 
which is still occupied by the enemy. The countryman goes 
thither; he is captured; his letters are read, and the ruse 
rarely fails. Well-to-do countrymen are better adapted to 
playing this part than men of a higher class, because they 
value more their little possessions, are more hardened to 
fatigue, and patriotism is a sentiment less developed in them 
than in the superior classes. Moreover, they awaken less 
suspicion. If inhabitants are not to be seen, as often hap- 
pened in Spain, it will be necessary to drive along the cattle 
that are found. Their owners will not fail to come to claim 
their animals, and they can be compelled to ransom them by 
service as spies; being warned that their herds will be re- 
stored to them only when the information brought in is 
verified. With the same object in view, hostages may be 
captured during the night in a town or city near the enemy.' 7 
The fidelity of a spy depending entirely upon his individ- 
ual interests, he must, even if apparently devotedly faithful, 
be regarded with suspicion. His safest and most profitable 
role is that of a "double spy" ; that is, one who is engaged in 
carrying true information to both armies. For fear that a spy 
may be playing this double part, he should always be halted 
at the outposts, or even be met at a designated place beyond 
them. It is a good rule to go to meet the spy, instead of 
having him come in to report. This rule, which is practica- 
ble whenever the time of the spy's return can be foretold, 
subserves another good end ; for there are often men who are 
willing to act as spies, but who are afraid or ashamed to be 



SPIES. 227 

known as such, even among friendly people. Such men 
would willingly render their reports at some isolated rendez- 
vous, while they would dread to be seen entering the camp. 

Double spies are often of great value. Prince de Ligne 
even declares that they are the best. But he adds that it is 
necessary. to deceive them in order that we may not be de- 
ceived by them, and to make a false movement in order to 
test them. It can then be seen whether, after allowing the 
spy to learn of the movement, the enemy is informed of it. 
If he is, the spy should not be hanged, but should be confined 
and compelled to send false news to the enemy. False infor- 
mation should be communicated to a spy only by an author- 
ized officer having full knowledge of the true plans and con- 
ditions. Any uninstructed officer taking it upon himself to 
disseminate false news might unwittingly give true informa- 
tion, and cause incalculable mischief. 

Nothing intrusted to a spy should be put in writing, un- 
less it be false information intrusted to a double spy. All 
other messages should be either verbal or expressed in ci- 
pher. The message should be closely written on fine paper 
and inclosed in a small quill, which could be concealed in 
the hair or beard, or enclosed in a hollow bullet, which could 
be fired away if capture seemed unavoidable. A still better 
plan, perhaps, would be to write the message in lemon juice 
on the margin of some book, such as a Testament or prayer- 
book, which the spy might carry without exciting suspicion. 
Exposing the leaf to heat, or passing a hot iron oVer it, would 
then bring out the writing. The dispatches carried by Camp- 
bell (one of Sheridan's spies) were closely written on tissue 
paper, rolled up in tin foil, and concealed in a quid of tobacco 
in his mouth. 

A spy should never be allowed to see that he is mis- 
trusted; but should be led to believe that particular confi- 

15 — 



228 SFXURITY AND INFORMATION. 

dence is reposed in him, and that his services are regarded 
as especially valuable. At the same time, other spies should 
be employed to cover the same ground, and their reports 
should be carefully compared. The same rendezvous should 
not be assigned to different spies on their return, as they 
would thus become acquainted with each other, and might 
conspire to bring in false news, or one might be betrayed to 
the enemy by another. In rare cases it may, however, be 
practicable to employ spies in pairs. In Tennessee, Sheri- 
dan employed the three brothers Card as spies; two of the 
men working together, while the third remained at head- 
quarters, available for duty in case of mishap to the others, 
or in case Sheridan wished to communicate with them. 

When a spy leaves the post, camp, or bivouac, he should 
be escorted beyond the outposts by an officer or non-commis- 
sioned officer, who should give only such information about 
him as may be necessary to insure his safe exit. When a spy 
comes in, he should be halted by the sentinel, and conducted 
to the nearest picket, where he should be retained under 
charge of the picket sentinel while awaiting the orders of 
the officer for whom he inquires. While at the picket, the 
sentinel should see that he communicates with nobody. A 
spy should always, if practicable, be assigned to the same 
officer, mutual acquaintance being essential to complete 
mutual understanding. A good spy often acquires a feeling 
of friendship and devotion for a chief who always sends him 
out, who always receives his reports, and (above all) who al- 
ways rewards him. A spy must always be well paid. He 
is usually working for money, and for money alone. A badly 
paid spy will generally strike a bargain, sooner or later, 
with the enemy. Communication with a spy should never 
be made through an interpreter, if it can be avoided. His 
information may be misinterpreted, and he will fear mis- 



SPIES. 229 

representation. Liberal pay and kindness should chiefly 
characterize the treatment of spies, though they should be 
treated with firmness, and held to the faithful performance 
of their duties. Threats should never be used. If the spy 
is offended, he can easily leave, or perhaps turn traitor. If 
his conduct has been so suspicious as to warrant a threat, 
it has been bad enough to justify his arrest. 

A spy's abilities should always be considered, and too 
much should not be required of him. If charged with ascer- 
taining too many things, he will probably bring back a con- 
fused report. Unless he be an exceptionally able man, he 
should be directed to ascertain only certain definite things. 
It is, consequently, necessary to employ many spies, and to 
assign to each a particular mission, giving them only such 
things in common to report upon as may enable them to act 
as a check upon each! other. The questions to which the 
spies are to find answers will depend upon circumstances. 
The following ones, of general application, should always be 
kept in view: 

1. Where are the headquarters? 

2. At what place are the different generals? What 
are their names, and what is the character of each? 

3. What are the numbers and strength of the corps in 
each position, and how many guns with each? 

4. Is the enemy concentrating or dividing his forces? 

5. W'hat are the measures taken for subsistence and 
transport? 

6. How are the enemy's troops clothed, fed, and paid? 
What is the state of their morale? How large is their sick- 
report? What is the mortality among them? What are 
the prevailing diseases? 

7. Is the enemy moving? If so, the entire army, by 
corps, or by detachments? 



230 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

8. Is he awaiting reinforcements? Whence are they 
coming? What kind of troops are they? When are they 
expected? 

9. Is he fortifying? If so, on what points? 

When the army is engaged in active operations, it may 
be a difficult matter for a spy to find the officer or the head- 
quarters to which he should report; and it may not be easy 
for him to establish his identity as a bona fide spy, when he ar- 
rives at the outposts or meets an advance guard, unless some 
general device has been adopted beforehand. In 1870-71 
each German spy w T ore a small medal, similar to a religious 
medal, around his neck, under his clothes* Wolseley sug- 
gests that each spy should carry "a coin of a certain date, a 
Bible of a certain edition, a Testament with the 3d or 7th 
leaf torn out," etc., etc. 

Spies sometimes remain in a certain locality, and send 
information, often through the ordinary channels of com- 
munication, in regard to the enemy's movements and prepa- 
rations. These communications, either telegraphic or by 
letter, may often be couched in commercial language, and 
sent to persons in a neutral country, by whom they are trans- 
mitted to the officials for whom they are intended. Such 
is the present perfection of telegraphic communication, that 
it would be practicable for an American spy in Quebec to 
send a disguised telegram to Hamburg, and have the infor- 
mation contained therein telegraphed via New York to an 
American army on the St. Lawrence not later than the fol- 
lowing day. Spies can, with a small pocket instrument, tap 
the telegraph wires and gain valuable information by means 
of the messages passing. This information can then be for- 
warded to the army by means of mobile spies, or under dis- 
guise through neutral territory. Officers or trusted agents 
should always be posted in a neutral country for the purpose 



SPIES. 231 

of transmitting promptly to the headquarters of the army 
such news of importance as they may there learn. 

Thus far we have considered only the employment of 
spies against the enemy. We must now consider the meas- 
ures necessary to guard against espionage on his part. The 
mischief that may follow carelessness in this respect is well 
shown by Lewal in the following incident: 

"A stranger presented himself, giving false, but spe- 
cious, news of the Germans. He was listened to; he gained 
the confidence of the French; he went without hindrance to 
the center of the army, even to headquarters. He saw all 
there was to be seen, and returned to the enemy under pre- 
text of going in search of further news. He never returned. 
At daybreak the enemy, well informed by him of our posi- 
tions, attacked. A great reverse for us followed. It was a 
case of a German spy whom nobody had suspected." 

When the presence of the enemy's spies is suspected, the 
soldiers should be warned against intimate association with 
the inhabitants, and should be instructed not to answer any 
questions relative to the army or its movements asked them 
by strangers. Strangers caught giving liquor to the soldiers 
should be at once arrested and subjected to a rigid exami- 
nation. 

Vigilance at the outposts will do much to keep spies 
away; but the necessity of allowing inhabitants to pass 
often gives admission to spies. When Napoleon was biv- 
ouacked on the Danube, opposite Essling, some Jews came 
into the French bivouac ostensibly to bargain for the hides of 
the animals slaughtered for the subsistence of the troops. 
It afterwards transpired that they were spies of the Arch- 
duke Charles. People on such alleged mercantile errands 
must be carefully watched, as well as persons on supposed 
religious missions. ^Beggars, peddlers, itinerant preachers, 



232 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

and strange women should be objects of suspicion, and 
should not be allowed to approach the camp or bivouac or to 
remain in the vicinity of the troops. 

A spy may often be detected by his obsequious polite- 
ness, by his having plenty of money with him, by his liber- 
ality in "treating" the soldiers, by his extreme care to ob- 
serve all the regulations of the camp, by his presence every- 
where where military movements are taking place, by his 
manner of looking and listening while trying to seem not to 
4o so, by his assumed air of extreme frankness, and by his 
promptness in producing papers to establish his innocent 
and worthy character. 

When a spy is captured, he should be carefully searched, 
his clothes ripped apart, the soles and heels of his shoes cut 
open, and his buttons examined. If he is suspected of hav- 
ing about him papers which are not discovered in the search, 
his clothing should be burned. His hair, beard, and mouth 
should be searched; and if he is armed when captured, his 
cartridges and revolver should be carefully examined. If 
he is suspected of having swallowed a dispatch, he should be 
given an emetic. 

The management of the secret service of an army re- 
quires a profound insight into human nature, and an ability 
to estimate at once the military worth of the information 
brought in. The chief of the secret service should be a pe- 
culiar combination of detective and general; it is not suffi- 
cient that he should be a detective alone. The chief of 
McClellan's secret service was a well-known and skillful de- 
tective; yet that general seemed to be, to an unusual degree,, 
the victim of misinformation in regard to the movements, 
and especially the numbers, of the opposing army. The 
Regulations for Troops in Campaign now prescribe that 
the provost-marshal-general shall superintend the secret 
service. 



NEWSPAPERS. 233 

NEWSPAPERS. 

In time of war much attention should be given, at the 
headquarters of an army, to the newspapers of the enemy 
and to those of neutral countries; for much valuable infor- 
mation may thus be obtained. It is said that, in 1796, Mo- 
reau first received intelligence of the reverses of Jourdan 
from the columns of a German newspaper; and it is known 
that in the Franco-German war, when MacMahon attempted 
his disastrous march to the relief of Bazaine, the first news 
of this important movement came to Von Moltke through the 
French and English newspapers. 

With the increasing means of gathering and transmit- 
ting news, and with the constantly growing popular de- 
mand for late and complete information, the trouble created 
in military operations by the mischievous energy of news- 
paper reporters will, more than ever, justify the character- 
ization of such correspondents as "the plague of modern 
armies." Such is the power of the press in the United States 
that an attempt to banish newspaper correspondents from 
an American army would probably do more harm than good ; 
but it does not seem impracticable to place restrictions upon 
the unavoidable evil, and even, in some cases, to turn it to 
practical use. No correspondent should be allowed to ac- 
company the army, unless provided with a license signed by 
the Secretary of War, on which should be an agreement, 
signed by the correspondent and the managing editor of his 
paper, not to violate any orders relative to correspondence 
that might, from time to time, be issued by the commander 
of the army. 

An officer should be detailed as press censor. He should 
exercise a general supervision over all the accredited corre- 
spondents, and should satisfy himself as to the propriety of 
all newspaper dispatches before allowing them to be sent. 



234 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

Any correspondent known to be discreet, subordinate, and 
trustworthy should be freely given all news of proper na- 
ture at headquarter sj but mischievous ones should be 
promptly deprived of their licenses, and otherwise punished 
according to the nature and degree of their offense. 

It is impossible to prescribe hard-and-fast rules for the 
government of the newspaper reporters accompanying an 
army; but regulations of some kind must be adopted to hold 
in check the mischievous gossip of those correspondents who 
would unhesitatingly imperil the safety of the army for the 
purpose of getting ahead of their rival reporters with some 
item of news. "Complete and unfettered freedom of the 
press is incompatible with a state of war."* 

It is not merely the metropolitan newspapers that work 
the mischief, but the petty local press as well. 

"Of course," says Von der Goltz, "even the best-informed 
paper will neither be able nor willing to make known the 
position of its party in all its entirety. But, even here, what 
is worth knowing is composed of many petty details. Other 
flashes of light have often so far lit up the picture of the 
enemy's doings, that only a breath of wind is still wanting 
to rend asunder the thin enshrouding veil of mist. The 
presence of a high commander is mentioned, a letter pub- 
lished, in which the writer mentions a division of troops and 
its station, or narrates a deed of arms, exactly describing all 
the circumstances, the regiments, and commanders. Each 
detail by itself is perfectly unprejudicial, but may yet serve 
as a valuable link of a chain that at last leads to its aim. 
* * * The national press can not in war-time be suffi- 
ciently warned to caution. The demand for news must be 
decidedly suppressed in its disastrous effects, much as, on the 
other hand, it must, in consideration of the feeling of the 

*Bronsart von Schellendorf. 



SPIES. 235 

country, be treated with regard. It would be better to trust 
reliable persons with the spreading of the news that is worth 
knowing to the country, than, by attempting to close all 
sources of communication, to incite unqualified and unrelia- 
ble persons to independent action." 

It may sometimes be practicable to lead the enemy into 
error by giving the newspaper correspondents incorrect in- 
formation. This misinformation will do no harm to the read- 
ing public at home, and it may produce great results in the 
field. This ruse must not, however, be too frequently at- 
tempted, as the correspondents, who are invariably men of 
alert intelligence, would cease to fall into the trap, and might 
feel justified in smothering the official news in a mass of sen- 
sational conjecture, which they might succeed in smuggling 
past the press censor. 

When a newspaper has incurred the displeasure of the 
commander by the nature of its correspondence, the punish- 
ment should, except where the fault manifestly lies with the 
editorial management, fall upon the correspondent individ- 
ually, and not upon the newspaper. Instead of denying the 
paper the privilege of having a correspondent with the army, 
it should be notified that it could retain that privilege only 
by sending a new man in place of the offending reporter, who 
should be expelled from the army, or otherwise punished 
according to the nature of his offense. But the problem of 
dealing with correspondents is a difficult one, and it must be 
solved by the commander according to the circumstances of 
each case. The chief objects to be considered in regard to 
the newspapers in war are, to derive the greatest possible 
benefit from the indiscretions of the correspondents with the 
enemy's armies, and to prevent similar indiscreet publica- 
tions by the reporters with our own.* 

*Por illustrations of the annoyance caused by newspaper corre- 
spondents in the War of Secession, see "Battles and Leaders of the 
Ciyil War," Vol. I., page 141; Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. I., page 232 
ct seq. ; and Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. IT., page 143, et seq. 



236 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 



CHAPTER VIII. 



ORIENTATION AND MAP-READING. 



The conduct of patrols, reconnaissances, partisan corps, and in 
general all the operations of war, require that military men of all 
grades should understand orientation, and be familiar with map- 
reading. — Von Witzleben. 

Orientation is the art of determining the points of the 
compass at any place where the observer may be. 
It is effected: 

1. By means of the magnetic compass; 

2. By observing the sun; 

3. By observing the moon; 

4. By observing the North Star; 

5. By means of maps; and 

6. By means of indications. 

Orientation by means of the compass scarcely needs ex- 
planation. It is well known that the needle points north. 
Facing, then, towards the north, a right face, left face, or 
about face will cause the observer to face towards the east,, 
west, or south. Care should be taken that the needle is not 
affected by the proximity of weapons,or other objects of iron. 
For ordinary purposes of orientation, the variation of the 
compass may be neglected. All the ordinary methods of 
orientation are, in fact, the rough expedients of the practical 
soldier, and not the scientific calculations of the astronomer. 

Orientation by observing the sun can give only an approxi- 
mation to correct results. Roughly speaking, the sun is in 
the east at 6 o'clock in the morning, in the south at noon, and 
in the west at 6 o'clock in the evening. This method of 



ORIENTATION AND MAP-READING. 237 

orientation requires that the hour be known. If the observ- 
er is without a watch, the time of day can be judged approxi- 
mately by the height of the sun in the heavens. To judge 
correctly requires practice; no rules can be given. If the 
observer knows approximately the time of sunrise, and knows 
the distance traveled since that hour, this distance divided by 
the usual rate of march will give the hours marched, and, 
consequently, the time of day. 

The sun passes over an arc of 15 degrees in an hour. At 
11 o'clock the shadow cast by a vertical stake will be west 
of the meridian, and will make an angle of 15 degrees with 
it. If then a line be drawn to the eastward of the shadow 
and at right angles with it, a division of this angle into three 
equal parts will enable the observer to lay off an angle of 15 
degrees east of the shadow, which will give the meridian line. 
At 10 :30 o'clock the right angle should be bisected. At 10 
o'clock an angle of 30 degrees should be taken, and so on. 
In the afternoon the meridian line should be drawn corre- 
spondingly to the westward of the shadow. But all attempts 
at orientation by observing the sun are scarcely more than 
guesses, unless a timepiece of some sort is at hand. 

When the sun is shining, a watch answers the purposes 
of orientation as well as a compass. While the sun is pass- 
ing over 180 degrees (from east to west), the hour hand of the 
watch passes over 360 degrees (from 6 o'clock to 6 o'clock).. 
Consequently, the angular movement of the sun in an hour 
corresponds to the angular movement of the hour hand in 
half-an-hour. If, then, holding the watch horizontal, we 
point the hour hand in the direction of the sun, a line from 
the pivot of the hands to the point midway between the hour 
hand and XII will point to the south. To illustrate : Suppose 
that it is nine o'clock in the morning. Following the rule 
given above, we find the south as indicated in Figure 1. 



238 




SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

S 



Sun. 



r&j. 




Orientation by observing the moon is more difficult and 
not very reliable ; it depends upon the quarter in which the 
moon happens to be. 

The full moqn is in the east at 6 o'clock in the evening, 
in the south at midnight, and in the west at 6 o'clock in the 
morning. 

The moon in the first quarter is in the south at 6 o'clock 
in the evening, and in the west at midnight. 

The moon in the last quarter is in the east at midnight, 
and in the south at 6 o'clock in the morning. 

These indications, except the first, may vary an hour or 
so earlier or later. 

The moon in the first quarter has the concavity to the 
left. In the last quarter the concavity is to the right. 



ORIENTATION BY INDICATIONS. 239 

Orientation by observing the North Star is one of the easi- 
est methods. In whatever position the constellation of the 
Great Bear, or the Dipper, may be, the line joining the "point- 
ers" will, if prolonged to about six times its length, pass 
nearly through the North Star, which can be readily recog- 
nized by its brilliancy. (See Fig. 2.) 



Fjcr. 2 



A 
j/' > 



Orientation by map is altogether the most satisfactory. 
The north is generally at the top of the map ; if not, it is in- 
dicated by the direction of an arrow or similar symbol. Hav- 
ing a map, and being on the ground represented by it, all that 
is necessary is to place any line on the map in the same direc- 
tion as a corresponding line on the ground, and the map will 
give the direction of the points of the compass. Any line 
may be chosen, such as a portion of a road or railroad, or a 
line joining two prominent landmarks. 

Orientation by Indications. — If compass and maps are 
lacking in cloudy weather, or at night, the points of the com- 
pass may be found by various indications. In the Northern 
Hemisphere the moss on stones and trees is found thickest 
on the northwest or north side. Walls are damper on the 
north than on the south side. The bark of trees is most 



240 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

deeply wrinkled on the north side. In stumps of trees it will 
be observed that the rings of annual growth are wider on the 
south than on the north side. Vines are trained on the south 
side of walls. Headstones in cemeteries are generally at the 
west end of graves. Weathervanes are often marked with 
the points of the compass. 

MAP-READING. 

Quick and accurate map-reading can be acquired only 
by practice. This practice can be obtained by going to the 
ground represented, and orienting oneself with the map. 
facing the distance from one object to another, the result 
should be compared with the distance between the same ob- 
jects as indicated on the map. At each cross-road or fence 
delineated on the map, the angle made with the road should 
be estimated or measured, and compared with the angle rep- 
resented. The actual appearance of all hills or natural fea- 
tures should be compared with the cartographic representa- 
tion, and this practice continued until an examination of a 
topographical map gives to the mind a clear conception of 
the actual appearance of the ground represented. The best 
way to learn to read a map is to learn to make one; which 
knowledge can be acquired by the study of military topog- 
raphy. 

To ascertain the distance between any two points on the 
map, take the distance as indicated by a pair of dividers, and 
apply it to the scale given on the map. If the distance is too 
great to be measured with a single span of the dividers, or 
greater than the length of the given scale, draw a straight 
line in pencil on the margin of the map, or on any convenient 
paper, and lay off the distance thereon. Then adjust the 
dividers to any suitable portion of the scale (say 1,000 yards) 
and see how many times the adjusted span is contained in the 



MAP-READING. 



241 



space marked off. If there is a remainder, apply it to the 
scale. The quotient multiplied by the number of yards rep- 
resented by the span, plus the number represented by the re- 
mainder, will indicate the distance measured. 

The distances measured along roads are rarely on a 
straight line. The best method of measuring such distances 
is as follows: 

Let it be required to find the exact distance from the 
point B to the point A on the map, measured along the road 

Fitfu.re 3. 



\ 




B C D E J A. (See Fig. 3.) Placing one foot of the dividers 
at B and the other at C, we get the distance between these 
two points. Without changing the opening of the dividers, 
we leave one foot at 0, and swing the other around on the 
prolongation of the line D 0, where it falls at some point F. 
Extending the other foot of the dividers to the point D, we 
find F D =B C-f CD. Swinging the foot at F around in pro- 
longation of E D, and extending the foot at D to E, we find 
G E=B C+C D+D E. In a similar manner we find H J= 
BC+CD+DE+E J, and finally AI=BC+CD-hD E+E J 
-f J A. Applying the distance A I to the scale on the map, 
we have the distance by road from B to A . 



242 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 



CHAPTER IX. 



INDIAN SCOUTING. 



It must be emphatically asserted that there does not exist, never 
has existed, and never, except by pedants, of whom the most careful 
students of war are more impatient than other soldiers, has there ever 
been supposed to exist, "an art of war" which was something other 
than the resultant of accumulated military experience.— Maurice. 

As contributing to a demonstration of the fact that 
sound theories of war are simply the accumulations of ex- 
perience, it is interesting to note the essential points in com- 
mon possessed by the scouting methods of European armies 
and those of the Indians, who, far from knowing anything 
about European warfare, are ignorant of the existence of 
Europe itself. It will be sufficient to consider the methods 
of the Apaches and the Sioux. 

Unlike the other Indian tribes, the Apaches are essen- 
tially foot-soldiers. They often use great numbers of horses 
on their raids, but they never fight mounted, their horses be- 
ing used merely as a means of transportation from one point 
to another. As warriors, they are formidable only when 
afoot, and as scouts they are seen at their best when acting 
as small infantry patrols. 

During the wars in Arizona during the past decade, the 
ordinary methods of an Apache company in the field against 
hostile Indians were about as follows: The scouts were up 
and on the alert before the earliest signs of dawn ; and, hav- 
ing received their instructions as to> the next camping-place, 
and especially in regard to "ranches" inhabited by white 
men (by whom they were likely to fired upon, if they ap- 



INDIAN SCOUTING. 243 

proached unaccompanied by troops), they started out from 
camp, spreading out like a fan, in groups of three, and pushing 
on so far ahead of the troops that the latter rarely saw them 
until camp was reached, or the trail became so hot that word 
was sent back to the column. The patrols reconnoitered the 
country in the most thorough manner for about five miles 
on each side of the trail, and absolutely nothing escaped their 
notice; tracks, broken branches, upturned stones, ashes of 
camp-fires, horse-dung — in short, everything, being com- 
mented on, and, if deemed important, reported to the com- 
mander of the column by one of the party. If less than three 
men remained of a party, it always united with another, an 
Apache dreading to be alone. 

As soon as camp was made (generally about 1 o'clock 
p. m.), the scouts, without instructions being given, encircled 
the camp with an outpost line, which nothing could approach 
without being seen. As soon as it became dark, everyone 
came in and went to bed, the horses were turned out under 
soldiers for night-herding, and the camp slept securely, be- 
cause it is a cardinal principle with the Apaches never to 
attack at night. This peculiarity of the Apaches is by some 
attributed to the extremely rough country covered with cac- 
tus and prickly pear; by others, to superstition. Whatever 
the cause, it seems to be an invariable rule. The earliest 
gray of dawn always found the outposts reestablished, the 
herd in (or the guards about it quadrupled), and the men 
under arms. 

The methods of these scouts were in all respects essen- 
tially the same as those of the hostile Indians to whom they 
were opposed. 

The Apaches show a surprising skill in the selection of 
positions and in the measures taken for defense. An officer 
of experie'nce says: 

16 — 



244 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

"In the field against Victorio for two years, I never saw 
one of his camps that did not astonish me with the splendid 
means of defense against any opponent coming in any direc- 
tion, and the absolute impossibility of sudden surprise guar- 
anteed by his arrangement of outposts. * * * * In his 
own country the Apache is the ideal scout for an infantry 
patrol, as he obtains all information without being seen, can 
conceal himself on a bare plain, and is good for thirty miles 
a day all the time." 

While the Apache, habitually operating on foot, gives us 
a valuable lesson in the conduct of infantry patrols, the 
mounted Indian furnishes a similar one for the cavalry re- 
connoitering service. 

The Sioux is, probably, the best type of mounted Indian. 
He is "all eyes and ears," is seldom seen, and may, in fact, 
be characterized as a perfect scout. When General Crook's 
command left Fort Fetterman, in the campaign of 1876, it 
had in its front from 8,000 to 10,000 hostile Sioux; and yet, 
in a march of 200 miles, not one of them was seen, though 
they kept the command under constant observation, and 
knew its every movement. At Tongue River the camp was 
fired into in broad daylight by Indians who had stealthily ap- 
proached unseen to the opposite bank of the river. Had the 
stream been unfordable, so that the Indians could not have 
been dislodged, they would have made the camp untenable. 

The advance guard and flankers of the Sioux are pushed 
miles beyond the main body, and their scouts hang upon the 
flanks of an approaching enemy. The scout gains some high 
point, where, lying on his belly in the shadow of some tree or 
rock, he sees everything without being seen himself; his 
horse meanwhile being either picketed or grazing with drag- 
ging lariat behind the crest of the hill. The expedients 
adopted for concealment are many and ingenious. The scout 



INDIAN SCOUTING. 245 

sometimes crawls towards a rock on the crest of a hill, and 
when near it draws his blanket, or a white cloth or stable 
frock (according to the color of the rock) over his head and 
shoulders, covering everything but his eyes, and then wrig- 
gles himself by degrees up to the rock, where he remains 
motionless, until he has minutely scanned all the country in 
sight, when he withdraws as stealthily as he approached, 
whether anything has been discovered or not. He often con- 
ceals himself by holding a piece of sage-brush in front of him 
while lying down. Sometimes he fastens bushes to the up- 
per part of his body, extending above his head ; then, sitting 
in a "wash-out" or wallow, he is completely concealed, while 
his o"wn view is unobstructed. 

In long-distance reconnoitering, the scout (lying flat on 
his belly) places his elbows on the ground, rests his head on 
his hands, which are so placed as to shade his eyes and limit 
the front of vision, and then fixes his gaze upon some distant 
object, which he watches intently. In this way Bloody Knife, 
one of General Custer's scouts, located Sitting Bull's camp on 
the Little Big Horn at a distance of about twelve miles ; dis- 
covering first the smoke, and then ponies grazing in the 
valley. 

Buttes and other prominent points near the trail are 
sought as lookouts, the scouts often going miles to reach 
them, unless the enemy is known to be near. In almost every 
case, the scouts work in pairs, a watch being kept to the rear 
as well as to the front. Before crossing a ridge, the scouts 
invariably scan carefully the valley in front. They never 
enter any place without first reconnoitering it ; and if it does 
not aif ord means of easy escape, they keep out. If they come 
to an unfordable stream, they swim it without any ado, and 
continue their reconnaissance. 

The Sioux place their camp in hollows and valleys,where 
it is well concealed; the location chosen being always such 



246 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

that numerous canons or ravines provide means of escape. 
In the daytime watch is kept from the highest points; at late 
dusk and early dawn the scouts are drawn in so as to enable 
them to see an approaching enemy on the sky-line. 

If attacked and forced to abandon their village, the 
Sioux retreat, by means of the ravines or other avenues, to 
the high ground ; and in many cases a neglect on the part of 
the troops promptly to occupy surrounding heights has en- 
abled the Indians to drive them out of the captured camp by 
fire from commanding positions. 

On the battle-field the tactics of the Sioux is simple and 
effective. At the battle of Rosebud, on being discovered, 
they advanced so rapidly to the attack that the troops barely 
had time to prepare to receive them. On being dislodged 
from one height, the Indians retreated rapidly, and made a 
stubborn stand at the next. They fought in successive lines, 
one advancing when the other retreated; and when they 
were charged, they scattered only to unite and fight at some 
point beyond. Their ability to rally quickly often enables 
them to inflict a heavy blow upon troops disordered by 
pursuit. 

In attacking, the Indians endeavor to surround, or, at 
least, to extend beyond their enemy, so as to bring upon him 
a convergent fire; their tactics, in this respect, as in many 
others, bearing a considerable resemblance to the lava of the 
Cossacks. The fact that their own line is thus thin and easi- 
ly broken causes them no uneasiness ; for their enemy's fire 
is divergent and directed against a difficult target; and if 
the line is broken, they scamper away, quickly rally at a sig- 
nal, and resume the same tactics as before. The chief object 
of their tactics is to place themselves in such a position as to 
give them the most effective fire on the enemy, and, at the 
same time, to incur the least possible loss. 



INDIAN SCOUTING. 247 

In order to mislead the enemy in regard to the move- 
ments of their "villages," or to gain time for the escape of 
their families or herds, they not infrequently uncover the 
trail and mass their warriors in another direction, making 
just enough resistance to draw the pursuing force away from 
the trail of their non-combatants. 

Like the Apaches, the Sioux do not expect a night attack. 
They post no sentinels after dark, but are on the alert at the 
first sign of dawn. They do not, however, have so great an 
aversion to night operations as the Apaches; for parties of 
prowlers often approach camp, to steal horses, if the animals 
are on the "picket line,'' or to stampede them, if they are 
herded or lariated. Night attacks by the Sioux are almost 
unknown ; though a considerable force of warriors fired into 
the camp of Baker's battalion of the Second Cavalry at Pom- 
pey's Pillar, on the Yellowstone, in 1872. 

The Sioux warrior also resembles the Apache in his 
knowledge of the country and its topography; in his expert- 
ness in trailing; in the many makeshifts of the practical 
warrior; and in his skillful interchange of signals with dis- 
tant comrades. 

It is not because of his courage, expertness with fire- 
arms, or celerity of movement that the Indian is a formidable 
foe — indeed, in the first two qualities he is greatly surpassed 
by our troops. He is formidable because his thorough knowl- 
edge of all the essential details of the science of security and 
information generally enables him to give battle when he 
chooses, and to avoid conflict when he sees fit. As a scout 
he is a model; and it may be said that the scouting methods 
prescribed by the best European authorities are valuable in 
proportion to the degree of their approach to those of the 
North American Indian. 

It should be observed that these Indians are all trained 



248 SECURITY AND INFORMATION. 

to war, and that their methods are not the result of the in- 
spiration of the occasion, but of constant practice, and of a 
study which is not less deep because it is unlettered. Meth- 
ods of scouting, various expedients of warfare, and even 
geographical details, are learned by one generation from an- 
other; and more than one instance has been known of an 
Indian finding his way without difficulty through a country 
which he was traversing for the first time, because he had 
learned so thoroughly from others the relative positions of 
prominent landmarks as to be in possession of a reliable 
mental map. Constant practice in hunting, stalking game, 
and making long journeys through wild country, makes the 
Indians expert in judging distances, reconnoitering, utiliz- 
ing cover, and husbanding the strength of themselves and 
their horses. In fact, the Sioux quite as well as the Prus- 
sian, teaches the lesson that nothing but constant practice 
in the real or simulated conditions of war can properly pre- 
pare the soldier for the duties of a campaign. 



ADVANCE GUARD DRILL — INFANTRY. 249 

APPENDIX I. 



Advance Guard Drill — Infantry. 

Often in active service a command is ordered on de- 
tached dut} T from a point some distance within the outposts 
of the army. It is unnecessary and fatiguing to march from 
the camp or bivouac with an advance guard, which should 
be thrown out only when the outpost line is passed. Troops 
should, therefore, be drilled in forming advance guard from 
column with celerity. 

When a single company forms the advance guard, the 
first section constitutes the advance party, the second sec- 
tion the support, and the second platoon the reserve. 
The company being in column of fours, at a halt, the 
captain commands: 1. Form advance guard, 2. MARCH. 
At the first command, the first sergeant takes command 
of the first section, and the corporal of the first four 
exchanges places with his rear rank man. At the com- 
mand March, the front rank of the first four, under the sec- 
ond sergeant, moves to the front as a point. The rear rank 
of the first and the front rank of the second four oblique to 
the left and right, respectively, to form flanking groups. 
The point and flankers all move out at double time, reducing 
their pace to quick time as soon as they reach their proper 
positions. The first sergeant detaches two men from the 
rear rank of the second four to march as connecting files be- 
tween the advance party and the support, puts the other 
two in the line of file-closers, and commands : 1. Forward,. 
2. MARCH, the second command being given as soon as 
the point has gained its proper distance. When the section 
consists of only two fours, the first sergeant marches the 



250 APPENDIX I. 

rear rank of the second four forward, and the connecting 
files are furnished by the support. 

The first lieutenant (remaining with the second section) 
commands: 1. Forward, 2. MARCH, the second command 
being given as soon as the support has its proper distance, 
He then adds: 1. Rear four, 2. Right and left oblique, 
3. Double time, 4. MARCH. The front rank of the rear four 
obliques to the right, and the rear rank to the left, at double 
time, forming the flankers of the support, and taking quick 
time on gaining their positions. 

The captjain (remaining with the second platoon) com- 
mands: 1. Forward, 2. MARCH, the second command be- 
ing given as soon as the reserve has its proper distance. 
Should flankers be necessary for the reserve, they are then 
sent out, at double time, by the same commands as in the 
case of the support, from the rear (or rear and leading) fours. 
The entire advance guard marches at attention, the advance 
party and support marching on as broad a front as practica- 
ble, and the reserve in column of fours. 

If the command is: 1. Form advance guard, 2. Double 
time, 3. MARCH, the point and flankers move out as already 
prescribed, but do not reduce their pace upon gaining their 
positions. The advance party, the support, and the reserve 
move forward successively at double time. The reserve 
takes quick time at the command of the captain, and the 
other parts of the advance guard then conform to the pace 
of the reserve. 

If the company is left in front, the duties described 
above for the first lieutenant will be performed by the sec- 
ond lieutenant, and the point will be commanded by the 
third sergeant. In either case the first sergeant commands 
the section constituting the advance party. 

When the advance guard consists of an entire battal- 



ADVANCE GUARD DRILL— INFANTRY. 25 I 

ion, the first and second companies constitute the vanguard, 
and the third and fourth form the reserve. The vanguard 
is commanded by its senior captain. The major commands: 
1. Form advance guard, 2. MARCH, the commands being 
repeated by the commander of the vanguard. The point 
and flankers move out from the first section of the leading 
companj 7 , the first platoon of this company constituting the 
advance party. The first sergeant does not take command 
of the first section. As soon as the point has gained its 
proper distance, the lieutenant commanding the first pla- 
toon moves it forward. As soon as the advance party has 
gained its proper distance, the commander of the vanguard 
commands: 1. Forward, 2. MARCH, immediately adding, 

1. Rear fours first and second companies, 2. Right and left 
oblique, 3. Double time, 4. MARCH. The fours designated 
move out as flankers in the manner already prescribed, 
those of the first company being slightly in advance of, and 
those of the rear company slightly in rear of, the support. 
If only one group of flankers is needed on each flank, they 
.are formed by the rear four of the first company. When 
the support has gained its proper distance, the major moves 
the reserve forward, and orders; flankers out from the re- 
serve, if necessary, in the same way as from the support. 

In the case of two battalions forming the advance 
guard of a brigade, the major commanding the first battal- 
ion, upon receiving instructions from the commander of 
the advance guard, commands: 1. Form advance guard, 

2. MARCH. The commands are repeated by the captain of 
the first company, who adds: 1. Forward, 2. MARCH, in 
time to move his entire company forward as advance party 
as soon as the point has gained its proper distance. The 
major commands: 1. Forward, 2. MARCH, the second 
■ command being given the moment the advance party has 



252 APPENDIX I. 

gained the proper 'distance. The major then adds: 1. Rear 
four (such) company or companies, 2. Eight and left oblique, 
3. Double time, 4. MARCH, the flankers being taken from the 
second, fourth, or third company, or from all three in the 
order mentioned, according to the number of groups required 
on each flank. When the support has gained the proper dis- 
tance, the major of the second battalion moves the reserve 
forward. The major commanding the reserve should ordi- 
narily be the senior, as the commander of the advance guard 
is habitually with the reserve. 

The terrain will not always lend itself readily to the 
normal formation of the advance guard. When the normal 
formation is impracticable, the commander will designate 
the different parts of the advance guard, will specify the 
number of flankers, etc., and will then give the command: 
1. Form advance guard, 2. MARCH, which will be executed 
according to the preliminary instructions. 

To assemble the advance guard, the reserve is halted, 
and the other parts of the advance guard at once halt. The 
command is then given: 1. Assemble, 2. MARCH, or the 
commander gives the signal of assembly as prescribed in the 
drill regulations. The command is repeated by the com- 
mander of the vanguard, and then by the commander of the 
advance party. At the command March, the point, flankers, 
and connecting files move on the shortest lines to the body 
from which they were sent out, and take their places in the 
column. The detached men having thus rejoined, the ad- 
vance party marches back and joins the support, and the 
united bodies then march back and join the reserve. Should 
the advance party or support not be in column of fours, 
such column should be formed before its commander gives 
the order for assembling. 

If it is desired to assemble on the advance party, the 



REAR GUARD DRILL. 253 

command is: 1. Assemble on the advance party, 2. MARCH. 
The command is executed as prescribed above, except that 
the advance party remains halted, and the support and re- 
serve move forward and close upon, it. 

The assembly may be similarly made on the support 
by the command: 1. Assemble on the support, 2. MARCH. 
In this case the assembly is made as prescribed above, ex- 
cept that the advance party marches back, and the reserve 
moves forward to join the support. In all cases the assem- 
bly may be made either at quick time or double time. 

Rear Guard Drill. 

Upon the receipt of the order to form a company as a 
rear guard, its captain halts it, and, if it be not already in 
that formation, forms it in column of fours facing the enemy. 
The main body having gained the proper distance, the cap- 
tain commands: 1. Form rear guard, 2. Second platoon 
fours left about, 3. MARCH, and the second platoon, under 
command of the captain, at once moves to the rear and fol- 
lows the main body. At the command, 1. First and rear 
fours, 2. Right and left oblique, 3. MARCH, the designated 
fours move out as flankers in the manner prescribed for the 
advance guard, the front rank to the right and the rear rank 
to the left. 

When the reserve has gained its proper distance the first 
lieutenant commands: 1. Second section, 2. Fours left about, 
3, MARCH. The section follows the reserve as a support, 
maintaining the proper distance. Flankers are sent out from 
the rear four as in the advance guard. 

The support having gained its proper distance, the first 
sergeant commands: 1. Form rear party, 2. MARCH. At 
the first command the corporal of the first four exchanges 
places with his rear rank man, and at the command March, 



254 APPENDIX I. 

the rear rank of the first four and the front rank of the sec- 
ond four face to the left and right respectively, leave the 
column at double time, and upon gaining the proper interval 
from the column, march to the rear at quick time. The front 
rank of the first four stands fast. Immediately after giving 
the command for forming rear party, the first sergeant com- 
mands: 1. Fours left about, 2. MARCH, and afterwards 
detaches two men as connecting files between the rear party 
and support. The front rank of the first four assumes the 
proper formation for a rear point, and marches to the rear 
as soon as the rear party has gained the proper distance. 

Similar modifications will give suitable commands for 
larger bodies of infantry as rear guards. In the cavalry, at 
whatever pace the main body may be retiring, the whole 
rear guard is halted, and the successive fractions then follow 
at the gait of the main body. 

As in the case of the advance guard, the terrain will 
rarely lend itself readily to the normal formation. It will 
accordingly generally be necessary for the commander to 
designate certain modifications before giving the command: 
1. Form rear guard, 2. MARCH. The command will then 
be executed in accordance with the preliminary instructions. 
At the command : 1. Assemble, 2, MARCH, the rear party 
and support are assembled in the same manner as the ad- 
vance party and support in an advance guard, and are 
marched forward to the reserve. 

Advance Guard Drill — Cavalry. 

The troop being in column of fours, the captain com- 
mands: 1. Form advance guard, 2. MARCH. At the first 
command, the commander of the first platoon takes com- 
mand of the vanguard, and the guidon sergeant takes posi- 
tion abreast of the leading four of the reserve. At the 



ADVANCE GUARD DRILL — CAVALRY. 255 

command MarcJt] the first four, under the command of the 
right principal guide, moves forward at a trot, consti- 
tuting the point. The second and third fours oblique to 
the right and left, respectively, at a trot, until they are 
about 300 yards from the line of march, and then move 
forward until they are on a line about 100 yards in rear of 
th< point, increasing their pace, if necessary, in moving for- 
ward to their position. The right principal guide is the 
commander of the advance party, and regulates the move- 
ments of the point and flanking groups. 

When the point has gained a distance of 600 yards, the 
commander of the vanguard moves the support forward at 
a walk, and the advance party (consisting of the point and 
flanking groups) at once takes the same pace The com- 
mander of the vanguard, as soon as he has put the sup- 
port in motion, detaches two flanking groups from the last 
three fours. These patrols, which are always under a non- 
commissioned officer, march, one on each flank, about half a 
mile from the column and slightly in advance of the reserve. 
As one flank is generally more exposed than the other, the 
patrol on the dangerous flank would consist of eight and the 
other of four men. If both flanks appear to be equally ex- 
posed, each patrol should consist of six men, but it is not 
otherwise advisable to break up the unity of a four. These 
patrols move to their positions at a trot, and take such for- 
mation as circumstances may require. 

When the support has advanced about 700 yards, the 
captain moves the reserve forward. When flanking groups 
are thrown out from the reserve, they should be taken from 
the rear fours. 

If the command is: 1. Form advance guard, 2. Trot, 
3. MARCH, the advance guard is formed as above de- 
scribed, except that the point and flankers move to their posi- 



256 APPENDIX I. 

tions at a gallop, and the support and reserve move forward 
at a trot. As soon as the support moves forward, the ad- 
vance party comes down to a trot. The entire advance 
guard continues to move at a trot until the pace of the reserve 
is either increased or reduced, when the other parts at once 
conform thereto. Unless orders be given to the contrary, 
the reserve always regulates the pace of the advance guard. 

If the command is: 1. Form advance guard, 2. Gallop, 
3. MARCH, the advance guard is formed as in the last 
case, except that the advance party continues the gallop 
and the other bodies move out successively at the same 
pace. The cavalry should be habitually drilled in forming 
advance guard at a gallop. 

If the troop is left in front, the advance party is com- 
manded by the left principal guide, and the vanguard by the 
corresponding platoon commander. 

The above method of forming an advance guard will 
answer in the case of a troop of 60 men or more. If the 
troop numbers only 60 men, it should be divided into three 
platoons. If the troop is small, the point will be taken from 
the first four, and the flankers of the advance party may be 
reduced to two on each flank, both taken from the second 
four. The flanking patrols sent out from the support may 
be reduced to four men each. When the troop is very small, 
and (as is usually the case) the country is such that these 
patrols can not be dispensed with, it will not be able to fur- 
nish the entire advance guard, the whole strength being re- 
quired for the advance party and support. 

An advance guard consisting of more than one troop is 
formed by similar commands and means. 

The assembly is executed as in the case of infantry. It 
may be made at a walk, trot, or gallop. 



ADVANCE GUARDS. 257 

APPENDIX II. 



Questions. 



The following questions have been prepared with a 
view to their use in a general review of the book. The num- 
ber in parentheses indicates the page on which the answer 
to the question is to be found. 

1. How is the security of an army provided for on the 
march? (18.) 

2. How, at a halt? (18.) 

3. Why are the two elements of security and informa- 
tion inseparable? (18.) 

4. The information necessary for a commander is of 
what two kinds? (18.) 

5. How is the first kind of information generally ob- 
tained? (19.) 

6. In what two ways is the second class of informa- 
tion gained? (20.) 

7. By whom may a reconnaissance be effected? (21.) 

8. To gain reliable information of the enemy, what 
should be done? (21.) 

Advance Guards. 

9. What would be the effect if troops moving in one 
body should come suddenly upon the enemy? (22.) 

10. How is a column of troops on the march divided? 
(22.) 

11. What, in general terms, are the objects of the ad- 
vance guard ? (22.) 



258 APPENDIX II. 

12. What are the specific objects of the advance 
guard? (22.) 

13. How does the proportionate strength of the ad- 
vance guard vary? (23.) 

14. What is the danger in having the advance guard 
too weak? (23.) 

15. As a general rule, what portion of the entire force 
is assigned to the advance guard and to the rear guard on 
advance — and what on a retrograde movement? (23.) 

16. Whence are the flanking parties taken? (23.) 

17. With a small force, what may be the proportionate 
strength of the advance guard? (23.) 

18. Why should the proportion be larger in the case of 
a large force? (23.) 

19. What is the object of each of the constituent de- 
tachments of the advance guard? (24.) 

20. Into what two parts is the advance guard prima- 
rily divided, and what is the strength of each? (27.) 

21. Into what two parts is the vanguard divided, and 
what is their relative strength? (27.) 

22. How are these proportions varied? (27.) 

23. Draw a diagram representing the formation of a 
company of infantry as an advance guard. (Plate I.) 

24. If the nature of the country is such as to render 
the use of flanking groups impracticable, what is done? 
(28.) 

25. When marching in an open country, how may the 
advance guard be formed? (28.) 

26. Draw a diagram representing a battalion of in- 
fantry as an advance guard. (Plate HI.) 

27. Describe briefly the formation of an adance guard 
consisting of two battalions. (31.) 



ADVANCE GUARDS. 259 

28. What might result if the distance of the advance 
guard from the main body were too great; and what, if it 
were too small? (31.) 

29. Give the "rough rule" which will answer in most 
cases for determining the distance of the advance guard 
from the main body. (31.) 

30. When must this distance be decreased, and when 
may it be increased? (32.) 

31. Where does the commander of the vanguard 
march? (35.) 

32. Describe the duties of the commander of the van- 
guard. (35.) 

33. How are losses in the advance party replaced?" 
(36.) 

34. In a command of considerable size, who is charged 
with the duties of selecting a camp or bivouac for the main 
body? (36.) 

35. Where does the commander of the advance guard 
march? (36.) 

36. What qualities does the commander of the ad- 
vance guard need, and why? (36.) 

37. What should the commander of the advance guard 
continually consider, and what, in general, should he do? 
(37.) 

38. What is done when the advance guard halts? (37.) 

39. How is information conveyed from one part of the 
advance guard to another? (37-38.) 

40. Draw a diagram representing an advance guard 
consisting of a troop of cavalry. (Plate IV.) 

41. Describe the composition of the advance party, the 
supports, and the reserve, when the advance guard consists 
of two troops. (41.) 

17 — 



?6o APPENDIX II, 

42. What would be the composition of the advance 
party in a very large advance guard? (42.) 

43. Why are the distances and intervals greater in a 
cavalry advance guard than in one composed of infantry? 
(42.) 

44. Why should an advance guard be composed of all 
arms? (43.) 

45. In the United States Army, what arm should, if in 
sufficient numbers, compose the support? (43.) 

46. Describe the use of artillery with the advance 
guard, and its position therein when marching. (43-44.) 

47. Describe the use and position of the engineers with 
the advance guard. (44-45.) 

48. Upon what does the proportion of each arm with 
the advance guard depend, and when is each preferable? 
(45.) 

49. As a rule, what troops perform the duty of advance 
guard, and when may it be desirable to compose the advance 
guard differently? (45.) 

50. State the general and important rule in regard to 
the disposition of the advance guard, whether on active 
service or merely at drill. (46.) 

51. Describe the method of action of the advance 
guard on meeting the enemy. (46-47.) 

52. Describe the order of inarch of a division — advance 
guard, main body, and rear guard. (48-51-52-53.) 

53. How would the front of an army corps on the 
march be protected ? (53-54.) 

54. In the case of a flank march near the enemy, in 
what respects does the flank guard resemble an advance 
guard, and how does it differ from it? (54-55.) 

55. Describe the duties of the advance guard in a re- 
treat. (55.) 



OUTPOSTS. 26l 

Outposts. 

56. What are outposts, and with what duties are they 
charged? (56.) 

57. What effect on an outpost has a good cavalry 
screen in its front? (56-57.) 

58. How may the duties of an outpost be classified? 
(57.) 

59. Into what four parts is an outpost divided? (58.) 

60. Who occupy the line of observation; and who, the 
line of resistance? (58.) 

61. What are the normal distances between the sub- 
divisions of an outpost of infantry? — of cavalry? (58.) 

62. To what may the general plan of an outpost be 
likened? (58.) 

63. What portion of the strength of the outpost is 
generally assigned to the reserve, to the supports, and to 
the pickets? (61.) 

64. On what does the strength of a picket depend, and 
what principle regulates the strength of each support? (61.) 

65. What two systems of outposts are there, and what 
are their general characteristics? (61.) 

66. State the requirements of a good outpost position. 
(61.) 

67. State what furnishes one of the best; and what, 
one of the worst, outpost positions. (61.) 

68. What should be done when the outpost is com- 
pelled to occupy a wood, the farther edge of which is too dis- 
tant to be occupied? (62.) 

69. If the outpost be not compelled to occupy the 
wood, in this case, what is generally advisable? (62.) 

70. Where a stream, canal, or other obstacle having 
but few passages, lies parallel to the outpost line, what may 
be done? (62-6.3.) 



262 APPENDIX II. 

71. What should generally be the shape of the outpost 
line? (63.) 

72. On what does the strength of the outpost depend ? 
(63.) 

73 As a rule, what is the maximum strength of the 
outpost in proportion to the entire command? (64.) 

74. When the army is marching, from day to day, what 
constitutes the outpost at each halt? (64.) 

75. If outposts are required on the flanks and rear, of 
what are they composed ? (64.) 

76. Draw a diagram representing an outpost consist- 
ing of a regiment of infantry. (Plate VI.) 

77. Draw a diagram representing an outpost consist- 
ing of a squadron of cavalry. (Plate VII.) 

78. State how the outposts for divisions and brigades 
are generally furnished, and give the alternative forma- 
tions of a brigade outpost. (64-67.) 

79. What provisions for the command of the outpost 
are made in this case? (67.) 

80. If two brigades encamp in the first line, with the 
third in reserve, whence are the outposts taken? (67.) 

81. Where is the baggage of the outpost troops kept? 
(67.) 

82. State when infantry is preferable to cavalry for 
outpost duty, and the reverse, and state how the two arms 
may be advantageously combined. (67-68.) 

83. How should artillery be used with an outpost? 
(69-70.) 

84. State the considerations on which the distance of 
the outpost from the main body depends. (70-71.) 

85. What is the usual distance, and what is the maxi- 
mum distance? (71.) 



OUTPOSTS. 263 

86. How is the outpost divided, and where are the sev- 
eral headquarters? (71.) 

87. What instructions does the outpost commander 
receive from the commander of the forces, and what does 
he (the outpost commander) then do? — including his in- 
structions to his subordinates. (71-72.) 

88. As a rule, how should the outpost be intrenched? 
(73.) 

89. How are sentinels generally posted, and how may 
the group system be used? (73.) 

90. State the requirements of a good post for a sen- 
tinel. (74.) 

91. How far apart may sentinels and vedettes be? — 
minimum and maximum distances. (74.) 

92. What are the general duties of a sentinel, and 
what should he clearly understand? (74-75.) 

93. What persons are allowed to cross the line of sen- 
tinels, and what is done with the others? (75.) 

94. How are deserters from the enemy received at the 
outpost? (75.) 

95. When a flag of truce approaches, how is the bearer 
received by the sentinel? (76.) 

96. Everything observed by the sentinel is how com- 
municated? (76.) 

97. What are the general rules in regard to sentinels 
firing? (76.) 

98. How often should sentinels be relieved? (77.) 

99. How are vedettes posted? (78.) 

100. How may vedettes sometimes perform their duty 
dismounted? (78.) 

101. What is a connecting sentinel? (78.) 

102. What is a picket sentinel? (78.) 



264 APPENDIX II. 

103. What is the object of an examining post, and of 
what persons does it consist? (78-79.) 

104. How is a person approaching an examining post 
received? (79.) 

105. If a person approaches the line of sentinels at 
any other point than the examining post, what is done? (79.) 

106. What are the objections to examining posts, and 
when may such posts be advantageously used? (79.) 

107. What are detached posts? (80.) 

108. What points may be advantageously held by de- 
tached posts? (80.) 

109. How often are detached posts relieved, and what 
is required of the men composing them? (80.) 

110. What is the usual strength of a picket? — both 
infantry and cavalry. (80.) 

111. How many double sentinels or vedettes does a 
picket usually furnish? (80.) 

112. What regulates the strength of a picket, and 
what portion of the picket is used in patrolling? (80-81.) 

113. What are the maximum and minimum fronts of 
an infantry picket? (81.) 

114. What are the maximum and minimum fronts of 
a cavalry picket? (81.) 

115. Pickets are generally about how far apart? (81.) 

116. What line is the first consideration in selecting 
the ground for the outpost? (82.) 

117. What are the six requirements of a perfect picket 
post? (82.) 

118. If a picket is posted in a defile, what should be 
done? (82.) 

119. What is the general rule in regard to posting a 
picket in a house or inclosure; and what exception is there 
to the rule? (82.) 



OUTPOSTS. 265 

120. How should the picket be situated relatively to 
a junction of roads leading from the enemy's position? (83.) 

121. When an impassable obstacle lies along a portion 
of the front of the outpost, what may be done? (83.) 

122. What are the general rules concerning fires with 
the picket? (83.) 

123. What is required of the men composing the 
picket? — both infantry and cavalry. (83-84.) 

124. What should be done if a noise is heard from a 
neighboring picket? (83.) 

125. What do the supports constitute? (84.) 

126. What regulates the position of the supports, and 
what should be its general requirements? (84.) 

127. What arrangements should the commander of a 
support make with a view to defense? (84-85.) 

128. What is required of the men composing the sup- 
port? (85.) 

129. Describe a Cossack post. (85-86.) 

130. What are the disadvantages and advantages of 
Cossack posts? (86.) 

131. What does the reserve constitute, and of what 
does it generally consist? (89.) 

132. What considerations influence the selection of 
its position? (89.) 

133. Wliat rules obtain in regard to the men and 
horses of the reserve? (90.) 

134. When may the reserve be dispensed with? (90.) 

135. What is the advantage of the omission of the 
reserve, and why can it but rarely be omitted? (90.) 

126. What is the objection to retaining the cordon sys- 
tem at night? (90-91.) 

137. What system is generally adopted, in its essen- 
tial features, at night ; and on what is it based? (91.) 



266 APPENDIX II. 

138. Give the important details of the outpost system 
at night. (91-92.) 

139. In cavalry outposts, where are the pickets posted 
at night, and what precautions are taken? (92.) 

140. When the enemy is close at hand and aggressive, 
what may sometimes be advisable? (92.) 

141. When are the changes in the position of the out- 
post arranged and made? (92.) 

142. What change is made in the positions of the 
sentinels for night ? (92.) 

143. Describe the composition and duties of a visiting 
patrol. (94.) 

144. When are visiting patrols mainly used; what 
extent of front do they cover; and how far to the front do 
they go? (94-97.) 

145. What is the object of reconnoitering patrols? 
(97.) 

146. What is the size of reconnoitering patrols, and 
how far do they go beyond the line of sentinels? (97.) 

147. What patrols should be used at night, and what 
must be constantly varied in regard to them ? (97.) 

148. When is the duty of a reconnoitering patrol best 
performed? (97.) 

149. Wliat are patrolling posts? (98.) 

150. Describe the manner in which a patrolling post 
performs its duties. (98.) 

151. If the number of patrolling posts is such as to 
weaken the picket materially, what must be done? (98.) 

152. From what part of the outpost are strong patrols 
taken, and how do they vary in size? (99.) 

153. How far from the line of sentinels may a strong 
patrol advance, and how may it sometimes be used? (99.) 



OUTPOSTS. 267 

154. With what should the men detailed for outpost 
duty be supplied ? (100.) 

155. What should each officer detailed for outpost 
duty have? — each non-commissioned officer? (100.) 

156. Describe the posting- of the outpost, both in- 
fantry and cavalry. (100-101.) 

157. After the picket is posted, what does its com- 
mander do? (102.) 

158. When, at the close of the day's march, the ad- 
vance guard forms the outpost, what portions of it consti- 
tute the various parts of the outpost? (103.) 

159. Whenever practicable, what should be done to 
make an equitable division of sentinel duty? (103.) 

160. Describe the defense of an outpost. (104.) 

161. If the enemy is repulsed, by whom, and to what 
extent, is pursuit made ? (104.)- 

162. Soon after the repulse of the attack, what should 
be done? (104.) 

163. When knowledge of the enemy's approach is 
gained in time to admit of full preparation, how should he 
be received, and why? (105.) 

164. When should the pickets be under arms, and 
why? (105.) 

165. When is the outpost relieved, and why at this 
time? (105.) 

166. Describe the manner of relieving the outpost. 
(105-106.) 

167. How often are outposts relieved? (106.) 

168. If the army is on the march, when is the out- 
post relieved ? (106.) 

169. If the army is retreating, what does the outpost 
form? (106.) 



268 APPENDIX II. 

Reconnaissance. 

170. Under what three heads may reconnaissance be 
considered? (107.) 

171. By whose order, and how, is a reconnaissance in 
force made? (107-108.) 

172. How should information be sought from the pris- 
oners captured? (108.) 

173. What arms are especially valuable in a recon- 
naissance in force, and why? (108.) 

174. What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
making a reconnaissance in force in the evening; and what, 
in the morning? (108-109.) 

175. To what three serious objections is a reconnais- 
sance in force open? (109.) 

176. What is a special reconnaissance? (110-111.) 

177. How is an attempt upon a hostile picket carried 
out? (112.) 

178. How may a force employed on a special recon- 
naissance vary in size? (113.) 

179. How are patrols primarily divided, and how does 
each vary in size? (113.) 

180. Patrols are also classified as what kinds? — State 
briefly the duties of each. (114-116.) 

181. State what should be reported by an exploring 
patrol in regard to the following: Roads, railroads, bridges, 
rivers, woods, canals, telegraphs, villages, defiles, ponds 
and marshes, springs and rivulets, valleys, heights. (114- 
115-116.) 

182. What arm is generally best suited to patrolling; 
and why is the union of infantry and cavalry on this duty 
undesirable? (117.) 

183. What is the composition of a small infantry 
patrol? (117.) 



RECONNAISSANCE. 269 

184. Describe the preparation and inspection of a 
small infantry patrol, and describe the signals used. (117- 
118.) 

185. Every patrol should have what general forma- 
tion? (119-120.) 

186. What is the only definite rule that can be laid 
down for the formation of a patrol ? (120.) 

187. What considerations influence the distances and 
intervals between the members of a patrol, and what are 
generally the minimum and maximum distances? (120.) 

188. Of what should the point generally consist ; how 
are the signals to and from the commander transmitted; 
and how is the patrol assembled? (120-123.) 

189. Describe briefly how the patrol moves, and how 
it returns. (123.) 

190. What should the patrol do in regard to great 
roads? (123-124.) 

191. What is the general rule in regard to a patrol 
halting? (124.) 

192. If another patrol of the same army or any friendly 
force is met, what should be done? (124.) 

193. What should be done if a hostile patrol is dis- 
covered? (125.) 

194. What should be done if the patrol falls into an 
ambuscade, and what if a hostile sentinel or patrol is sud- 
denly encountered in the dark? (125.) 

195. What questions should be asked of civilians com- 
ing from the direction of the enemy, or whose neighborhood 
has been visited by hostile troops? (126.) 

196. What should be done in regard to rumors among 
the inhabitants of important movements by the enemy? 
(127.) ., i I , 



270 APPENDIX II. 

197. What should be done in regard to people going 
in the direction of the enemy? (128-129.) 

198. Give the general rules in regard to the selection 
and treatment of guides. (129.) 

199. Describe the manner of reconnoitering cross- 
roads, heights, denies, bridges, and fords. (129-130-131.) 

200. Describe the manner of reconnoitering woods, 
inclosures, and houses. (131.) 

201. Describe the manner of reconnoitering villages, 
cities, and towns. (132-133.) 

202. If the patrol is strong enough, what places in a 
village or city should it seize? (132.) 

203. What information may a patrol often gain from 
private letters? (132.) 

204. Describe the reconnaissance of the enemy in po- 
sition. (133-134.) 

205. Describe the reconnaissance of the enemy on the 
march. (134-135.) 

206. What indications are furnished by boats and 
bridges in the vicinity of the enemy? (135.) 

207. What indications are furnished by the flames 
and smoke of the enemy's camp-fires? (136.) 

208. What indications may be noted of the arrival 
and departure of troops? (136.) 

209. What indications are furnished by the whistling 
of locomotives, the hurrahing of troops, and the noise of 
explosions? (136.) 

210. Describe the noise made by troops on the march, 
and the distance at which the various arms can be 
heard. (137.) 

211. What indications are furnished by the reflec- 
tion from the weapons of marching troops? (137.) 

212. State the distances at which various objects 



RECONNAISSANCE. 27 1 

should be seen, on a clear day, by a man with good vision. 
(138.) 

213. Slate some of the conditions which cause an ob- 
ject to appear farther or nearer than it really is. (138.) 

214. What information may be gained from the trail 
of the enemy? (138-139.) 

215. What indications are furnished by an abandoned 
camp or bivouac? (139.) 

216. What inferences may be drawn from the manner 
and bearing of the inhabitants in a hostile country? (140.) 

217. When should reports be sent in, and what should 
be reported? (140.) 

218. How should a verbal report be sent, and when 
are such reports better than written ones? (140-141.) 

219. What are the indispensable qualities of a written 
report? (141.) 

220. As a rule, what is the general nature of the forma- 
tion of a strong infantry patrol ? (143.) 

221. How do the operations of an expeditionary pa- 
trol generally differ from a special reconnaissance? (143- 
144.) 

222. In general, how does an expeditionary patrol 
effect the capture of a sentinel? — of a patrol? — of pris- 
oners generally? (144.) 

223. When is the most favorable moment for ques- 
tioning prisoners, and why? (145.) 

224. What is the relative value of different grades of 
prisoners? (145.) 

225. If enlisted men are captured, what should they 
be questioned about? (146.) 

226. When the object is the destruction of roads, rail- 
roads, or telegraphs, or the tapping of a telegraph,, how 
should the expeditionary patrol act? (146.) 



272 APPENDIX II. 

227. When may harassing patrols be used, and what 
is their general method of operating? (147.) 

228. Describe the nature and duties of flank patrols. 
(148-149.) 

229. When may flank patrols be called covering pa- 
trols? (149.) 

230. Describe the manner in which an advance guard 
passes through a town. (149-150.) 

231. What are the essential differences between a 
cavalry and an infantry patrol? (154.) 

232. What cavalry soldiers should be selected for pa- 
trol duty, and what is required in their inspection? (154.) 

233. What general rule may be prescribed for the for- 
mation of a cavalry patrol, and how do the members of the 
patrol carry their firearms? (154-155.) 

234. How do the signals of a cavalry patrol differ from 
those of an infantry patrol, and what additional signals may 
be used on open ground? (155.) 

235. How does a cavalry patrol conduct itself at 
night? (155-156.) 

236. Why must a cavalry patrol move along turnpikes 
and good roads, and what precautions should it take? (156.) 

237. Wliy should the patrol commander adhere to the 
road selected? (156.) 

238. In what details of the reconnaissance of different 
kinds of ground do the operations of a cavalry patrol differ 
from those of an infantry patrol? (157.) 

239. If necessary to halt to feed or water, what places 
should be avoided, and what selected? (158.) 

240. Of what are connecting patrols always composed, 
and how do they operate? (159.) 

241. Describe the composition and duties of pursuing 
patrols. (160.) 



THE CAVALRY SCREEN. 273 

242. Why can cyclist patrols operate, on a favorable 
terrain, more effectively than patrols composed of infantry 
or cavalry? (160.) 

243. What is the usual elevation of a captive balloon, 
and what can be observed from that height? (162.) 

244. To what height can a captive balloon easily 
ascend, and at what height is it safe from hostile fire? (162.) 

245. What objection has been urged to the use of 
balloons on reconnaissance, why is this objection not a 
serious one, and what is the compensating advantage? (163.) 

The Cavalry Screen. 

246. W T hat may the cavalry screen be said to consti- 
tute? (166.) 

247. By what cavalry may the screening duty be per- 
formed, and which system would probably be adopted in 
the United States service? (166.) 

248. On what does the distance of the screen from the 
main army depend? (167.) 

249. How does the distance of the screen from the 
army change from the time the armies begin to concentrate 
until tactical operations begin? (168.) 

250. What are the two great objects of the cavalry 
screen? (168.) 

251. On what does the front of the screen depend, and 
what is the first consideration influencing it? (168-169.) 

252. What would be the average front of an American 
cavalry brigade in screening and reconnoitering? (169.) 

253. Draw a diagram representing an American cav- 
alry brigade on screening and reconnoitering duty. (170- 
171.) 



274 APPENDIX II. 

254. How may this formation be varied, if the enemy 
is at a distance, or lacking in aggressiveness ; and how, if he 
is close and enterprising? (171.) 

255. On what will the number of contact troops and the 
intervals between them depend? (171.) 

256. How much artillery should be attached to the 
brigade, and what would be its position under different cir- 
cumstances? (172.) 

257. When the brigade is marching on two parallel 
roads, where is the reserve? (172.) 

258. When the brigade is forced to march on a single 
road, what dispositions are made? (172-173.) 

259. When the ground permits, and no serious en- 
gagement is expected within the next twenty-four hours, 
what formation may be adopted? (175.) 

260. What rear guard is provided? (175.) 

261. Describe the formation of the cavalry screen, 
based upon the experience of the War of Secession. (176.) 

262. Why should the patrols sent out from the screen- 
ing force generally be small ; and what is the general rule 
for the size of a detachment? (179.) 

263. From what bodies are the scouting patrols taken, 
and about how many are usually employed? (180.) 

264. Describe Bonie's "points." (180.) 

265. How far out are patrols and detached scouts sent, 
and of what should a patrol always keep informed? (180.) 

266. In the movements of the patrols, to what is every- 
thing subordinated, and how do the patrols accordingly act? 
(181.) 

267. As a rule, what patrols are detailed for each of 
the main routes, and the flanks, and to whom are the lesser 
roads intrusted? (182.) 



THK CAVALRY SCREEN. 275 

268. When should a patrol sent out on a special mis- 
sion return? (183.) 

269. What precautions should the members of a patrol 
take in regard to papers on their persons? (183.) 

270. For what duty are officers' patrols especially val- 
uable; and in entering a village or town what should they 
do? (183.) 

271. Asa rule, the patrols, if driven in, will do what? 
(184.) 

272. Why must the duties of information be separated 
from those of security in the case of a- cavalry screen, and 
how is this separation usually effected? (185.) 

273. To whom is the information gained by the cav- 
alry screen transmitted? (185.) 

274. On gaining contact with the enemy, what is the 
first consideration, and what should be done? (186.) 

275. If the contact troops find themselves in the pres- 
'ence of large hostile bodies, advancing or deployed for 
battle, what should be done? (186-187.) 

276. Concentration effected, what should be done under 
different circumstances? (187.) 

277. Why should good cavalry never be surprised by 
a serious attempt of the enemy to break through the 
screen? (187.) 

278. If the cavalry is driven in by the enemy, on what 
does the direction of its retreat depend? (188.) 

279. How may the cavalry screen sometimes find it 
necessary to act as a veritable advance guard? (188.) 

280. In combating the opposing cavalry screen, when 
should the saber, and when the carbine, be used? (188.) 

281. Why must cavalry always be ready for effective 
fire action? (188.) 



276 APPENDIX II. 

282. What effect on the infantry has a good covering 
screen of cavalry ? (189-190.) 

283. How may the advanced cavalry be used to seize 
important points; and in this use, what are the prime 
considerations? (190.) 

284. Describe how the advanced cavalry furnishes and 
covers foraging parties. (191.) 

285. What determines the number of connecting posts, 
and of what does each generally consist? (192.) 

286. What changes are made in the strength and lo- 
cation of connecting posts in a dangerous country? (192.) 

287. How are dispatches received at, and forwarded 
from, a connecting post? (192-193.) 

288. When will connecting posts generally be found 
practicable, and what bodies must never establish them? 
(194.) 

289. Describe the formation of a regiment of cavalry 
as a screening force. (195.) 

290. Describe the alternative formation when a strong 
reserve is desirable. (195.) 

291. Give a summary of the general rules for the 
conduct of a cavalry screen. (196.) 

Rear Guards. 

292. How is the withdrawal of a defeated army cov- 
ered on the field of battle, and when does the duty of the 
rear guard begin ? (198.) 

293. Why is it that a retreating army can be pro- 
tected by a fraction of itself? (198.) 

294. Why must a rear guard be organized as soon as 
possible? (198.) 



REAR GUARDS. 277 

295. By what must the rear guard profit, and what 
two courses of action are then open to the enemy's choice? 
(198-199.) 

296. State the strength of the rear guard under vari- 
ous conditions, and the objections to having it too large 
or too small. (200.) 

297. What troops should be selected for the rear 
guard, and what should be done to raise their morale? (200- 
201.) 

298. When, and how, should offensive returns be 
made? (201.) 

299. W T hat qualities should be possessed by the com- 
mander of the rear guard, and (briefly) how should he con- 
duct its operations? (202.) 

300. In general terms, what is the distance of the main 
body from the rear guard; and what are the objections to 
having it too great or too small ? (202.) 

301. Describe the formation of the rear guard. (203.) 

302. Of what arms should the rear guard be com- 
posed? (203.) 

303. How many guns should there be with the rear 
guard, and what may their effective use do? (203.) 

304. How should the artillery of the rear guard be 
used, and what should be done if it becomes necessary to 
abandon the guns ? (203-204.) 

305. How should cavalry be used with the rear guard? 
(204.) 

306. How are the several arms arranged in a rear 
guard composed of all arms? (205.) 

307. What should be done with the baggage of the 
rear guard? (205.) 

308. Draw a diagram representing a company of in- 
fantry as a rear guard. (207.) 



278 APPENDIX II 

309. Draw a diagram representing a troop of cavalry 
as a rear guard. (209.) 

310. Describe the withdrawal of the rear guard from 
action. (206.) 

311. What precautions should be taken to insure the 
right road being followed by the rear guard? (206.) 

312. Why must the flanks of a rear guard be guarded 
with especial care, and what provision is made for pro- 
tecting them from surprise? (206-207.) 

313. If the two armies are of approximately equal 
strength, why should the rear guard have, at first, an 
advantage over the opposing advance guard; and why does 
not this advantage continue? (211.) 

314. In regard to what is the pursuing army always 
in doubt? (211.) 

315. What advantage has the rear guard over the 
pursuing force in regard to the ground? (212.) 

316. What topographical features afford good posi- 
tions for the rear guard; and on what will the amount of 
resistance at each stand depend? (212.) 

317. To what extent should the commander-in-chief 
supervise the operations of the rear guard? (212.) 

318. What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
having an intermediate body between the main body and 
the rear guard? (213.) 

319. Why must contact with the pursuing force be 
preserved ? (214.) 

320. If the pursuit seems to slacken or cease, how is 
contact maintained, and what will often be necessary to 
ascertain the nature of the pursuit? (215.) 

321. Why do defiles offer good opportunities to an 
energetic pursuer and to an able rear-guard commander? 
(215.) 



SPIES. 279 

322. How may a defile be defended at the entrance? 
(215.) 

323. How may a defile be defended at the outlet? (216.) 

324. What measures of the rear guard may be classi- 
fied as positive; and what, as negative? (216.) 

325. Describe some of the most important negative 
measures that may be taken. (217.) 

326. What should be doue with stragglers, and with 
the sick and wounded, with the rear guard? (218.) 

327. At each halt, what is done by the rear guard? 
(219.) 

328. How is the rear guard relieved when practicable? 
(219.) 

329. When an army is retreating by several parallel 
roads, how are the rear guards formed and commanded? 

(219.; 

330. If retreating by a single road, when may second- 
ary rear guards be of use? (220.) 

331. When the line of retreat is changed, what may be 
done with the rear guard? (220.) 

332. How may a rear guard be used in a retrograde 
movement which is not a retreat? (220.) 

333. In what respects are the duties of a rear guard 
easier in a friendly than in a hostile country? (221.) 

334. Describe the duties of the rear guard in a forward 
march. (221-222.) 

Spies. 

335. Into what two classes may spies be primarily 
divided, and what may often be the characteristics of each? 
(223.) 

336. When are the services of spies most valuable? 

(224.) 



280 APPENDIX II. 

337. From what people should spies be selected? (224.) 

338. What qualities should a spy possess, and how 
should he be tested if practicable? (225.) 

339. How may compulsory spies be used in certain 
extraordinary cases? (225-226.) 

340. What are double spies; what precautions should 
be taken against them; how may they be punished; and 
how may they be utilized? (226-227.) 

341. What precautions should be taken in regard to 
messages intrusted to a spy? (227.) 

342. How may a check be kept on one spy by the em- 
ployment of others? (228.) 

343. How should a spy be conducted from camp, how 
should he be received when he comes in, and how should 
he be treated? (228-229.) 

344. State the questions of general application to 
which spies should be required to find answers. (229.) 

345. What measures may be taken to establish the 
identity of a spy? (230.) 

346. How may spies remaining in a certain locality 
convey information ? (230.) 

347. When the presence of the enemy's spies is sus- 
pected, what should be done? (231.) 

348. What people should be especial objects of sus- 
picion in a camp or bivouac? (231-232.) 

349. How may a spy often be detected? (232.) 

350. When a spy is captured, how should he be 
searched? (232.) 

351. What qualifications are requisite for the man- 
agement of the secret service of an army? (232.) 



INDIAN SCOUTING. 28 1 

Newspapers. 

352. Under what conditions only should a corre- 
spondent be allowed to accompany an army? (233.) 

353. What are the duties of a press censor? (233.) 

354. How may correspondents sometimes be utilized 
to lead the enemy into error ? (235.) 

355. When a newspaper has incurred the displeasure 
of the commander by the nature of its correspondence, 
upon whom should the punishment fall? (235.) 

Orientation and Map-Reading. 

356. What is orientation? (236.) 

357. Describe the method of orientation by means of 
the compass. (236.) 

358. Describe the methods of orientation by means of 
observation of the sun. (236-237.) 

359. How are the points of the compass indicated by 
the moon in the different quarters? (238.) 

360. Describe how an observer could orient himself 
by means of the North Star. (239.) 

361. Describe the method of orientation by map. (239.) 

362. Describe the means of orientation by indica- 
tions. (239-240.) 

363. Describe how practice in map-reading may be 
obtained. (240.) 

Indian Scouting. 

364. Describe the ordinary methods of an Apache com- 
pany in the field against hostile Indians. (242-243.) 

365. How far out do the Sioux push their advance 
guard and flankers, and what do the scouts do? (244.) 



282 APPENDIX II. 

366. Describe some of the expedients adopted by 
Sioux scouts to obtain concealment. (244-245.) 

367. How does the Sioux scout execute long-distance 
reconnoitering? (245.) 

368. What places do the Indian scouts seek as look- 
outs, and what are their methods in regard to ridges, en- 
closed places, etc.? (245.) 

369. Where do the Sioux place their camps, and what 
do they do if attacked and driven out? (245-246.) 

370. Describe the tactics of the Sioux. (246.) 

Advance Guard Drill. 

371. Describe the commands and movements by which 
a company of infantry is formed as an advance guard. (249- 
250.) 

372. Describe the commands and movements by which 
a battalion of infantry is formed as an advance guard. (251.) 

373. Describe the commands and movements by which 
two battalions of infantry are formed as an advance guard. 
(251-252.) 

374. Describe the commands and movements by which 
an advance guard of infantry is assembled. (252.) 

375. How is a rear guard formed? (253.) 

376. Describe the commands and movements by which 
a troop of cavalry is formed as an advance guard. (254-255- 
256.) 

377. How is an advance guard of cavalry assembled? 
(256.) 



INDKX. 283 

INDEX. 



Advance guard, 22; objects of, 22; strength of, 23; how divided, 27; 

typical formations of, 27, 31, 38; distance of, from main body, 31; 

of all arms, 43; important rules for the formation of the, 46; 

encountering the enemy, 46; of a division, 48; of an army corps, 

53; in retreat, 55; passing through a town, 149; drill (infantry), 

249; drill (cavalry), 253. 
Alexander, Gen. E. P., quoted, 163. 
American wan of 1775-'83, 86. 
Andre, Major, the spy, 223. 
Apaches, as scouts, 242. 
Archduke Charles, spies of, 231. 

Army, taken by surprise, 17; condition of, after defeat, 197. 
Army corps, advance guard of, 53. 
Artillery, with the advance guard, 43; with the outpost, 69; with the 

cavalry screen, 172; with the rear guard, 203. 
Ash, Captain, gallant exploit of, 112. 
Ashby, Col. Turner, as a spy, 223. 
Atlanta campaign, 109. 

Babcock, Major J. B., on cavalry screen, 176. 

Baker's battalion of 2d U. S. Cavalry, 247. 

Balaklava, Turkish posts at, 111. 

Balloon reconnaissance, 161. 

Banks, Gen. N. P., 61. 

Barnes, Lieut.-Col., reconnaissance by, 110. 

Beaujeu, retires from the Monongahela, 214. 

Benedict, Gen., unfortunate outpost position chosen by, 61 

Big Bethel, mutual retreat of combatants from, 214. 

Black'burn*s Ford, action at, 109. 

Blenker's division as a rear guard, 200. 

Bloody Knife, the scout, 245. 

Blueher, night attack of, at Laon, 56. 

Boguslawski, remarks of, on cavalry screen, 57, 189. 

Bonie, Col., on the front of the cavalry screen, 169; patrol system of. 

180; on German scouts, 181. 
Boonsboro, rear guard action at, 201. 
Braddock, Gen., retreats from the Monongahela, 214. 
Bridges, reconnaissance of, 114, 131. 
Bronsart von Schellendorf, 116; on the press during the war, 234. 



284 INDEX. 

Buford, Gen. John, report of, 127; cavalry of, in Gettysburg cam- 
paign, 168, 188. 
Bugeaud, Marshal, outpost system of, 91; on compulsory spies, 225. 
Bull Kun, reconnaissance at, 109; retreat from, 200. 

Campbell, the spy, 227. 

Camping places, always noted, 116. 

Canals, reconnaissance of, 115. 

Card, the brothers, spies, 228. 

Cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, 69; an expensive arm, 69; 
advance guards, composed of, 38; with the outpost, 67; in recon- 
naissance in force, 108; Fifth U. S., 112; the arm for patrolling, 
117; patrols, differ from infantry, 154; how composed and how 
inspected, 154; signals used by, 155; conduct of patrols at 
night, 155. 

Cavalry screen, composition of, 166; distance of, from the army, 167; 
frontage of, 168; formation of, 169; separation of duties of secur- 
ity and information in, 185; transmission of intelligence in, 185; 
contact and fighting, 186; protecting the infantry, 189; seizing 
important points, 190; foraging by, 191; connecting posts with, 
192; regiment as, 194; conclusions in regard to the, 196. 

Chihuahua, Wool's expedition against, 19. 

Cities, reconnaissance of, 133. 

Clausewitz, on retreats, 197. 

Clery, examples given by, of outpost strength, 64. 

Cold Harbor, 52. 

Colombey, battle of, 24. 

Commander, the duty of a, 17; of the advance guard, 36; of the out- 
post, 71; of the picket, 101; of the vanguard, 35; of the rear 
guard, 202. 

Compliments, 38, 90. 

Connecting files, 28, 41. 

Connecting posts, 192. 

Connecting sentinels, 78. 

Cooke, Gen. P. St. G. s 166. 

Cordon system of outposts, 61. 

Cossacks, covering detachments of, 165; annoy French rear 
guard, 204. 

Cossack posts, 85, 101. 

Cox, Gen. J. D., ingenious disposition of advance guard by, 46. 

Crimea, the, unknown to the Allies, 19. 

Crook, Gen. Geo., march of from Fort Fetterman, 244. 

Cross-roads, reconnaissance of, 130, 



INDEX. 285 

Crown Prince of Prussia, 109. 

Cultivated ground, reconnaissance of, 116. 

Custer, Gen. Geo. A., defeats Rosser, 184; news of defeat by the 

Indians, 128. 
Cyclists, employment of, 28. 
Cyclist patrols, 160. 

Davoust's use of cavalry, 165. 

De Cissey, Gen., attacks German patrols, 184. 

Defensive positions, should be noted, 116. 

De Fezensac, at Smolensk, 201. 

Defiles, reconnaissance of, 115, 130; defense of, 215. 

Deserters, how received at outpost, 75. 

Early, Gen. J. A., in Shenandoah Valley, 184. 

Enemy in position, reconnaissance of, 133; on the march, reconnais- 
sance of, 134. 
Engineers with advance guard, 44. 
Eugene, perilous march of, 126. 
Ewell's Corps, capture of, 214. 
Examining posts, 78; when they may be of use, 79. 

Firing, by sentinels, 76. 

Fires, with picket, 83; with support, 85; with reserve, 90. 

Fisher's Hill, battle of, 184. 

Flags of truce, 76, 79. 

Flank guards, 54. 

Flanking groups, 28. 

Fleurus, battle of, 161. 

Fords, reconnaissance of, 115, 131. 

Forey's division, defeats Stadion's corps, 109. 

Forrest's cavalry as rear guard, 200. 

Forton's surprise at Vionville, 56. 

Franco-German War, advance guards in, 24. 

Franklin, Tenn., advance guard entering, 150. 

Frederick the Great, 17. 

French cavalry patrols, ingenious expedient of, 156. 

General staff, Bronsart von Schellendorf's "Duties of the," 20. 

Gettysburg, Army of the Potomac at, 197. 

Giulay, Count, 109. 

Grant, Gen. U. S., 52; gets possession of Johnston's plans, 224. 



286 INDKX. 

Grant's Virginia campaign, 20. 

Gravelotte, Germans at, 198. 

Guides, employment and treatment of, 129. 

Hale, Gapt., the spy, 223. 

Halts, of the advance guard, 37; of rear guard, 219. 

Hancock, Gen. W. S., enabled to receive Long-street's attack, 145. 

Hardee, Capt, surrenders to Mexicans, 158. 

Hardee, Gen. W. J., at Hoover's Gap, 190. 

Heights, reconnaissance of, 116, 130. 

Henry, General Guy V., formation of regimental screen devised 

by, 195. 
Heth, Gen. H. s held in check by Buford, 188. 

Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince Kraft zu, on German scouts, 182. 
Hooker, Gen. J., 166. 
Hoover's Gap, battle of, 190. 
Horse artillery, in reconnaissance in force, 108; with cavalry 

screen, 173. 
Hospital troops, 48. 
Houses, reconnaissance of, 131. 

Howard, Gen. O. O., orders special reconnaissance, 113. 
Humphreys, Gen., quoted, 145; defeats Gordon, 214. 
Hurlbut, Gen., at Memphis, 224. 

Inclosures, reconnaissance of, 131. 

Indian scouting, 242. 

Infantry patrols, small, their composition, 117; preparation and 
inspection of, 117; signals used by, 119; formation of, 119; con- 
duct of, 123; encountering the enemy, 124; meeting inhabitants, 
126; employing guides, 129; strong, 142. 

Information, the indispensable basis of military plans, 18; the kinds 
of, necessary for a commander, 18; lack of, in Mexican war, 19; 
how gained, 19. 20. 

Inhabitants, how questioned, 126. 

Jackson, Gen. Andrew, harassing patrols used at New Orleans 

By, 148. 
Jackson, Gen. "Stonewall," 167. 
Jena, pursuit after battle of, 197. 
Johnston, Gen. J. E., on condition of his army, Bull Run, 197; retreat 

of, to Jackson, Miss., 218. 
Jomini, on reconnaissance, 107. 



INDEX. 287 

Katzlef's contact squadrons, 165. 

Kenesaw Mountain, reconnaissance at, 110. 

Koniggriitz, Prussians at, 198. 

Kntusoff, retires from Malo-Jaroslawitz, 214. 

Laon, Marmont's neglect at, 56. 

Lee, Gen. Fitzhugh, 52, 201. 

Lee, Gen. R. E„ 52, 133, 183, 214. 

Lee, Col. W. H. F., at Boonsboro, 201. 

Lewal, "Gen., on German spies, 231. 

Ligne, Prince de, on double spies, 227. 

Line of observation, by whom occupied, 58; regulates position of 

picket, 82. 
Lomax, Gen., defeated by Merritt, 184. 
Longstreet, Gen., attack by, at The Wilderness, 145; precaution of 

in regard to a written order, 183. 
Lyon, Gen. Nathaniel, 223. 

MacArthur, Major A., jr., reconnaissance by, 110. 

McClellan, Gen. G. B., testimony of, before Committee on the Con- 
duct of the War, 19; obtains Lee's orders, 183; at Malvern Hill, 
212; secret service of, 232. 

McDowell, Gen. I.. 109. * 

MacMahon, Marshal, march of to the relief of Bazaine, 127, 233. 

Malo-Jaroslawitz, mutual flight of combatants from, 214. 

Map-reading, 240. 

Marmont, Marshal, on marches, 22; his negligence at Laon, 56; in 
1814, 168. 

Mars-la-Tour, battle of, 32, 186. 

Mason, Lieut., killed, 158. 

Massena's retreat from Portugal, 211. 

Mam-ice, Col. F., on Art of War, 242. 

Merritt, Gen. W., on cavalry screen, 176; defeats Lomax, 183. 

Milaradowitch, cuts in between main body and rear guard of the 
French, 214. 

Military Intelligence, bureau of, 19. 

Monongahela, mutual flight of combatants from the, 214. 

Montebello, battle of, 109. 

Montecuculi, on spies, 223. 

Monterey, Taylor's movement on, 19. 

Moore, Col., 99. 

Moore, Sir John, at Coruna, 212; directs the movements of his rear 
guard, 212. 



288 INDEX. 

Moreau, Gen., receives intelligence of Jourdan's reverses, 233. 
Moscow, French annoyed by Cossacks on retreat from, 204. 
Murat, enjoined to capture prisoners, 145; screening duty by, 164; 
beaten back by Russian rear guards, 199. 

Nancy, entered by Uhlans, 158. 

Napoleon, remarks of, 45, 199; his army covered by a screen of cav- 
alry, 165; directions to Marmont, 168; retires from Malo-Jarosla- 
witz, 214. 

Nashville, Confederate retreat from, 200. 

Negative measures of rear guard, 216. 

Newspaper correspondents, trouble caused by, 233; conditions re- 
quired of, 233; how utilized, 235; how punished, 235. 

Ney, Marshal, in retreat from Moscow, 199; at Smolensk, 201; mis- 
take of at Ceira, 211; compels Wellington to deploy at Re- 
dinha, 212. 

Observation, line of, regulates position of pickets, 82. 

Outposts, definition of, 56; diasters resulting from neglect of, 56: 
duties of, 57; subdivisions of, 58; two systems of, 61; position of, 
61; strength of, 63; composition of, 64; distance of the, from the 
main body, 70; at night, 90; Bugeaud's system, 91; patrols, 94; 
posting the, 100; relieving the, 100; defense of the, 104. 

Orange Court House, reconnaissance toward, 111. 

Orientation, 236; by compass, 236; by sun, 236; by moon, 238; by 
North Star, 239; by map, 239; by indications, 239. 

Paris, German pickets at siege of, 82. 

Patrol system of outposts, 61. 

Patrolling, 97; patrolling posts, 98. 

Patrols, outpost, 94; visiting, 94, 114; reconnoitering, 94, 116; small, 

97, 117; strong, 97, 99, 142; officers', 114, 182, 183; covering, 114, 

133; connecting, 116, 159; exploring, 114; harassing, 116, 147; 

expeditionary, 116, 143; pursuing, 116, 160; flank, 148; cyclist, 

160; with cavalry screen, 179. 
Picket, strength of, 80; front of, 81; requirements of good position 

for, 82; posting the, 100; under arms, 105. 
Picket commander, duties of, 101. 
Picket firing, in War of Secession, 77. 
Picket sentinel, 78. 
Pierron, Gen., on Cossack posts, 86. 
Pleasant Hill, battle of, 61. 

Pleasonton, Gen. Alfred, screening duty by, 166. 
Ponds and marshes, reconnaissance of, 115. i 



INDEX. 289 

Pont-a-Mousson, capture of German patrol at, 158. 

Posts, examining, 78; detached, 80. 

Prentiss, Gen., 99. 

Prisoners, questioned, 108; examination of, at Wilderness, 145; 
Napoleon enjoins their capture, 145; when questioned, 145; dif- 
ferent values of, 145. 

Railroads, reconnaissance of, 114; destruction of, 146. 

Rear guard, when its duties begin, 198; strength of, 198; morale of 
the, must be raised, 200; offensive returns of, 201; commander of, 
202; distance of, from the main body, 202; formation and com- 
position of, 203; withdrawal of, from action, 206; communication 
of, with main body, 206; protection of the flanks of, 206; conduct 
of, 211; must preserve contact with the enemy, 214; negative 
measures of, 216; sick and wounded with, 218; retreating by par- 
allel roads, 219; when line of retreat is changed, 220; in retro- 
grade movement not a retreat, 220; in a friendly country, 221; in 
a hostile country, 221; on a forward march, 221. 

Reconnaissance, how primarily performed, 21; kinds of, 107; in 
force, 107; special, 110. 

Report, of exploring patrol, 116; of small infantry patrol, 140; indis- 
pensable qualities of a, 141; form of a, 142. 

Reserve, of advance guard, 28; of outpost, 89. 

Rivers, reconnaissance of, 115. 

Roads, reconnaissance of, 114; destruction of, 146; obstruction of, 217. 

Rodman, Lieut. John B. } 128. 

Rosebud, battle of, 246. 

Rosecrans, Gen. W. S., moves against Bragg, 190. 

Rosser, Gen. T. L., defeated by Custer, 184. 

Running guard, 77. 

Riistow, intermediate body recommended by, 213. 

Sabine Cross Roads, battle of, 61, 167. 

Sailor's Creek, battle, of 214. 

Salamanca, battle of, 139. 

Saxe, Marshal, on spies, 223. 

Scouts, cavalry, 154, 156; Apache, 242; Sioux, 244. 

Secret Service, requirements of, 232. 

Sentinels, how posted, 73; their duties, 74; who may cross the line 

of, 75; connecting, 78; picket, 78. 
Shaw, on scouts, 156. 
Shenandoah Valley, roads in, 177. 



29O INDEX. 

Sheridan, Gen. P. H., on condition of the cavalry of the Army of the 
Potomac, 69; gains information of the condition of the Confed- 
erate army, 133; employment of spies by, 227, 228; screening 
duty by, 166, 167; defeats Early at Tom's Brook, 184, 186; cuts 
off Confederate rear guard, 214. 

Sherman, Gen. W. T., 113; on Johnston's retreat, 218. 

Shiloh, carelessness of U. S. outposts' at, 56; reconnaissance be- 
fore, 99. 

Signals, use of, by the advance guard, 37; by patrols, 119. 

Signs and trails, 135. 

Sioux, their camps, 245; scouts, 244. 

Sitting Bull's camp, 245. 

Smith, Gen. Kirby, 167. 

Smolensk, rear guard action at, 201. 

Smyrna Camp Ground, reconnaissance at, 113, 189. 

Solferino, reconnaissance before the battle of, 127. 

Spicheren, battle of, 24, 183; retreat from, 184. 

Spies, military and civilian, 223; compulsory, 225; double, 226; how 
detected, 232; how searched, 232. 

Spottsylvania, 52. 

Springs and rivulets, reconnaissance of, 115. 

Stadion's corps, reconnaissance by, 109. 

Staff officer with the advance guard, 36. 

Stanley, Gen. D. S., special reconnaissance by, 113. 

Stedman, Fort, capture of, 76. 

Stoneman, Gen. Geo., 166, 167. 

Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., screening duty by, 166. 

Stulpnagel's advance guard, 32. 

Support, of advance guard, 27, 41; of outpost, 84. 

Sykes' regulars, cover retreat from Bull Run, 200. 

Taylor, Gen. R. s report of, to Kirby Smith, 167. 

Taylor, Gen. Z., movement of, on Monterey, 19. 

Telegraphs, reconnaissance of, 115. 

Terrain, influence of the, on formation of the advance guard, 45. 

Thomas, Gen. G. H. 5 191. 

Thornton, Captain, capture of, 158. 

Tom's Brook, battle of, 184, 186. 

Torbert, Gen., 52. 

Towns, reconnaissance of, 133. 

Trench, Chenevix, on frontage of cavalry screen, 168. 

Truce, flag of, how received, 76, 79. 

Tyler, Gen., reconnaissance by, 109. 

Uhlans, enter Nancy, 158; annoy the French columns, 181. 



INDEX. 291 

Valleys, reconnaissance of, 115. 
Van Mulken, on outposts, 56. 
Tauban, at siege of Luxembourg - , 125. 
V T edettes, bow posted, 73. 
Vibray, German cavalry stopped at, 189. 
Victorio, skill of, in selecting positions, 244. 
Villages, reconnaissance of, 115, 132. 
Vionville, Forton's surprise at, 06. 
Von Decker, on women as spies, 224. 

Von der Goltz, on advance guards, 24; on cavalry, 165; on news- 
papers in war, 234. 
Von Moltke, receives news of MacMahon's marcb, 233. 
Von Scbmidt, quoted, 188. 
Von Valentini, on American outpost duty, 86. 
Von Witzleben, on orientation, 236. 

Walker, Gen. J. B., 183. 

Waterloo, pursuit after battle of, 197. 

W^aumadaka-Wanicb, conveys news of Custer's defeat, 128. 

Weissenburg, battle of, 189. 

Wellington, pursues tbe Frencb after Salamanca, 139; compelled to 

deploy at Redinba, 212. 
Wiasma, battle of, 214. 

Wilder's mounted infantry at Hoover's Gap, 190. 
Wilderness, battle of, 52, 145. 

Wilkinson, Gen., marcb of, against Montreal, 220. 
Wolseley, Lord, on rear guard duty, 221; on spies, 230- 
Woods, reconnaissance of, 115, 131. 
'Worth, battle of, 24, 109, 189. 
Wright, Gen. H. G., 52. 



Organization and Tactics 

. . . BY . . . 

ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 

Captain 6th Infantry, U. S. Army; Instructor in the Art of War at the 
U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School. 

¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 

CONTENTS. 

Introduction. — Organization and Discipline. — Characteristics of the 
Three Arms. — Historical Sketch of Modern Infantry. — Infantry in 
Attack and Defense. — Historical Sketch of Modern Cavalry. — Cavalry 
in Attack and Defense. — Historical Sketch of Field Artillery. -Ar- 
tillery in Attack and Defense. — The Three Arms Combined. — Convoys. 
— The Transportation of an Army Corps. — Space and Time Required 
in Formations and Marches. —Recent Changes in European Infantry 
Tactics. 

¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 

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officially recommended by the War Department for the use of officers in 
preparing for examination for promotion. 

¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 

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" 'Organization and Tactics' gives the gist of what has been discussed, worked 
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Military Letters 
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MARS-LA-TOUR, by Major Kaehler. (German 

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Catechism of Outpost Duty 

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ADVANCE GUARD, REAR GUARD, AND RECONNAISSANCE, By ARTHUR 
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
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